Reforming the tax incentive structure in Sri Lanka

Originally appeared on Daily FT

By Roshan Perera, Thashikala Mendis, and Janani Wanigaratne

The second tranche of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was delayed as the country failed to meet some of the program targets including the Government revenue target. This prompted the IMF in their latest review to reiterate the need to “strengthen tax administration, remove tax exemptions, and actively eliminate tax evasion” to ensure revenue is collected as per the program targets. This requires intense efforts by the Government if the country is to achieve sustainable macroeconomic stability.

Corporate Income Tax (CIT) in Sri Lanka has the potential to significantly contribute to Government revenue. However, CIT performance has been dismal with collection averaging around 1% of GDP over the last two decades although economic growth averaged around 4% during the corresponding period. It peaked at 1.9% in 2022 due to some one-off taxes.1 Compared to other countries in the region as well, CIT collection in Sri Lanka has been abysmally low (see Figure 1).

Further, CIT collection is concentrated in a few sectors in the economy. The 230 companies listed in the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) for financial year 2019/20 account for around 25% of total corporate income tax collection. However, financial services, food & beverages, and telecommunications account for a disproportionate share of taxes (see Figure 2). Sectors such as wholesale and retail trade, real estate and transportation which account for more than 25% of GDP, contribute less than 2% in CIT. Tax holidays and concessionary tax rates to selected sectors have eroded the CIT tax base, leading to lower CIT revenue collection. Ad hoc tax concessions complicate tax administration, distort resource allocation and provide opportunities for rent seeking and corruption.

Tax incentives

With the liberalisation of the economy in 1977 and the shift to a more export oriented development strategy, the Government sought to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering attractive tax incentives, first under the GCEC Act No. 4 of 1978 and subsequently the Board of Investment (BOI) of Sri Lanka from 1992. Tax incentives were also offered under the Inland Revenue Act. The enactment of the Strategic Development Projects (SDP) Act, No. 14 of 2008 permitted the Minister in charge of investment the discretion to grant incentives to projects deemed of strategic importance with only subsequent ratification by Cabinet and Parliament.

The lack of clear criteria of what constitutes a “strategic development project” in the SDP Act and the discretion given to the Minister to decide on what constituted a “strategic” project led to generous tax holidays and incentives granted to projects that were not in any sense strategic (see Table 1 for a list of projects granted under the SDP Act). Furthermore, tax concessions under the Act have been awarded to projects that are not purely foreign funded, violating one of the core objectives of this Act, which is to attract foreign investment.

The operation of multiple tax jurisdictions has led to an overlap of tax incentives, obscuring the process of monitoring the overall benefits and costs of tax incentives provided. Lack of transparency and well-defined criteria as well as poor evaluation of projects has led to the granting of tax incentives without proper justification, leading to large revenue losses.

Transparency, availability and accessibility of information regarding companies that have received tax incentives, especially under the BOI Act, are limited3. In light of this, the IMF diagnostic report has highlighted the need for a more transparent data sharing protocol.

The case of Port City

More recently the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act, No. 11 of 2021 was given the authority to grant tax incentives within the Port City.

The CPC Act grants incentives to businesses that are identified as strategically important. Extraordinary Gazette 2343/604 lists several industries as strategically important. Even though the Act provides a descriptive definition of a business of strategic importance, the rationalisation for these industries to be selected for special incentives is unclear. Especially as some of these industries already exist in Sri Lanka, which puts them at a disadvantage. Moreover, under section (4) subregulation (3) of the Extraordinary gazette 2343/60, one of the criteria for granting incentives is the ability of the business to demonstrate to the Port City Commission the potential contribution to Sri Lanka’s economy and social development by fostering innovation, knowledge transfer, technology transfer, research and development. This criteria is vague and subjective, thus allowing the Commission to grant incentives at its discretion.

Granting incentives often leads to differential tax treatment creating an unlevel playing field. While an entity in an already established industry within the country located within the CPC is provided generous tax incentives, the firm located outside is subject to the normal taxes operating in the rest of the country. Such differential treatment could create labour market distortions, as the employees in the Port City benefit from tax exemptions.

Sri Lanka has not been able to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) despite the plethora of incentives offered. It is questionable whether we can expect different results by applying the same failed strategy with the Colombo Port City. For instance, out of 74 land plots, only 6 were leased so far, and even those have not yet materialised.

To improve the performance of CIT, reforming the existing incentive structure is critical.

Improving investment environment

Evidence suggests that tax incentives are not the most important factor attracting FDI. Rather investors prioritise factors such as macroeconomic stability, access to skilled labour, and quality infrastructure facilities when making investment decisions. Therefore, shifting focus from relying on tax incentives to creating a favourable macroeconomic environment and policy consistency while providing the necessary resources and infrastructure will be more important to attracting investments. This will reduce distortions in the economy while ensuring the Government’s revenue base is protected.

Renegotiating tax incentives

Given the weak fiscal position of the country and the debt restructuring exercise being carried out at present, a similar exercise to renegotiate existing tax incentives may be warranted. Rationalising existing tax incentives would widen the tax base and enable lowering corporate tax rates.

Centralising tax incentives

If tax incentives are to be granted it should be done by a centralised authority. This authority should be able provide justification for granting special tax incentives by carrying out a cost benefit analysis. Clear objectives and proper criteria for granting incentives should be established and the authority held accountable for monitoring the progress of the investments to ensure the objectives of the investment are fulfilled. Failure to meet the objectives should lead to an immediate cancellation of the incentives granted. To ensure transparency, all incentives granted should require Cabinet and Parliamentary approval and information on incentives granted made publicly available through gazette notices. Sunset clauses will ensure that incentives have a limited timeframe and are periodically reviewed.

Conducting tax expenditure analysis

Tax expenditure refers to concessions such as tax exemptions, deductions, concessionary tax rates, etc. granted to specific industries or entities. While typically a government budget provides estimates of government revenue, tax expenditures are rarely reported. However, given the generous tax incentives offered it is vital to ensure the costs and benefits of tax expenditures are properly accounted for. Conducting regular tax expenditure analysis will enable comprehensive cost benefit analysis to evaluate the potential revenue loss and the expected economic benefits of tax incentives. Moreover, it is essential to carry out regular assessments to ascertain whether the revenue loss resulting from tax exemptions is justified by the employment, GDP contribution, and economic impact of these projects.

Global Minimum Tax 5

When tax incentives and holidays are granted, it should be ensured that their rates are not lower than the rate recommended by the Global Minimum Tax (GMT). This is an agreement introduced by the OECD/G20 in October 2021, with the purpose of establishing a minimum tax rate of 15% for large multinational companies. It allows countries with taxable parent companies of Multinational Enterprises (MNE) to impose a top-up tax on the profits of any foreign subsidiary that pays an effective rate less than 15%. It also allows the host country where the MNE subsidiary carries out its activities to charge a top-up tax rate on subsidiaries, if the home country of the parent company imposes a CIT rate less than 15%. So even if the countries are free to grant tax holidays and incentives with a CIT rate lower than 15%, the agreement grants the taxing rights to either the FDI exporting countries or the countries in which the MNE subsidiaries are operated. Therefore the MNEs would not be benefitted by lower rates as they will be taxed by either country.

The countries that do not adopt this GMT rule would lose out on tax income as the other countries will adjust their domestic tax rules to top up undertaxed profits. This proposal has already been strongly backed by 130 countries. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka was one of the nine countries that did not agree to this proposal.

The country is struggling to meet its revenue targets. The potential of CIT as a significant source of revenue has not been not fully exploited. A plethora of tax incentives granted under numerous agencies have seriously eroded the tax base. Reversing these trends are vital for restoring fiscal sustainability and enabling the Government to promote sustainable and inclusive growth.

Footnotes:

1This is due to the imposition of a retrospective one-time surcharge tax of 25% on individuals, companies, and partnerships with a taxable income exceeding 2 billion for the 2020/2021 tax assessment year.

2Based on the taxes paid by around 230 listed companies on the Colombo Stock Exchange in 2019/2020.

3Information on projects granted under the SDP Act are publicly available through gazette notices which are mandatory. This is unlike projects granted incentives under the BOI Act which are not publicly available. An RTI filed to extract this information was also not responded to by the relevant authority.

4http://documents.gov.lk/files/egz/2023/8/2343-60_E.pdf

5World Bank, 2023, “Can the global minimum tax agreement reduce tax breaks in East Asia?” https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/can-global-minimum-tax-agreement-reduce-tax-breaks-east-asia#:~:text=In%20October%202021%2C%20the%20G20,to%20be%20implemented%20in%202024.

(Roshan Perera is a Senior Research Fellow at Advocata Institute. She can be contacted via roshananne@gmail.com. Thashikala Mendis is a Data Analyst at Advocata Institute. She can be contacted via thashikala@advocata.org. Janani Wanigaratne is a Research Consultant at Advocata Institute. She can be contacted via janani.advocata@gmail.com.

The opinions expressed are the writers’ own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.)

SL slides down to 115 on Global Soft Power Index

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Global research outfit Brand Finance ranks countries by considering each country as a brand through the Global Soft Power Index. Sri Lanka’s brand results as a nation were released in partnership with the Sri Lanka Institute of Marketing (SLIM) last week and the country was ranked 115th out of 121 countries – a steep drop of 42 positions from ranking at 73 on the index in 2022.

Below us are Iraq, Laos, Trinidad, Uganda, Guatemala, and Zimbabwe. This survey was conducted globally with more than 11,000 samples. SLIM has to be appreciated for taking such an initiative at a very difficult time for Sri Lanka. A country’s perception and brand image are very important, especially when it comes to ‘Country of Origin’ status in global trade. The same matters in tourism and many other income-generating activities.

Brand strength of a country is determined under eight key themes and sub categories for each key pillar:

Business and trade

Governance

International relations

Culture and heritage

Media and communication

Education and science

People and values

Sustainable future

It is said that “perception is reality”. In simple terms, though we may feel that we do not deserve to be ranked 115th, outsiders do not perceive us positively. The reasons for our steep drop are quite obvious. It is more important to understand the drivers of positive perception according to the Brand Finance survey than to dwell on our ranking.

Out of the key drivers of reputation, a strong and stable economy is considered the most important driver for people. In a survey conducted within the index, it ranked very highly, with 8.9 points out of 10. The next driver, with 6.2 points, is having internationally admired leaders. Being politically stable and well-governed is ranked as the third most important attribute, while ease of doing business and sustainable cities for transport are ranked at fourth and fifth place respectively, based on importance.

Developing a nation’s brand

The expectations of people indicate that a dynamic economy and the ability to do business easily are the main drivers of pretty much everything else. If we, as Sri Lankans, are serious about building our brand, attracting FDIs, and bringing in tourists, there is no other choice than to undergo economic reforms.

The expectations indicate that most of the attributes that help develop a nation’s branding are influenced by the market and freedom. When a paternal government steps in, there is no ease of doing business for enterprises. When a government imposes high tariffs on imports, there is no efficient trade. When a government restricts movement of people and adds visa regulations, tourism cannot prosper. Countries which experience a higher degree of economic freedom also have credible country brands and soft power.

In Sri Lanka’s assessment, our worst ranking is for ‘international relations’. We have ranked 120 out of 121 countries. This comes as no surprise after our poor management of foreign relationships with all our key friends including India, China, Japan, the Middle East, and the US.

Our immaturity in managing the Indian Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the East Container Terminal (India), managing the Port City and the fertiliser shipment (China), cancelling the Light Rail Transit Project (Japan), forced cremations of Muslims (the Middle East), and dealing with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (the US) undeniably isolated us, pushing our reputation to a historic low.

Our diplomatic service is basically a meal ticket for unemployable relatives of politicians. It is imperative that a merit-based exam for diplomatic service be required in order to ensure our economic prosperity. Diplomacy is economic; a friendship built on doing business is much better than a business built on a friendship.

We have ranked relatively better on ‘culture and heritage,’ standing at 92 from among 121 nations. On ‘governance,’ we are ranked at 118 and on ‘business and trade’ we come in at 115.

Solutions

There are quick fixes, but building a brand is like raising a child. Values, ethics, and dynamism take time to instil. If we are to improve Sri Lanka’s brand, a comprehensive economic reform package is needed. Countries that recently picked up their ranking did it through reforms and allowing markets to work smoothly.

New Zealand had a reform plan in the 1980s while South Korea transformed through market-based reforms. Dubai was converted into a business hub, Vietnam was converted into an export-oriented economy, and so on. The common denominator is a concrete economic reform plan.

In the short run, what we can consider is implementing a free, six-month business and vacation visa plan for countries with twice the per capita GDP of Sri Lanka. This will allow us to earn much more through their spending in Sri Lanka. At present, we have nothing to lose, as they are not visiting Sri Lanka anyway.

The next step is to allow foreign spouses to work in Sri Lanka. As many people leave the country, at least some may consider staying back in these cases, especially those married to foreigners. They will bring their skill set, which enables better knowledge transfer. In some areas such as Galle, this synergy can already be observed in the tourism industry, despite bad regulations.

Thirdly, all tariffs should be brought under either a four-tier structure (0%, 5%, 10%, and 15%) or a higher tariff structure that is simple and unified so that it can incentivise trade. We need to keep our Central Bank independent and not intervene in the forex market in order to get the maximum benefits out of this. All these can be done with just a stroke of a pen at zero cost to the Government.

The brand ‘Sri Lanka’ can only be built by instilling the right values within the brand. A communications campaign may only dilute the brand when people realise we oversell ourselves by overpromising and under-delivering.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Which reforms should take the spotlight after the IMF?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

According to news reports and a tweet by International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, Sri Lanka is likely to enter its 17th IMF programme since its membership began. We are yet to know the details of the programme, but we have an overview of key areas as per the press conference in September 2022, when we entered the Staff-Level Agreement. Out of the previous 16, we have only completed nine programmes and have given up in the midst of seven programmes without completion.

This time, things are slightly different, because on the previous 16 occasions our debt was sustainable, but this time it is not. Dropping out in the middle of the programme while we are under a debt restructuring plan will erode even the remaining confidence of investors and many other stakeholders.

There seems to be an overestimation that the IMF can fix all our problems. We have been trying to debunk this myth for a long time; the IMF cannot fix our economy. It is merely a lifeboat to make sure we don’t drown in our debt. Only we can fix our economy through economic reforms.

What the IMF can bring us is credibility. Credibility will provide us breathing space on a few fronts. It will provide room to negotiate debt with external creditors and enable us to obtain some relief before we start our debt repayments. This credibility will allow Sri Lanka to tap into more bilateral and multilateral funds to reactivate some of its economic activity.

It is imperative that we reform the economy and move forward with all this funding. Other countries that have gone through debt distress have fallen into a cycle of defaulting. We have to avoid this, which can only be done by creating a competitive economy.

A competitive economy can only be achieved through economic reforms and not in any other way. Most of these reforms are simple to understand but complicated to execute, as many of the beneficiaries of the current inefficiencies will be on the losing end. They will all have to work hard and compete in a market environment.

While there are many reforms to be undertaken, which will also be included in the IMF agreement in different forms, I would like to prioritise three key reforms.

Social safety nets to protect the poor

During an economic crisis, people are angry as well as hungry. Protecting the most vulnerable section of society has to be a priority. Ultimately, the objective of all economic principles we practise is to eradicate poverty.

Poverty eradication cannot be undertaken simply by distributing money to the poor. We can only eradicate poverty by opening up opportunities for the impoverished to engage in economic activity and expand their capacity to add productive value to society. During difficult times, they should have some support so they can worry less about basics and worry more about joining economic activities.

The current expenditure on our main social safety net programme – Samurdhi – is about Rs. 55.4 billion. This is peanuts compared to the losses of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) over eight months in 2022, which amounted to Rs. 632 billion. Most of the losses in petroleum caused by the Government’s fuel subsidy have benefitted 60% of the wealthiest families in the country.

Rather than entertaining the inefficiencies of the CPC and transferring fuel subsidies to those who can obviously afford it, the money should be channelled to the poor. This needs to be done by proper targeting and via cash transfers to their accounts, rather than in a material form.

It was reported that about 3.7 million families have applied for the social safety net system, but unfortunately, the Government authorities have been on strike without having verified the families that have applied. Cash transfer systems should ideally be connected to inflation with a targeted time frame, so that those below the poverty line are incentivised for upskilling and to contribute to economic activity.

State-Owned Enterprises reforms

It is no secret that our State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are massive burdens to taxpayers with limited value being added to our economy. Therefore, selected SOEs should be privatised, which will improve the income levels of employees.

It cannot be emphasised enough that the privatisation process has to be transparent and should take place on a competitive basis. Politicians cannot be the facilitators of these transactions. There are some SOEs which can be opened up for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Certain SOEs can be consolidated and others can be brought under a holding company.

Some of these SOEs are managed extremely poorly. Therefore, with the current liabilities, finding a buyer too seems next to impossible. As such, unfortunately, some of the debt may have to be absorbed by the Government, considering the stoppage of longer-term money leakage. We have to realise that the Government has no role in doing business. This has been proven many times globally and in Sri Lanka. Without SOE reforms, Sri Lanka simply has no future.

Trade reforms

In many forums where we converse about solutions for Sri Lanka’s economic crisis, a common refrain is that “Sri Lanka has to come out of this crisis”. A country of 22 million, which is almost the same population as the city of Mumbai, cannot grow by selling goods and services to its own citizens.

Sri Lanka’s market size is very small, so we have to sell to a global market. However, we cannot sell to a global market without being competitive. As such, imports are a big component in being competitive. What we need is a simple unified tariff structure; when things are simple, we can limit the room for corruption.

The complicated para-tariffs such as cess, PAL, and many other tariffs added one on top of the other have to ideally be within three main tiers. For instance, 5%, 10%, and 15% customs duty so that importers are clear on what to pay and can estimate in advance.

Monetary policy has to be fixed with trade reforms so that we will not face a currency crisis. It is true that the US Dollar is required for imports, but import demand is created by the Sri Lankan Rupee when the exchange rate is artificially low and money is added to the monetary system in the form of filling the deficit in Government expenditure and income.

When we fix this monetary policy, the currency will remain solid and exports will automatically start picking up with the stability in the market. The scarce US Dollar resources will be shared only for the prioritised needs through the pricing system.

In conclusion

If we can implement these three reforms within the next 12 months and maintain them for three years, we most likely will not require an IMF bailout for the 18th time.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Feasibility of estimating economic recovery via LKR appreciation, CSE performance

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Sri Lankans base their assessment of the economy’s performance on two crucial factors. One is on the operations of the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) and the other is on the exchange rate – the appreciation or depreciation of the LKR to the USD.

However, neither are the right indicators to measure the performance of the economy. The companies listed on the CSE are insignificant compared to the number of business establishments in Sri Lanka.

Around 99% of the business establishments in Sri Lanka are Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) but they are not listed on the CSE. However, the MSME sector accounts for 75% of all employment. Large firms are responsible only for 25% of all employment, but not all large corporations are listed on the CSE.

For instance, MAS Holdings, which is one of Sri Lanka’s leading apparel manufacturers and employers in the sector, is not on the CSE. Moreover, just before the economic downturn in Sri Lanka, there was a bull run at the CSE. A performing economy is measured through the reduction of poverty and when the populace contributes to solving an economic problem.

The second popular measure to assess economic performance is the exchange rate. Recently, with the appreciation of the LKR, there is a sentiment that the economy is recovering. Previously, when the LKR was depreciating, the perception was that the economy was not doing so well.

Appreciation or depreciation of a currency has its own consequences, but connecting the exchange rate to performance of the entire economy is definitely not the right way to look at things.

There were few reasons behind the recent appreciation of the LKR. Nevertheless, the exchange rate is simply the price we pay to buy USD. Like for many other commodities and services, the price of USD is determined through demand and supply. Suppliers of USD are mainly exporters, service exporters, remittances, foreign grants, and tourism. Main buyers are importers, the Central Bank, service importers, etc.

If you are wondering how the Central Bank becomes a buyer of USD, that is one way reserves are built. Until the last week of February, the Central Bank had a direction for all commercial banks to surrender 25% of their USD flows from exporters. That limit has now been reduced to 15%, which means that banks will have an additional 10% of USD than they did before, so the availability of USD in the market is slightly higher. Further, over the last few months, the Central Bank has been the main buyer of USD/forex and as a result our reserve levels have improved slightly.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) also approved a $ 400 million facility to support Sri Lanka to purchase essential items, so the inflows to the market are likely to increase. As a result of high supply and constant demand, the exchange rate has come down slightly.

Another reason is that the Central Bank increased the middle spot rate for banks to Rs. 5 from Rs. 2.50 last week. In simpler terms, previously, the Central Bank had provided a direction on the price of the USD. It is similar to a price control but slightly more flexible. As a result, banks can now provide better rates so that forex sellers are willing to supply.

As the economy contracted by 7.1% in the first nine months of 2022 and the World Bank projects a further 4.2% contraction for 2023, demand for imports has been low. On top of this, most imports are restricted. Additionally, tourism is slowly picking up and with many Sri Lankans migrating for work, it helps to recover remittances to an extent.

We need to realise that none of the above changes are reforms. They are just dynamics in the market. These little fluctuations are not an indication to measure whether we are moving in the right direction.

Reforms mean establishing a dynamic market and creating a suitable environment as soon as possible given the gravity of our crisis. When reforms are implemented, the exchange rate will become predictable rather than subject to speculation.

Reforms involve systems design and thinking, so that the system works even when a new person takes over. It is important not to mix up market changes and reforms. Markets will always fluctuate based on the availability and scarcity of resources, but reforms are about creating an environment for markets to work. Even the forex market optimises the use of resources.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Why it takes so long to recover from an economic crisis

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

I have been reflecting on the last few years of public policy and discussion, which I can broadly divide into three main chapters:

Chapter 1 – Denial

Chapter 2 – Realisation

Chapter 3 - Recovery

Chapter 1 – Denial

There was a time when even respected businessmen thought an economic crisis was a distant scenario. Many politicians, across all party lines, failed to consider a situation of 12-hour power cuts and long fuel lines, and viewed debt restructuring and accessing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as taboo conversations.

We relied on a $ 3.6 billion bailout from an unknown Omani fund and thought China and the Port City would bail us out as a last resort. Some even thought the discovery of a sapphire cluster might be the breakthrough Sri Lanka needed. Sri Lankans believed we were a special nation with a magical power that would rescue us in some other way.

Despite our strategic location, beautiful weather, and natural beauty being undeniable assets, they do not guarantee a rescue from our own bad policies. Our denial was so strong that an international institution titled their report on the Sri Lankan economy as ‘Denial is Not a Strategy’.

Chapter 2 – Realisation

The moment of truth came, but we were too late to respond. None of our bailout expectations materialised and the international financial architecture found it difficult to save us. Our debt is unsustainable and the IMF requires a commitment from our creditors before providing us financial assistance.

We are struggling due to global geopolitics and our poor diplomatic service and lack of professionalism doesn’t allow us to be taken seriously. We hurt all our friendly nations as well as India, China, Japan, and the US. Islamic countries too were concerned and unhappy with us over different issues.

People only realised the depth of the crisis when medicine was in short supply and their loved ones considered leaving the country. Inflation skyrocketed, prices increased, and poverty affected about 30% of the population.

Chapter 3 – Recovery

The moment people realised the severity of the crisis, they started asking about when we would recover. The simple answer is that it takes a long time and now many of us understand why. Overcoming a crisis of this scale, which in itself is a combination of multiple crises, cannot be done easily.

Simultaneously, we face a balance of payment crisis, a debt crisis, a financial crisis, a humanitarian crisis, and a political crisis. The cost of delaying a response to the crisis and mismanagement has to be shared by us all, with mounting tax increases and high inflation pressure from the grassroots.

As a result, we can see constant protests and interruptions to public life, further worsening the situation. At the same time, this opens a new political space where any political party can make unrealistic promises and auction for votes. This vicious cycle is why recovery from the economic crisis takes a long time.

The specifics of debt restructuring are still a mystery to us. We don’t know how the restructuring will be carried out or the impact it will have on the banking industry. It is also unclear how the markets will respond.

Without domestic debt restructuring, even if we apply a 50% haircut on International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs) and Sri Lanka Development Bonds (SLDBs), our debt to GDP ratio after 10 years will be 136%, according to a Verité Research study published in October 2022. Cost of servicing new debt and the cost of rolling over previous debt at a high yield curve will not bring down our debt to GDP ratio.

Nevertheless, it is still possible for domestic debt to be restructured and banking recapitalisation is necessary. According to the same document, investments in Government securities, primarily Treasury bills and Treasury bonds, account for more than 30% of the interest revenue for the total banking industry.

Hence, changing the interest rates on these securities will affect the stability of banks. On the other hand, 82% of the money in the EPF and ETF has been put into Government securities.

As the required changes take place, no one will be happy, so people and opinion leaders will react in different ways. The changes will go back and forth and recovery will be prolonged. Elections will come and decision-making authorities will change and policy decisions will also go back and forth.

All this is why it takes so long to recover from an economic crisis.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Our only saviour is reforms

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Whether we will be able to receive International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board approval is now a topic of discussion even amongst the most economically-illiterate person. Let us first set the context.

The Sri Lankan Government and the IMF came to a Staff-Level Agreement in early September 2022. One of the key milestones we have to pass through is to get to some level of negotiation with our creditors. Our credit portfolio is diverse. We have multilateral senior creditors followed by bilateral creditors, including members of the Paris Club, mainly Japan.

On the other hand, there are two main creditors who are non-Paris Club members; India and China.

Paris Club members agree on equal treatment in debt restructuring. In simple words, all member countries of the Paris Club will be treated equally when it comes to restructuring. India has also agreed to assist Sri Lanka in the debt restructuring plan and has provided a letter to the IMF. However, according to the IMF, letters provided by China are not adequate. It has indicated a two-year moratorium, but given the financial needs expected by the IMF, Sri Lanka will not be on a sustainable debt path after a two-year moratorium alone.

Generally, credit assistance provided by multilateral donor agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank is not restructured, provided it has been given with very long maturity periods and very low interest rates. Therefore, restructuring those loans has not been the practice. That is how the global financial architecture is designed, given their assistance in eradicating poverty and the IMF being the lender of last resort. 

However, over the last few years, there has been a request by private creditors, bondholders, and some stakeholders that the credit of multilateral donor agencies should also be restructured and China is one party that has made this request. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka is too negligible an economy to make that request or challenge the global financial architecture. .

Given the delays, there is now an emerging conversation on whether we have any other alternative options if the IMF agreement is further delayed. In fact, I asked this question at the meeting convened by the National Council Sub-Committee on identifying short- and medium-term programmes related to economic stabilisation, on whether alternative options were being considered in the likelihood of a delay. According to its Chair MP Patali Champika Ranawaka, the committee has not considered it, but he has an aim of being prepared for the worst-case scenario.  

As we have been saying over the years, we have come to this situation through our own policy errors and with our bad reputation, we do not have many choices in hand. Therefore, finding a solution without the IMF is a major challenge, but we, as a country, cannot avoid the consequences should this agreement get further delayed; social discussion is needed on what we can do to get it soon and on the available alternatives. 

Managing with what we have

One option is to drastically cut down our consumption, including essentials such as food and medicine, and face the situation with what we have. That option can trigger some level of social unrest because ‘a hungry man is an angry man’. 

Even at this level of consumption contraction, our poverty rate has increased above 30% according to a Parliament committee. Out of about five million households, about 1.7 million receive Samurdhi and another 1.1 million are on the waiting list. Of course, Samurdhi is not a good indication, as some people who should receive Samurdhi benefits are not recipients, while others who should not be in the programme are included. However, managing with what we have is one available option that comes with its own consequences. 

Moving ahead with debt restructuring without China?

The next option is to move ahead with debt restructuring without China. This option has a significant limitation because IMF confirmation is required even to restructure the debt of bilateral creditors. Without the IMF, it will be difficult to get Paris Club members and other stakeholders to a debt negotiation table. The more we delay and if China takes a very hard stance, which is likely, we have to request the IMF to move ahead with those who have agreed and hold China’s debt payments until we come to some level of agreement.

We have to understand China’s point of view and geopolitics as well. Our crisis has also become a tug of war between two economic powerhouses. On one hand, China does not want to align or agree with a US-led programme. On the other hand, the relief measures given to Sri Lanka have to be provided to all other countries making similar requests in future.

Pakistan and many African countries and emerging economies are expected to face debt distress in the coming years. China’s growth predictions are low, impacting global economic growth. Hence, the more we delay opening up Sri Lanka to geopolitical sensitivities, the more we will be pushed to align with certain superpowers. If we were to depend on China or India for continuous relief measures, it would be extremely difficult to avoid becoming a geopolitical pawn.

Possible reforms and opportunities 

In this context, it is clear that all available options (with the IMF or without the IMF), will result in extremely difficult times. However, in a crisis, there will be winners as well. Regardless of any of the aforementioned options, there are basic levels of reforms we have to undertake in any scenario. 

State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reforms must be at the forefront. Without this, we have no future. One good opportunity is to capture the drive within the Indian market. Even if Sri Lanka does nothing, there will be spillover effects from India. The Indian economy, especially the North Indian economy, is growing very fast and we have to connect to their market. If we had played our cards right, we could have become a good connection point for trade between India and China. Instead, we made enemies all over. However, there is still potential. 

The more we delay reforms, it will further exacerbate the problem. As such, reforms are the only saviour in any scenario. It is sad to see how we are distancing ourselves from reforms, with political developments triggering another round of economic and political uncertainty which will lead to social uncertainty. Let us hope reforms move forward fast. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Sri Lanka’s biggest insecurity: Fear of competition

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

If we were to take some collective responsibility for the sad state of our country and attribute it to any cause, I believe it is due to our ‘fear of competition’. 

From top to bottom, Sri Lankans have been fearful of competing. Over a period of time, we have become very reluctant to compete and our fear has grown into incompetence. The fear of competition syndrome is spread across all sections of society, from the top executives to people below the poverty line. 

Sadly, as a country, we have not understood the meaning of ‘competition’. In our vocabulary, competition is where winners are selected and losers are ridiculed. However, competition is actually where the winner and the loser both win – when the winner wins, the loser also wins. How can this be?

A winner is defined as an individual who takes the leap to utilise the resources available to their maximum potential. Even in a 100 m race, the winner is the person who covers the distance within the shortest time span.

The recipe for the title of a winner is determined by the effort endured by any individual to go that extra mile and maximise the resources available. Once that formula is found, even the loser can use the formula of the winning person without wasting their resources further. Losers can ask the winners to run on their behalf next time so that the losers can better use their skills elsewhere.

This is how we all use so many consumable goods. Let us take computers as an example: most of us have lost the race of manufacturing computers while many have not even tried. But someone found the computer formula, so now we can all use the winning formula, which helps many of us save our valuable resources. Thus, losers have also benefited. This is why competition makes winners win and losers also win. It is much more than simply picking a winner – it is about the allocation of resources.  

In the Sri Lankan context, the fear of competition is what mainly led to the misallocation of resources. From top to bottom, not only are Sri Lankans fearful, but we also instigate fear in others. 

It was recently reported that a driver who was providing a taxi service using a mobile app had been threatened by some other drivers who were not using the app-based taxi service. The threat had taken place while the service was being provided to foreigners. The underlying reason for this is the fear of competing with mobile app-based technology.  

Fear of competing with private medical schools

While our tuk-tuk drivers have fear of competition regarding app-based solutions, our doctors have a fear of competition regarding private medical schools. They do not want someone capable with a better service in the market because they are fearful that someone else will overtake them. 

Fear of competition in furniture manufacturing 

Our furniture manufacturers are fearful of competing with other furniture manufacturers in the region. Not only are they fearful, they even ask the Government to support some of these industries with taxpayer money.

Fear of competition in the construction industry

Our bathware and tile manufacturers are reluctant to compete with the same category of products overseas. As a result, our cost of construction is about 25-40% higher than the region due to our widespread fear of competition. Most of our construction materials have a tariff of nearly 100% to avoid competition. Even the private sector is suffering from the fear of competition, which is one of the main reasons Sri Lanka lacks big industries and innovation in the system.

University students’ and the labour force’s fear of competition 

Our university students and teachers do not want to compete with international students. As a result, resistance is high against the entrance of any type of private university to the market. Rankings of our universities and colleges have been deteriorating over the years, but we still remain reluctant to compete. Not only do university students want to avoid competition, but they also want to be dependent on the Government.

Our Government servants and entire labour force are fearful that if we open the job market, foreigners with better skills will replace them. Although we are not competitive, we want to maintain our stake.

Across the board, Sri Lankans are deeply fearful of competing with the world. We lack the courage to admit the truth that our competitors can produce high quality products with high efficiency and productivity. If we are so afraid to compete with the world, there is little reason to claim that we have to improve exports. Exporting would mean competing with the world on an uneven playing field with different tariffs imposed in different regions.

Hasn’t our fear of competition not only made the country worse, but also contributed greatly to our economic crisis? Not just politicians, but all Sri Lankans have promoted fear among our fellow citizens. There are no innovations, inventions, or new technologies without competition. That is the sad truth. We have unfortunately become victims of our own actions.

For once, we should admit that we are the problem without absolving ourselves and instead blaming our political elites. While the poor decision-making of politicians is definitely a problem, if we are reluctant to compete, they can easily say that they simply represented our worldview and opinion.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

A flawed independence

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Over the years, our definition of ‘freedom’ has become full of flaws. We took freedom for granted and we lost both our freedom and independence. Even though we gained independence in 1948 from Great Britain, we have no understanding of what real freedom is. 

We fail to understand that freedom comes at the cost of hard work, courage, respect, the ability to cooperate, and being competitive with the world. There is an ecosystem we should have built if we really want to be free. We did not build that ecosystem, so over the 75 years of independence, we question ourselves and argue back, asking, “Are we really free?”

Prof. Amal Kumarage in a recent tweet has asked this question very eloquently on independence and freedom.

“I’m confused as to what’s happening on 4 February in #SriLanka. Is it: 

1. A fake celebration of a real independence, 

2. A real celebration of a fake independence, or 

3. A fake celebration of a fake independence?”

Freedom is an alluring subject to many as people in general summarise freedom to being liberated to have an easy life, getting things free of charge. Over time, as the dire need for freedom kept rising, the wrong seeds of freedom grew by encapsulating and manipulating the idea of freedom to a level where people truly believed that we are entitled to many benefits even though we lack the resources. 

The drive down the tunnel of distorted versions of freedom led to many ethnic and religious turns over the years, believing that freedom is restricting someone else’s freedom for the betterment of someone else.

This is similar to a situation where a child learns the wrong values or habits without realising they are wrong and instead thinking they are right. After 75 years of practising the wrong values and ethics, we now have an operating system which we try to sustain with unsustainable resources. That is a brief summary of insights on our 75 years of independence.    

During that journey of 75 years, we have failed to understand the damage done by the existing system to our competitiveness and productivity. We simply became irrelevant in the world over a period of time. By deciding not to compete with the world, we decided to sacrifice our freedom. 

Our decision to not compete with the world mainly came through our economic policy. We simply misread the world and future of the world. In a world of sharing resources and collaborating for each other’s benefit and independence, we thought that real freedom is the ability to produce everything on our own. 

We supported the narrative of ‘self sufficiency’ when the world actually moved away from self sufficiency to interdependence. As per the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index, Sri Lanka has been ranked at the 138th position out of 165 countries based on our ‘Freedom to Trade Internationally’. Though we claim we are an open economy, the facts say otherwise. In terms of our openness, we are at one of our lowest points.

My father used to say: “If you think you are the smartest person on the street, it is time to change the street.” This is because an uncompetitive environment does not support growth. Without growth, no wealth will be created nor will there be freedom or independence.

When we isolate ourselves from global trade, we avoid competition. Avoiding competition means we are out of touch with the real needs and wants of people. Not only that, we try to become dependent on the world without contributing anything to the world or to its maximum utility of resources. Being open to competition is what keeps us all competitive and relevant.

Real freedom is the freedom to compete and be competitive in a global landscape. Even when we are one of the closed economies in the world, we are open for global competition. Our IT, apparel, tea, and rubber sectors and even unskilled labour that contribute with remittances are competing at a global level. 

When we are really competitive it provides us the tools and freedom to change the direction of our fellow human beings and to support humanity. That comes only through the freedom to trade. That is the real freedom we should all aspire to. We are far from this and we are moving further away, but at least it is important to keep the idea alive so that one day someone can move towards it. 

A fake celebration of a real independence, 

A real celebration of a fake independence, or

A fake celebration of a fake independence? 

According to Prof. Kumarage, it is difficult to judge what we are actually trying to do this year, but we should aspire to have real freedom and this real freedom comes at the cost of hard work, free exchange, and free trade by being relevant and competitive in relation to the world.

Source : Central Bank of Sri Lanka

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

A well-told lie is worth a thousand facts

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Sri Lanka has always been consistent about two things. First, finding a villain to blame for incidents that have taken place in the past for Sri Lanka’s performance. Second, waiting for a hero to rescue us all with magical powers without making sure the systems and markets work. 

We always fail to evaluate reasons and economic context and understand the behaviour of people from an economic angle. A recent example is politicians claiming the economic crisis was a result of the Aragalaya and blaming the people who protested against the hardships they were going through, without realising that the economic crisis is what led to the Aragalaya.  

In a new turn, fingers have now been pointed at exporters, claiming that they have not brought money back into the country and accusing them of being part of the problem. In my view, the figures mentioned in relation to claims that exporters have parked funds outside are unrealistic. Some Sri Lankan companies have scaled their operations very successfully around the world, which has been done legally. For instance, there are energy investments in Bangladesh and Senegal and manufacturing plants in Africa and neighbouring India. Even our IT sector is expanding to the Middle East and to different regions around the globe using legally owned foreign exchange. 

This is obviously illegal and remedial action needs to be taken, but what is more important is to understand why it happens. We need to understand the reasons behind this and understand the reality with a solution-oriented framework. In most cases, the enemy is within, though we try to find the enemy outside. 

In my view, there are three main factors that influence such malpractices

Market intervention by the Central Bank

When central banks infuse more money into the system to maintain artificial interest rates, the exchange rate comes under pressure or the currency depreciates. The fear of currency collapse makes people withdraw money or avoid bringing money into the country.

Not only exporters, but even Sri Lankans who were sending remittances stopped sending their money through the banking system. Instead, they sent money through unofficial means at a depreciated exchange rate. When domestic prices are rising due to money printing or import controls, their families back home naturally need more money to buy goods.

However, exporters cannot keep unlimited amounts of money outside the country. Exporters need money to run their local operations, so they have to convert their export proceedings and get Sri Lankan Rupees to run the operation. When interest rates are kept artificially low, there is an incentive to borrow domestically and delay the conversion of dollars into rupees. 

However there is a limit to what exporters can borrow. Even if they borrow domestically, it cannot contribute to a foreign exchange shortage unless the Central Bank printed money to maintain an artificially low policy rate through discount windows or reverse repo operations.

If banks give extra loans to exporters, they have to cut down on other loans (to housebuilders, for example) or they have to pay higher rates and get deposits and reduce the consumption of their customers. Banks do not have to reduce other credit if the interest rate is maintained artificially through the injection of new money.

The policy of the Central Bank has simply created a highly unstable financial situation and it is human behaviour to protect one’s hard-earned money, so they will obviously keep their money outside. Understanding this should not require any financial expertise; even basic logic is enough. This is understood by our unskilled workforce contributing to our economy through remittances. 

To return to the matter of exporters, the margins are low in trading businesses and export quantities have to keep moving; a business cannot run without money. We have to reevaluate the numbers and it is unlikely that more than 10% of the proceedings will be repatriated, which is a figure that leans more towards the higher side. Even that is profits or value created by exporters. 

If the money comes, the exporter will use it and it will trigger demand. If money is not brought back, it will not become imports and instead becomes a private foreign reserve. While it may contribute to higher interest rates, this type of activity will simply reduce imports and not create forex shortages.

There were claims that some exporters sent goods to Singapore or Dubai and re-sold the goods to third countries while keeping some money there. 

We need to understand why people try to keep money outside the country. Who wants to bring money into an unstable country? Dubai and Singapore do not have central banks that print money and people not only import and export freely, they can also freely send capital in and out.

Sri Lanka, on the other hand, has exchange controls. Again, this is due to money printed to keep interest rates artificially low, which is exerting pressure on the exchange rate. Economists call this the impossible trinity of monetary policy objectives. A central bank cannot hold an exchange rate and allow the free flow of capital if it also prints money to control interest rates.

Exchange controls can be seen as a tool used to delay interest rates. It is worthwhile to recall the scale of Central Bank interventions and controls during this crisis. The Central Bank places price controls on Treasury bills and printed money. Exchange controls were also tightened further instead of correcting interest rates and stopping money printing.

The Treasury placed import controls on hundreds of items. The Central Bank increased margins for Letters of Credit (LCs). Moreover, forward markets for foreign exchange were killed, putting importers at risk and also damaging businesses that had hedged their imported input costs. Exporters were forced to convert their dollars early, which created problems for some exporters who had been in the habit of giving credit to customers to win business from competitors.

Additionally, forced conversion rules were imposed on service receipts. Some service workers and those others who used to bring these to the country and save them in foreign exchange accounts then kept their money abroad. Unlike goods exporters, service exporters have larger margins.

By this time, banks were facing a capital outflow and were unable to renew their credit lines and in some cases dollar-rupee swaps. Forced dollar conversions reduced dollar liquidity and brought these closer to default.

There are also concerns as to whether it is a violation of property rights for banks to force account holders to convert dollars without their consent. Foreign exchange controls are in any case a violation of property rights.

This very column previously warned of the potential drying up of forex with such market interventions. In simple terms, in a context where LKR is not hard pegged to the USD with floating interest rates or if there are no floating rates, all additional money supplied to the financial system to keep rates down evaporates in the form of imports, even with under-invoicing.

Trade barriers – High and complicated tariff structure 

Making tariff structures complicated is an incentive for corruption. The level of corruption that takes place at customs is no secret and the more complicated the system becomes, the more room for corruption. Simply, when the cost of corruption is lower than the legal procedure, the incentives are in place for corruption. 

This column has on many occasions recommended a simple tariff structure with three bands so that paying import tariffs becomes easier than taking on the cost of corruption. This was proved by Prof. Premachandra Athukorala in a practical research he undertook, where bringing down the tariffs by half on selected HS codes ensured that the Government income from those particular imported items doubled. Too many restrictions and intervention are the genesis of black markets and corruption. One of the easiest ways to minimise corruption at Sri Lanka Customs is to make our tariff structure simple, low, and consistent. 

Poor business environment 

Overall, Sri Lanka’s business environment is extremely poor. We have to ask ourselves why our own people leave the country and why they are reluctant to bring their money into the country. The answer is not complicated; we may act rationally or emotionally at times, but when it comes to money, we all tend to make rational decisions, especially when there is a tangible cost or benefit associated with it. 

It is obvious that people consider all alternative options to protect their hard-earned money. This is one reason remittances were not sent through official channels. Family members still received the money and imports still took place, but without going through the official channels. Any imports paid for with unofficial funds – such as open account imports – reduce the demand for dollars from exports.

Now that the Central Bank has raised rates and reduced money printing, leading to reduced exchange rates, people are sending their money through official channels. This shows that most people prefer to send their money through official and legal channels if a stable and consistent system is available.

It has been a while since Standard and Poor’s, Fitch Ratings, and many other international agencies warned about Sri Lanka’s worsening economic crisis. As such, our economic environment was extremely poor, which was why people did not feel that it was safe to bring their money into the country. The same happened even in Africa – with the crisis in Zimbabwe, many had bank accounts in Cape Town to protect the value of their money. 

Final thoughts 

One has to be careful about harassing exporters. Exporters, especially subsidiaries of foreign countries, have other countries to operate in. 

Under-invoicing exports is wrong, as it will reduce profits within the country. This is a tax fraud. However, reducing profits cannot contribute to forex shortages since any money that is not spent in the country will also reduce imports.

Sri Lanka wishes to be a hub for South Asia. It wishes to become a place where companies set up regional headquarters. If currency instability and exchange controls exist, these will not be set up in this country. Moreover, there are also rules on transfer pricing. 

If Sri Lanka possessed monetary stability, if there were no exchange controls, and if its tax rates were reasonable – the US has been pushing for a global corporate tax rate of 15% – companies would not try to take profits to safer places.

Exporters and importers have been harassed over the years. Framing exporters as the reason for the crisis instead of solving our own problems will simply make the situation worse. 

Can we really put the entire weight of the economic crisis on our exporters, forgetting the bond scam, Easter attacks, droughts, Covid-19, borrowing money at very high interest in USD, and investing in unproductive projects? The enemy is within, but we are always looking for a culprit outside. In politics, sometimes a well-told lie is worth a thousand facts.    

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

What next for Sri Lanka?

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

New predictions are emerging that debt restructuring and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Board-level agreement may take until the end of this year. Another ongoing discussion is about the Local Government Elections and postponement of elections. Electricity tariffs are to be increased and 10 banks have been downgraded by Fitch Ratings as a recalibration of Sri Lanka’s sovereign rating.

Overall, it appears that economic reforms are being sidelined faster than expected, without realising the consequences of each action. It is true these complicated problems have no easy, straightforward solutions. No solution will be perfect and the validity, impact, and effect of any solution will be weighed against time. To put it simply, a solution that appears valid and reasonable today may not sound reasonable in a few weeks or months.

Each action has its consequences and inaction will also have consequences. It will be a battle between the consequences of action and inaction and the continuation of this for the next few years.

Reforms and restructuring

Let’s take the case of reforming State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). With the election cycle commencing with Local Government Elections, attempts at restructuring SOEs such as the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) may be delayed. This delay means that inefficiencies will continue and tariffs will be increased without any competitive basis. This will in turn impact all businesses as well as macroeconomic indicators given the monopoly and the size of the electricity business. It may also extend the duration of power cuts and pave the way for another wave of protests, worsening the business environment.

Reforms too will be painful. Trade unions and some employees will be affected and an electricity monopoly can interrupt the life of the common man in multiple ways, with political and capital implications.

The cost of not implementing reforms will be much higher politically and economically, as it would be a cyclical result. Therefore, the reasonable decision is to restructure loss-making SOEs. Unfortunately, there is no other way out and delaying this further may invite darker years in the future.

The delays in the debt restructuring process will have its own consequences, both economically and geopolitically. The debt restructuring delay is a repercussion of maintaining bad foreign relations.

Poor international relations

How we treated India over the Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) and in discussions on the East Container Terminal was extremely unprofessional and irresponsible. There is a significant difference between disagreement, negotiation, and unprofessional treatment.

By suspending the Light Rail Transit (LRT) project, we lost the respect and trust of Japan. We even annoyed China with the fertiliser matter and continuous regulatory delays with the Port City project. Our relations with the Middle East deteriorated with the cremation of dead bodies of the Muslim community during Covid.

We are not even in the good books of the US over the way we dealt with the MCC grant. Simply put, we do not have a friend who will extend a helping hand during troubled times. It is said that countries have longer memories than people. As such, we have limited our options due to our own grave mistakes.

A stalemate in a crisis

Economics and politics often go hand in hand. During an economic crisis, instability in politics is unavoidable. Our President does not have a direct mandate and the composition of the Parliament may not really reflect the people’s voice with the dawn of the completely new sociopolitical environment.

This was one reason the discussion of a common minimum programme was floated by concerned individuals and professionals, but it appears that this too has been discarded, with everyone slowly turning their attention to the election cycle. The calibre of our politicians is too inferior for them to understand the dynamics involved and to come up with responsive and novel policies and political options.

We are now in a stalemate, with a lot of short-term distractions. In such situations, we become distracted and waste our time on non-value adding activities without realising the massive deterioration of the quality of life. A deeper analysis shows that while the absence of economic reforms is a major issue, the fragility of our institutions is a bigger concern, with the institutional capability for the functioning of a basic society being almost nonexistent.

Solutions

Appointing capable and credible human resources for debt negotiations with China is essential to avoid delays. Acceleration of debt restructuring will unblock many other barricades, enabling us to move forward. There is a huge vacuum of capable human resources needed to carry out reforms. Therefore, providing space for already appointed committees to recruit more capable people and working out a time-bound solution matrix is important. The solution now lies in setting up institutions that can execute reforms to get us the required results.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Economic priorities for the new president

Originally published in Echelon*

By Ravi Ratnsabapathy

A new president has now taken office. How should he set about addressing the concerns of citizens? During the campaign, the candidates and their supporters announced what they plan to do if elected to office. However, most of these lack credibility as they pay no heed to the constraints in the economy.

“THERE ARE THREE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS; THE FISCAL/ DEBT PROBLEM, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY.”

So after the celebration of victory is over the successful candidate should take a long cold shower, grab a stiff drink and become acquainted with some fundamental problems in the economy. Two months ago, former minister Milinda Moragoda helpfully provided a list of seven cold economic truths that presidential candidates must face:

1. The Sri Lankan government spends twice as much as it earns in revenue. Therefore every year, the Government borrows both domestically and internationally to meet approximately half of its expenditure.

2. It’s estimated that Sri Lanka requires only 750,000 to 800,000 government employees to provide the services needed by the public. However, the state employs over 1.5 million people. This is one of the highest public servants to population ratios in the world. Besides, to ease employment pressures, the government regularly absorbs the unemployed graduates of local universities. Further, there are now over 600,000 retired government servants, who receive pensions.

3. Ninety percent of government revenues are required to be spent on servicing the national debt.

4. Sri Lanka imports around twice as much as it exports.

5. Sri Lankan Airlines, the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, and the Ceylon Electricity Board have become dinosaurs and represent a severe drain on public finances. If left unchecked, these inefficient and costly enterprises can potentially cause the economy to collapse. Vested interests have long dominated these institutions, and no political leader has dared to restructure or reform them.

6. Although Sri Lanka is considered to be an upper-middle-income country, two million families or nearly 40% of the population is on the Samurdhi welfare programme. A new generation of political leaders must have the courage to re-examine and modernise Sri Lanka’s welfare system.

7. Twenty five percent of the Sri Lankan workforce is employed in agriculture. Experts say that in an economy such as ours, agricultural employment should be 15%. To manage this transition, Sri Lankan leaders will have to create higher-wage job opportunities in other sectors while bringing efficiencies into the farming sector.”

This is a good summary of critical issues. There are three significant problems; the fiscal/ debt problem, employment and productivity. The main problem is that the government spends far more than it collects in taxes and covers the difference by borrowing. As a result, the debt keeps rising every year, and because we borrow to pay both the capital and the interest, it increases even faster. It is exactly like a household living on a credit card but at a bigger and scarier scale. These problems have existed for decades but have progressively worsened and have now reached a difficult-to ignore point.

“DESPITE CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY, SRI LANKA IS NOT AN ATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT DESTINATION”

In 2018, total debt service cost was 108% of government revenue, meaning all government revenue (plus a bit more) went to service debt! On average, between 2006- 18 debt service cost was 93% of revenue. What does the government do with this money? The most substantial proportion about 42% of revenue gets spent on salaries and pensions of public servants. Interest on debt absorbs another 37%, the remainder gets spent on various other services, but loss-making state enterprises consume a chunk of it.

This, in a nutshell, is the major problem. What does this mean for policy?

1. Unless tax revenues are to rise (and who will ever vote for that?), spending must fall.

2. State sector salaries and pensions are no longer affordable. Politicians cannot promise more state sector jobs or salary increases until finances are on a sound footing. At the least, recruitment and increments may have to be frozen and the difficult question of reducing employment in the public sector faced.

3. Sri Lanka is producing graduates who expect a government job. During 2005-18, state sector employment grew from 850,000 to 1.3m, partly to “create” jobs for these graduates, adding to the debt problem.

   The average overall employability ratio of Sri Lankan university graduates is 54% according to a research paper (Nawaratne, 2012). Arts and management grads have higher rates of unemployment in the country and accounted for 76% and 36% of unemployed graduates (Kanaga Singam, 2017).

   The private sector experiences shortages of labour but complain that graduates lack skills. It is insane that the best of our students taught in our universities at public expense complete fifteen years of education but lack employable skills.

   About 55% of the graduates are from arts and management while only 28% are from science, IT and engineering. For a developing country, these ratios need to be in reverse.

   Primary and secondary education also have problems, not least a lack of school places and an excessive concentration of ‘popular’ schools in Colombo, leading to long commutes for children. Education is supposed to be free, but why do so many parents spend money on tuition? Why do many opt for private “international” schools or private tertiary/university education? These are symptoms of problems in quality and access. The broader question is: can the current system generate people for a knowledge economy?

4. If public sector jobs are not available, then the onus is on the private sector to create them, which requires new investment. Sri Lanka suffers from low savings rates (around 21% of GDP in 2017/8), meaning it does not generate the same levels of domestic capital for investment that countries with higher growth rates have. To raise the growth rate significantly implies sustaining an investment rate above 30%. For example, Singapore’s investment rate averaged 35% between 1961- 96. This shortfall in investment must be met from overseas.

Despite claims to the contrary, Sri Lanka is not an attractive investment destination, as evidenced by low FDI rates. There are many issues to solve, including policy uncertainty, regulatory problems, land and infrastructure.

In the 1990s privatisations formed an essential channel for FDI, by opening new sectors for investment, notably in telecoms. Public-private partnerships in the port (SAGT and CICT) were also a success. Before the PPP arrangements, between 1997–2000 the volume of containers handled in Colombo port averages 1.7m TEU’s. SAGT started operating in late 1999, CICT in 2013 and by 2018 volumes grew to 7m TEU’s; 66% of which was handled by the two private terminals.

Privatisations and PPP’s are no longer popular, but if an investment is needed and the state is unable to borrow what other options are open? The problem with privatisations and PPPs is that if they are not done through transparent, competitive processes outcomes may be poor. This issue needs to be faced squarely. The recent closed-door deal with the ill-fated Colombo East terminal is not the way forward: the open bid of 2016 which attracted top international shipping lines and operators including the Ports Authority of Singapore was inexplicably cancelled.

The failure to create jobs is why so many of the most talented and motivated people migrate for work. We see contradictory statements by politicians, on one side celebrating the inflow of remittances, on the other bemoaning the social costs associated with migrant labour. No one seems to ask the hard question as to why the local economy cannot create enough jobs to absorb these people.

By some estimates almost 23% of the workforce is employed abroad, if not for this, unemployment would be close to 30%. The failure is not just investment but investment in high productivity jobs that will pay the high salaries that people want. Agriculture is the most unproductive sector of the economy, absorbing 28% of the workforce but generating only 8% of GDP. Politicians promise subsidies or guaranteed prices to ‘help’ this sector but is this feasible in the light of the fiscal and debt issues?

None of these challenges are easily overcome, but unless the reality is faced, Sri Lanka may be heading for multiple crises.

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*this article was published in the November issue of the Echelon Magazine, prior to Presidential Elections.