Crisis

Salt, sun and shortages: The real cost of govt. interference

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

In economics, shortages often arise from one of two sources: price controls or government interventions. Sri Lanka’s ongoing salt shortage, while not caused by price caps as in past crises with rice or eggs, is still rooted in State interference – just in a different form.

Sri Lanka consumes around 180,000 MT of salt annually. Producing salt requires vast expanses of flat land near the sea, combined with long dry spells and strong winds to support natural evaporation. Regions like Hambantota, Elephant Pass, and Puttalam are ideally suited for this. However, unusually high rainfall last year – linked to shifting climate patterns – disrupted the crystallisation process, which typically requires over 40 uninterrupted days of dry weather.

Ironically, the same rains that hampered salt production helped boost agricultural yields and hydroelectric output, allowing for an electricity tariff cut that helped tame inflation and fuel at an impressive 5% economic growth rate. But the question remains: Sri Lanka has faced excessive rains before, so why a salt shortage now?

The answer lies in how markets respond to supply shocks. Typically, when local production falters, imports fill the gap. But in this case, the Government attempted to monopolise salt imports via a Cabinet decision mandating that only State entities handle them. Unsurprisingly, the bureaucracy involved led to delays and supply gaps. Unlike private sector importers, who are faster and more efficient, State procurement systems are slow, opaque, and often mired in red tape.

This is not a new story. The same importation challenges were in existence when the Government tried to import rice. The same way the Government imposed a tariff of about Rs. 60 per kilo of rice, salt is also liable for a tariff, making prices higher for the end consumer. 

Nearly 50% of domestic production is under State management, and, true to form, productivity suffers. Even with optimal natural conditions, we barely meet local demand and export almost nothing.

Salt is not just a kitchen staple. It’s a key industrial input for sectors like confectionery, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. Yet our salt industry remains underdeveloped. The reliance on expansive land-based evaporation ponds competes with tourism and urban development, reducing land-use efficiency. Although sunshine – our key production input – is free, we have failed to prepare for climatic variability or invest in resilient infrastructure.

There is, however, one thing the Government got right this time: it refrained from imposing price controls. Had it done so, scarcity would have worsened. Prices have indeed risen, but at least salt remains available. Market forces, though imperfect, have managed to balance supply and demand better than the State could.

The Government belatedly opened the door for private sector imports, but the damage had already been done. Consumers bore the brunt of higher prices and uncertainty, while the State’s credibility took another hit.

Salt production, like many sectors, is vulnerable to climate and policy risks. What we need is not more State control, but a bold vision to turn salt into an export-oriented industry driven by private enterprise. Value-added products, better land use, and climate-resilient production methods could unleash its potential.

As always, the fundamental rules of economics don’t bend for salt or automobiles. Shortages are almost always man-made – products of misguided interventions. As Milton Friedman once quipped: “If you put the federal government in charge of the Sahara Desert, in five years there would be a shortage of sand.” Sadly, that seems to ring true for Sri Lanka – an island blessed with saltwater and sunshine, yet still somehow short of salt.

Defence expenditure: The elephant in the Budget

Originally appeared on the Morning

By Avishka Jayaweera

In his recent Budget speech, President Ranil Wickremesinghe stated: “It has been difficult to allocate resources to health, education, and other important sectors due to the lower level of Government revenue generated from taxes in comparison to other countries.” However, increasing revenue is only one side of the coin. On the flip side, an equally important aspect of a state’s finances is expenditure.

It is only logical that if one tends to spend in excess of what they earn, effectively living beyond their means, their spending is unsustainable in the long run. The same holds true for a state. If a state spends beyond its earnings, it has no alternative but to borrow money to finance its expenditure. However, such borrowing can only be sustained for so long. This is Sri Lanka’s folly.

Except for 2017 and 2018, Sri Lanka has regularly run on a primary deficit [1]. The deficit has largely been financed through debt and money printing. It is the foreign component of this debt, which kept growing incrementally, that is responsible for the crisis Sri Lanka faces today. There is a limit up to which creditors are willing to extend loans to the country. Once Sri Lanka’s credit rating was downgraded and it lost access to the International Sovereign Bond market, the Government could not finance the current account deficit, causing the balance of payments crisis.

Government expenditure and the 2023 Budget

It is clear that the Government must balance its Budget, which is what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff-Level Agreement with the Government aims to achieve by aiming for a primary surplus of 2.3% of the GDP by 2025 [2]. The Government appears to be attempting to do this purely by increasing taxes. This places a high burden on consumers who are already facing diminishing standards of living and an inflation tax, caused by excess money printing among other factors.

What then is the alternative? The answer, although politically unpopular, is relatively straightforward. It lies in cutting down on State expenditure. State expenditure must be scrutinised and prioritised. Instead of reducing expenditure in the 2023 Budget, the Government has increased expenditure by 31% from the 2022 revised Budget to Rs. 5,819 billion.

Expenditure must be rationalised. Calls to cut Government spending do not mean reducing the amount spent on health, education, or social welfare. There are more obvious areas where expenses can be cut, freeing up resources to be used in these aforementioned areas that are of national importance. Defence and security spending is one of the main culprits. The Ministry of Defense has the third highest Budget allocation of all ministries.

Defence and public security spending

Allocations for defence and public security spending have risen in the 2023 Budget to Rs. 539.2 billion, which comprises approximately 1.78% of the GDP for 2023 [3]. The allocations for defence and public security spending have constantly been on the rise, with a 9.1% increase in the 2022 revised Budget and a 10.2% increase in the most recent 2023 Budget.

It has been 10 years since the civil war and Sri Lanka is yet to demilitarise. In fact, since the end of the war in 2009, military expenditure has consistently been on the rise. According to a publication in 2021 by Daniel Alphonsus, not only did military expenditure not return to pre-conflict levels, but even when adjusted for inflation, the military spending post-conflict (from 2009 to 2017) was higher than the spending during the wartime peak [4]. Defence expenditure as a percentage of the GDP was three times higher than in the last period of peace [5].

It must also be noted that 88% of the spending on defence and public security is for recurrent expenditure. Most of this is to sustain an active military force of around 250,000 – incidentally, the 17th highest in the world, exceeding even the military force sustained by the UK [6].

The defence expenditure also includes spending on a Police force of 74,835 officers and a Special Task Force of 8,860 [7]. In 2021, 34.6% of Government salaries and wages were spent on defence [8]. Bearing such a high cost on maintaining an active force during peacetime is not only overspending but is also an inefficient allocation of these resources.

The need for action

Reduction of these active personnel will not only lower Government expenditure but with proper programmes, provide valuable labour that can be utilised in an effective and productive manner in the private sector. While the proposal in the 2023 Budget speech mentions that armed force personnel will be allowed to retire after 18 years, it is unclear if this is optional or mandatory. Further, whether this proposal would even be implemented remains to be seen.

Many Sri Lankan citizens today find it difficult to simply get by due to the crisis brought about by the mismanagement of public finances. While the public is burdened with paying more in taxes, the Government should ensure that the public spendings are efficient, effective, and deliver good social outcomes. It is difficult to justify maintaining a large standing army or a vast defence expenditure in a time of peace.


(The writer is a Research Assistant at the Advocata Institute. He can be contacted at avishka@advocata.org. The Advocata Institute is an independent public policy think tank. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org.)

(The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.)

References

  • Central Bank, Annual Report 2021.

  • IMF, Press Release No. 22/295.

  • Based on 2023 Budget Estimates; Public Finance.

  • Daniel Alphonsus, Sri Lanka’s Post-War Defence Budget: Overspending and Underprotection, South Asia Scan, Issue No. 15 (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, November 2021).

  • Daniel Alphonsus, Sri Lanka’s Post-War Defence Budget: Overspending and Underprotection, South Asia Scan, Issue No. 15 (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, November 2021).

  • The International Institute For Strategic Studies, ‘The Military Balance 2021’; Global Fire Power.

  • Sri Lanka Police, ‘Performance Report 2019’.

  • Calculations based on Central Bank, Annual Report 2021.