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Sri Lanka’s economy is entering a dangerous tailspin

Originally appeared on Daily Mirror

By Ravi Rathnasabapathy and Rehana Thowfeek

Sri Lanka has just entered the deepest economic crisis in its history. Shortages and rising prices that people face today are only the first inkling of what lies ahead. Unless decisive action is taken, it can go into a destructive tailspin. 

Downgrades and forex shortages mean foreign banks will only accept upfront payments for imports until credibility is restored. This means the country is now in a hand-to-mouth existence: imports are restricted to the quantum of foreign exchange inflows. These inflows are shrinking. 

Production of goods and services, for both exports and domestic consumption is contracting due to shortages of fuel, power and other inputs. Exporters are losing orders as overseas buyers, concerned about the inability to supply and missed deadlines are switching orders to other countries. Tourist numbers dwindle due to long power cuts, lack of fuel for transport and the closure of restaurants due to lack of gas. 

Lower exports lead to even lower foreign exchange receipts, which in turn limits production even further. With each cycle, the noose tightens further, until eventually most activity ceases. 

The shrinking supply of goods and services within the economy leads to increases in prices, as spending outpaces production. Businesses become unviable due to their inability to function at normal capacity and people lose their livelihoods. As activity shrinks, individuals and businesses alike find it difficult to repay their bank loans and the pressure shifts to the banking sector. This cycle continues until most economic activity grinds to a halt. As the country is pushed into a subsistence existence malnutrition and hunger become widespread.

The crippling effects of the inability to import are similar to that of being under international sanctions except that these have been self-inflicted. Now that the downward cycle has started, it is very difficult to stop as the forces of destruction gather momentum and speed. Until the appointment of the new governor last week, Sri Lanka was in free-fall. The best hope now is to arrest the descent and stabilise it at some point. The governor has taken only the first step on the path to stabilisation but much more needs to be done.

It is clear from the people’s protests that the public have lost confidence in the government. What people don’t realise is that multilateral agencies, international banks and rating agencies have also lost confidence. The government budgets the last two years were replete with errors: overestimated revenues, irreconcilable differences and unrealistic assumptions. Abrupt changes in polices and asinine statements by officials underlined these concerns; one international bank entitled its update “Denial is not a Strategy”. Even before the default many foreign banks refuse to accept letters of credit from Sri Lankan banks unless guaranteed by an international bank.    
A key benefit of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme is that it will restore confidence. The mere fact that the government budgets and forecasts are being reviewed by the IMF signals that they are based on realistic assumptions and reasonable estimates. Together with concrete steps towards repairing public finances it will restore some confidence among lenders and pave the way for bridge finance – to relieve some of the crippling shortages that are choking production and livelihoods.

Returning to growth is not impossible but this means addressing the structural issues within the economy, a matter that is all but impossible due to the thicket of vested interests that have grown during the past two decades.

Stabilisation – averting complete meltdown
The major cause of the disequilibrium in the economy was the excessive money printing carried out by the Central Bank since 2019. Money has been printed to finance government expenditure at an alarming rate. The huge increase in government spending results in strong demand for goods and services within the economy. High levels of demand feed into local products and services as well as for imports. Historically, whenever the government has run a large budget deficit financed by the Central Bank credit, it has always resulted in a current account deficit.
The first step to addressing the problem of money printing is to borrow from the domestic market, instead of the Central Bank. Given the enormous sums being borrowed, the government needs to offer a sufficiently high interest rate to attract the required quantum of funds. This is why rates have been raised sharply. Higher rates will reduce consumption by the private sector (which also reduces imports) but may also affect investment, so such high rates, while unavoidable to stabilise the present situation, cannot be maintained in the long term.

For rates to reduce, the levels of government borrowing must reduce. This means cutting the budget deficit. This will have to be approached in two ways: an increase in taxes and a reduction in expenditure.

Increases in personal taxes will reduce the government deficit and therefore the government borrowing requirement reducing the pressure on interest rates. Higher taxes can help curtail private consumption (including import consumption) but may also impact savings and therefore investment. Increases in corporate taxes could curtail investment.

To minimise the negative effect on investment, the government should not rely on taxes alone, expenditure must be cut but the recurrent expenditure is very rigid (mainly salaries, interest and pensions), so reducing capital expenditure is more feasible both politically and practically. Resistance will however be encountered due the corruption involved, especially in highway projects. Reducing the drain from state enterprises and the disposal of idle or underutilised assets are other avenues to close the deficit. Some trimming of unnecessary current government expenditures can increase available fiscal space for social transfers.

Since the majority of the government expenditure is spent on salaries, pensions and interest, a recruitment freeze and a freeze on increments will halt further expansion. All discretionary expenditure unless directly welfare-related must be frozen along with capital expenditure at least in the short term. All transfers and support to state-owned enterprises must cease.

The imbalances will be resolved due to a combination of factors: contraction of demand due to higher interest rates and higher prices which follow from the adjustment of prices to the realistic exchange rate. Prices will need to rise to the market-clearing rate, critically energy prices, which are dependent on the exchange rate. This, however, delivers a huge negative shock to the poor, so it must be cushioned with social transfers.

These are purely stabilisation measures. If carried out properly, this can restore the economy to its state in 2019 but at a higher price level, higher unemployment, lower levels of output and higher levels of poverty. Those in the middle and lower-income groups will be pushed further down the income spectrum: large sections of the middle class will find themselves poor and the poor will be left in abject poverty. Due to low levels of productivity growth will be stagnant at 1-2 percent.

Some of the destruction that has been wrought on businesses will be permanent. The rate of increase in prices will slow to tolerable levels but prices for the most part will not decline from the current high levels. Lower incomes and high prices lead to much lower living standards for most people. The low levels of productivity within the economy mean that prospects for escaping poverty remain poor but on the positive side, things will stop getting worse.
If people are to have some hope, then growth needs to be restored, which means addressing the problem of productivity.

Growth – Restoring prospects for recovery 
The people will have little prospects unless growth returns but growth is impossible unless the barriers that impede it are addressed. 

Sustained economic growth and productivity improvement are intricately linked. These are two sides of the same coin: a faster rate of economic growth cannot be maintained without productivity improvement. Higher productivity must be achieved in all sectors of economy, including the government, public sector and agriculture, where it is weakest.

At its simplest, productivity is a measure of an economy’s ability to produce outputs (goods and services) from a given set of inputs. The more productive the economy, the more value it is able to generate, either through more efficient allocation of inputs, greater productive efficiency in converting inputs into outputs or through innovation – coming up with new products and processes. Achieving sustained economic growth ultimately depends on an economy’s ability to increase its productivity over time, so improving productivity should be the key long-term goal of economic policy.

Many of the barriers to increased productivity are the result of policies and regulations of past governments. Misguided or poorly implemented measures to protect or encourage particular sectors have stifled the competitive forces that drive productivity resulting in higher costs of production. Competitive intensity is a key driver of productivity. It is only in a highly competitive business environment that firms have a strong incentive to adopt best-practice techniques, and technology and engage in innovative activity. This works in three main ways. 

First, within firms, competition acts as a disciplining device, placing pressure on the managers to become more efficient. Secondly, competition ensures that more productive firms increase their market share at the expense of the less productive. These low productivity firms may then exit the market, to be replaced by higher productivity firms. Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, competition drives firms to innovate, coming up with new products and processes, which can lead to step-changes in efficiency. Protectionism shields them from these competitive forces and eliminates a vital incentive, stunting long-term growth. 

Increasing competition means opening the country to investment and trade, reducing the tariffs and regulatory impediments to both. This can help reduce consumer prices and prices of inputs. Import competition spurs local businesses to greater efficiency. With sound macroeconomic policies in place imports can flow in freely.

Within the government, productivity must be addressed through the process of privatisation of commercial activities that could be more productively undertaken by the private sector and the closing down of non-viable state-owned entities, reforming the legal foundations of the economy and substantially increasing the efficiency in critical government functions. For example, increasing the efficiency in the areas of tax and custom procedures and reducing trade and regulatory barriers to enhance competitiveness, digitisation and better systems that improve efficiency and ease of doing business.

Policymakers have no idea of how grave this crisis is or how bad things could get. It is a classic debt and balance of payments crisis, which, if mishandled, can result in a complete meltdown of the economy. The government has appointed, at long last, competent officials in the governor and the treasury secretary aided by a solid team in Indrajith Coomaraswamy, Shanta Devarajan and Sharmini Cooray. They must have unwavering support from the executive and legislature. All political parties need to work together towards resolving the political deadlock and restoring political stability to ensure economic change can be achieved without delay. 

Policy actions: Not quite enough

Originally appeared on Daily FT, Lanka Business Online and Groundviews

By Dr Roshan Perera and Dr. Sarath Rajapatirana

Key macroeconomic indicators signal an economic crisis

A reading of key macroeconomic indicators reveals the extent of the economic crisis Sri Lanka is faced with. Indicators in all four sectors of the economy (i.e., the real sector, fiscal sector, external sector, and monetary sector), have been at their worst level in recent years, and in some cases, at levels never before seen in the post-independence history of this country. 

Growth was negative in 2020 and continued in the negative territory in the third quarter of 2021. This was obviously partly due to the pandemic as well as the measures taken to curtail its spread. However, growth in Sri Lanka continued to remain subdued while other countries in Asia were firmly on a path to recovery. Macroeconomic instability will continue to negatively impact investor sentiment and growth prospects in 2022. This will be further exacerbated by the impact of the war in Ukraine, as the region accounts for a large share of tourist arrivals and is one of the key destinations for Sri Lanka’s tea exports.

Inflation as measured by the CCPI has reached double digits (15.1% YoY in February 2022). These levels were last seen only during the last stages of the civil war. Many countries around the world have also been experiencing an uptick in inflation due to higher commodity prices, especially energy prices and supply side issues due to pent up demand with the opening of countries.

However, in Sri Lanka, an extremely loose monetary policy due to excessive money printing by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) to finance the Government’s deficit has pushed inflation to double digit levels. Further, core inflation – which excludes food and energy – had risen to 10.9% by February 2022, reflecting the demand pressures in the economy. Food inflation has risen even faster, with the year on change reaching 25.7% in February 2022. The recent outbreak of war in Ukraine sharply increased energy prices, with Brent crude oil prices rising to over $ 100 in March 2022 – levels last seen in late 2014.  With domestic fuel prices adjusting to higher international prices, inflation is likely to increase even further.

Meanwhile, the fiscal sector continues to deteriorate. Ad hoc tax changes made at end-2019 resulted in tax revenue declining by around Rs. 500-600 billion in both 2020 and 2021. This decline will continue in 2022 unless measures are taken to reverse this trend. Consequently, tax revenue collection has fallen to the lowest level in history (8% of GDP). This has led to widening fiscal deficits and interest payments absorbing more than 70% of Government revenue.

The significant contraction in revenue with no adjustment to Government expenditure increased the fiscal deficit to 11.1% of GDP in 2020. This is likely to have increased further in 2021. A deficit of this size was last witnessed in 2009 (9.9% of GDP) and 2001 (10/4% of GDP). The sharp decline in revenue and the worsening fiscal position led to international rating agencies downgrading the sovereign, effectively locking Sri Lanka from international capital markets. Hence, the Government resorted to domestic sources to finance the widening fiscal deficit. However, with a cap on interest rates, it fell on the CBSL to do the heavy lifting.

Consequently, money supply rose to unprecedented levels, mainly driven by credit to the Government from CBSL, as the net foreign assets (NFA) of CBSL turned negative for the first time ever. Net Credit to the Government (NCG) in 2021 increased by Rs. 1.454 billion (38.2% YoY) with CBSL being the main provider of credit. Credit to the private sector increased by only Rs. 810 billion (13.1% YoY) during the same period.

The extent of the monetisation of the fiscal deficit is seen by the sharp increase in CBSL’s holdings of Government securities from Rs. 75 billion at end 2019 to Rs. 1,417 billion at end 2021. This has further increased to Rs. 1,529 billion by 11 March 2022. By artificially suppressing interest rates to keep Government borrowing costs low, the CBSL was forced to purchase Government securities not taken up in the primary market. This had increased reserve money (base money) by 35% (YoY) in 2021. The increase in base money would have been even higher if not for the decline in CBSL’s NFA to a negative Rs. 386 billion due to the use of foreign reserves for debt service payments and to support the ‘fixed’ exchange rate.

On the external front, the Government’s large foreign debt repayments and its inability to tap foreign capital markets due to the sovereign downgrade led to the use of foreign reserves for debt service payments. Consequently, the country’s official foreign reserves fell to precarious levels. To address the imbalance in the external sector, the Government restricted imports of many goods. The CBSL also imposed a 100% margin requirement on importation of selected “non-essential” goods.

Notwithstanding these import controls, the trade deficit (the difference between exports and imports) widened in 2021. In addition, in September 2021, CBSL fixed the exchange rate within a band of Rs. 200 to 203 per US Dollar and instructed banks to carry out transactions within this narrow band. Since demand for US Dollars outstripped supply at this “fixed” rate, a black market developed.

On 7 March 2022, when CBSL allowed “greater flexibility” of the exchange rate, the US Dollar was trading at around Rs. 260-270 in the black market. The large deviation between the official exchange rate and the black-market rate led to a significant decline in foreign inflows. Workers’ remittances, which hitherto helped cushion Sri Lanka’s trade deficit, had declined by 23% to $ 5.5 billion in 2021, with the decline continuing in 2022.

Recent policy actions not sufficient to stabilise the economy

To address the deteriorating macroeconomic environment on 4 March 2022, the CBSL revised its policy rates by 100 basis points, thereby raising the Standing Deposit Facility Rate (SDFR) to 6.50% and the Standing Lending Facility Rate (SLFR) to 7.50%. In the same monetary policy announcement, CBSL as the Economic and Financial Advisor, proposed several policy measures to be taken by the Government to address the current economic situation, such as;

  • Introducing measures to discourage non-essential and non-urgent imports urgently

  • Increasing fuel prices and electricity tariffs immediately, to reflect the cost

  • Incentivising foreign remittances and investments further

  • Implementing energy conservation measures, while accelerating the move towards renewable energy

  • Increasing government revenue through suitable tax increases on a sustained basis

  • Mobilising foreign financing and non-debt forex inflows on an urgent basis

  • Monetising the non-strategic and underutilised assets

  • Postponing non-essential and non-urgent capital projects

However, a few days after this announcement on 7 March, CBSL permitted “greater flexibility in the exchange rate”. Although the CBSL indicated that it was of the view that transactions in the foreign exchange market should be conducted at not higher than Rs. 230 per US Dollar, by 11 March, the US Dollar was trading at Rs. 265/275.

This was partly due to confusion in the market with parallel announcements being made by the Cabinet regarding increasing the incentive payment to Rs. 38 per US Dollar from the current rate of Rs. 10 per US Dollar for repatriations by migrant workers. Maintaining the exchange rate at these levels would require further policy action while restoring the confidence of migrant workers to use formal channels for their remittances.

While the monetary policy tightening cycle has commenced more needs to be done as inflation and inflation expectations remain elevated. The last time inflation was at these levels in 2009, policy interest rates were at 10.50% (SDFR)/12.00% (SLFR) and the 91-day Treasury bill rate was close to 16%. Higher interest rates are also necessary to maintain the interest rate differential given the Federal Reserve Bank of the US has signalled it will continue to raise interest rates to address “surging inflation”. The difference between the current policy interest rates and market interest rates also provides an arbitrage opportunity for investors to make supernormal profits. This opportunity is higher given the large liquidity deficit in the overnight market, which stood at Rs. 704 billion as at 11 March 2022.

Tackling inflation also requires bringing down aggregate demand in the economy. Excessive money printing by CBSL has increased currency in circulation by Rs. 290 billion (59%) from end 2019 to end 2021. The large tax cuts in 2019 have left around Rs. 1 billion in the hands of individuals and businesses. In addition, although workers remittances did not come through formal channels, there was a thriving informal system known as the ‘Hawala’ or ‘Undiyal’ system, by which remittances came into the economy. The increase in cash in the economy has elevated demand for both domestic and imported commodities, thus exerting upward pressure on domestic prices and increasing demand for foreign exchange to support higher imports.

Suppressing imports, particularly of cars, has also left money in the hands of dealers. This excess money in the system is likely to have driven the boom in the stock market and pushed up land prices and the market for second-hand vehicles. The higher money supply in the economy has thus driven speculative activities rather than being channelled into growth-enhancing economic activities. Addressing the build-up of aggregate demand pressures requires, in addition to further tightening of monetary policy, raising taxes and curtailing the monetisation of the deficit through CBSL financing.

Further, the exchange rate should be the mechanism through which imports are discouraged and exports incentivised. Imports in 2021 increased by 28.5% from 2020. However, the increase from 2019 was only 3.5%. Further, the main increases were in medicines, fuel, textiles, base metals, machinery and equipment, and building materials.

Allowing the market mechanism to determine prices would be the most efficient way to ensure that goods get allocated to their highest use. This is particularly important in the case of fuel, which is priced significantly below cost. Interference in the market mechanism leads to shortages and the development of a black market. There are plenty of examples in the recent past that amply demonstrate the impact of administrative price controls on the availability and quality of goods in the market. In addition, controlling the price or supply of commodities leads to a transfer of “profit” to those who control the market while taxing consumers in terms of time and effort expended to source goods.

Sri Lanka faces twin problems of an internal imbalance with high domestic inflation and an external imbalance with external outflows well in excess of inflows (in other words, a deficit in the balance of payments). The root cause of the twin problems is the Government continuing to run fiscal deficits and financing these deficits through high-cost external borrowing and monetary expansion. Addressing these issues requires policy action on several fronts. However, first, a debt restructuring programme needs to be put in place to give the country some breathing space to stabilise the macroeconomy and to implement growth enhancing reforms. 

A comprehensive macroeconomic stabilisation programme and overall economic reform agenda will impact key economic variables; some desirable and some not so. Low-income groups will be particularly affected by these policy adjustments. Hence, attention needs to be paid to ensure an adequate safety net to protect the most vulnerable in society from the fall out of policy adjustments.

The current Samurdhi programme is woefully lacking in terms of adequacy and targeting. There needs to be a more comprehensive social protection scheme. The additional cost of the programme could be funded through savings from the fuel subsidy (which currently disproportionately benefits richer households), reversing the tax cuts and reallocating Government expenditure (1).

References

  1. Tackling the COVID-19 economic crisis in Sri Lanka: Providing universal, lifecycle social protection transfers to protect lives and bolster economic recovery, UNICEF Sri Lanka Working Paper, June 2020

Dr. Roshan Perera, Senior Research Fellow, Advocata Institute and former Director, Central Bank of Sri Lanka.The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Special Goods and Services Tax: Issues and Concerns

Originally appeared on Ceylon Today, Daily FT, The Island

By Dr Roshan Perera & Naqiya Shiraz

I. Background

The new bill titled ‘Special Goods and Services Tax’ was published by gazette dated 07 January 2022. (1) The Special Goods and Services Tax (SGST) was originally proposed in Budget speech 2021 but was not implemented. It has once again been presented in Budget 2022. The SGST aims to consolidate taxes on manufacturing and importing cigarettes, liquor, vehicles and assembly parts, while also consolidating taxes on telecommunication and betting and gaming (see table 1 for existing taxes on these products and table 2 for taxes consolidated into the SGST as per the schedule in the gazette). The rationale for this new tax as per the bill is “...to promote self-compliance in the payment of taxes in order to ensure greater efficiency in relation to the collection and administration on such taxes by avoiding the complexities associated with the application and administration of a multiple tax regime on specified goods and services.”

Given the multiplicity of taxes and the complexity of the current tax system as a whole, rationalising taxes is necessary to improve collection. However, whether the proposed SGST simplifies the tax system while ensuring revenue neutrality or even improving revenue collection, needs to be carefully examined.

The SGST Bill is silent on the treatment of the existing VAT on these goods and services. However, according to the Value Added Tax (Amendment) Bill also gazetted on 07 January 2022,(2) liquor, cigarettes and motor vehicles will be exempted from VAT while telecommunications and betting and gaming services will still be subject to VAT. 

While the gazetted Bill sets out some of the features of the proposed SGST there are many important areas not covered in the Bill.  These are expected to be gazetted as and when required by the Minister in charge. 

II. Issues & Concerns

The motivation behind SGST is the simplification of the tax system. Although the objective of introducing the SGST is to improve efficiency by reducing the complexity of the tax system there are many issues and concerns with this proposed tax.

  1. Revenue

Tax revenue which was 13% of GDP in 2010, declined to 8% in 2020.  Ad hoc policy changes and weak administration contributed to the decline in tax revenue collection.  This continuous decline in tax revenue has led to widening fiscal deficits and increasing debt. One of the main reasons for the current macroeconomic crisis is low tax revenue collection. Hence, any change to the existing tax system should be with the primary objective of raising more revenue.  

According to the budget speech the SGST is estimated to bring in an additional Rs. 50 billion in revenue in 2022. (3) Revenue from taxes proposed to be consolidated under the SGST has significantly declined over the past 3 years. Given the already difficult macroeconomic environment, along with ad hoc tax policy changes raising the additional revenue estimated at Rs. 50 billion seems a difficult task. 

2. Tax Base and Rate

For the SGST to raise taxes in excess of what is already being collected through the existing taxes, the rate and the base for the SGST needs to be carefully and methodically calculated. Further, the existing taxes have different bases of taxation. For instance the basis of taxation of motor vehicles is both on an ad valorem (4) basis and a quantity basis while the basis of taxation of cigarettes and liquor is quantity. (5) In light of this, the basis of taxation on which SGST is applied becomes an issue. Having different bases and different rates for various goods and services would complicate the implementation of the tax These issues need to be carefully considered to ensure the new tax is revenue neutral or be able to enhance revenue collection.

3. Efficiency

One possible revenue benefit of this proposal is the inability to claim input tax credits on the sectors exempted from VAT. However, the issue is the cascading effect that would result where there would be a tax on tax with the end consumer paying taxes on already paid taxes. If the idea was to raise additional revenue by limiting tax credits, it would have been simpler to raise the tax rates on the existing taxes rather than introduce a new tax. 

4. Administration

According to the bill, SGST  will now be collected through a new unit set up under the General Treasury where a Designated Officer (DO) will be in charge of the administration, collection and accountability of the tax. The existing revenue collection agencies, such as the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) or the Excise Department will not be primarily responsible for the collection of this tax. By removing the  IRD and Excise Department, a parallel bureaucracy will be created, at a time when public spending needs to be carefully managed. The General Treasury also has no previous experience and expertise in direct revenue collection. Weak administration is one of the key reasons for the low tax collection and success of this tax would depend on the strength of its administration. 

In addition to the above-mentioned concerns, as per the Bill the minister in charge of the SGST has been vested with the power to set the rates, the base and grant exemptions. Accordingly, Parliamentary oversight over fiscal matters is weakened under this proposed Bill. 

It could also lead to a time lag between the gazetting and implementing of changes to the SGST (such as the rate, base etc) and obtaining Parliamentary approval for those changes.

5. Dispute resolution 

The SGST Bill also focuses on the dispute resolution mechanism. Under the present tax system,  with the enactment of the Tax Appeals Commission Act, No. 23 in 2011 the Tax Appeals Commission has the “responsibility of hearing all appeals in respect of matters relating to imposition of any tax, levy or duty”.(6) The most recent amendment to the Tax Appeal Commissions act (2013) (7)  seeks to address the large number (495) of cases pending before the Tax Appeals Commission (8) by increasing the number of panels to hear the appeals. 

Under the proposed SGST disputes will be handled through the court of appeal. However, the time period by which specific actions need to be taken is not provided in the bill. In addition, disputes have to be taken to the court of appeal.  Hence, the entire process will be more time consuming. This could result in revenue lags and difficulties in revenue estimation until disputes are resolved.

Additionally, in the case that no valid appeal has been lodged within 14 days, any remaining payments would be considered to be in default. Thereafter, the responsibility is shifted to the Commissioner-General of the IRD to recover the dues. Given the IRD is completely removed from the normal collection process, the rationale for bringing defaults under the IRD is not clear.

III. Policy Recommendations

As discussed, the SGST Bill has several limitations and much of this is due to the ambiguities in the Bill.  

  • If the tax is implemented, the rate and basis of taxation need to be revenue-neutral to ensure tax collection is maximised and administrative costs minimised.

  • The rates, basis of taxation, exemptions etc should be specified in the Bill, as done in most other Acts. This would avoid the power for discretionary changes to the tax being placed in the hands of the minister in charge. 

  • Given the already weak tax administration, it would be more sensible to strengthen the existing revenue collecting agencies and address the weaknesses in the existing system without creating a parallel bureaucracy.

  • In the case where VAT is consolidated into the proposed GST, the issue of cascading effect of input tax credits needs to be addressed. This is relevant particularly in the case of capital expenditure. 

Given the critical state of revenue collection in the country, the question to ask is whether this is the best time to introduce a new tax. Focus should be on fixing issues in the existing tax system to ensure revenue is maximised.  The VAT is the least distortionary tax and it is the easiest to administer. Given these features, it can be a very efficient revenue generator for a country. Therefore instead of introducing a new tax, capitalising on systems that are already in place and amending the VAT rate, threshold and exemptions may be a more practical solution to the revenue problem that the country is currently facing. 


Dr. Roshan Perera, Senior Research Fellow, Advocata Institute and former Director, Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Naqiya Shiraz is a Research Analyst at the Advocata Institute.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

References:

  1. http://documents.gov.lk/files/bill/2022/1/162-2022_E.pdf

  2. http://documents.gov.lk/files/bill/2022/1/163-2022_E.pdf

  3. https://www.treasury.gov.lk/api/file/0c3639d9-cb0a-4f9d-b4f9-5571c2d16a8b

  4. A value based tax base of ad-valorem refers to a rate of tax, where revenue will increase if the value of tax base increases. 
    A quantity based tax base is a tax imposed on a per unit quantity of the product.

  5. https://www.treasury.gov.lk/api/file/304e2f2f-f215-40ad-b613-4d7cc3427178

  6. https://www.treasury.gov.lk/api/file/4028b5a0-f166-4f1d-a076-299e32200212
    http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.lk/cab/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16&Itemid=49&lang=en&dID=10210

Repay Foreign Debt or Finance Essential Imports

Originally appeared on Daily FT, Lanka Business Online and Groundviews

By Dr Roshan Perera and Dr. Sarath Rajapatirana

The available foreign reserves of the country can be used to either repay foreign creditors or to finance imports of essential goods and services required by its citizens. This is the dilemma facing Sri Lanka today. Repaying the full value of the bond using the limited foreign reserves available would provide a windfall gain to those currently holding these bonds. But it will be at great cost to the citizens of the country who will face shortages of essentials like food, medicine, and fuel. 

In these circumstances, it is in the best interest of all its citizens, for the government to defer payment of the US dollar 500 million International Sovereign Bond (ISB) coming due on 18 January 2022, until the economy can fully recover and rebuild. 

Just as an individual with co-morbidities is more vulnerable to develop severe illness if infected with COVID-19 and more to likely require hospitalisation and even treatment in an ICU, Sri Lanka was vulnerable to economic shocks long before COVID-19 struck. The country was already facing several macroeconomic challenges. Muted economic growth. An untenable fiscal position. Although a tough consolidation programme was put in place to bring government finances to a more sustainable path, sweeping tax changes implemented at the end of 2019 reversed this process, with adverse consequences to government revenue collection. Weak external sector due to high foreign debt repayments and inadequate foreign reserves to service these debts. COVID-19 only exacerbated these macroeconomic challenges. And like a patient who gets over the worst of COVID-19 has a long road to recovery; the economy of Sri Lanka faces many challenges to get back on track. 

The onset of COVID-19 in early 2020, only worsened an already grim macroeconomic situation. The country lost the confidence of international markets, and the ability of the sovereign to rollover its external debt became difficult if not impossible. In these circumstances, there was a solid argument for a sovereign debt restructuring. But the response from the government and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) was a firm “No”. The argument was that Sri Lanka never defaulted on its debt and it was not going to do so now. The official position was also that the government had a ‘plan’ to repay its debt and hence there was no reason to engage in a debt restructuring exercise. However, Sri Lanka faced high debt sustainability risks: the debt to GDP ratio at 110% was one of the highest historically and interest payments to government revenue at over 70% was one of the highest in the world. 

Table 1: Summary of External Sector Performance Q1 – 2017 to 2021 ($mn)

Therefore, it is in the best interest of the country and its citizens for the government to defer payment on its debt and use its limited foreign reserves to ensure uninterrupted supply of essential imports. But this requires a plan. To minimise the cost to the economy, the government must immediately engage its creditors in a debt restructuring exercise. This will require a debt sustainability analysis (DSA) by a credible agency to identify the resources required for debt relief and the economic adjustment needed to put the country back on a sustainable path. This will be critical to bring creditors to the negotiating table and provide them comfort that the country is able and willing to repay its debt obligations in the future. 

The cost of not restructuring is much higher. A non-negotiated default (if and when the country runs out of options to service its debt) would lead to a greater loss of output, loss of access to financing or high cost of future borrowing for the sovereign. It could even spill over to the domestic banking sector, triggering a banking or financial crisis. 

The consequences are clear. What will we choose?



Dr. Roshan Perera, Senior Research Fellow, Advocata Institute and former Director, Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Dr. Sarath Rajapatirana, Chair, Academic Programme, Advocata Institute and former Economic Adviser at the World Bank. He was the Director and the main author of the 1987 World Development Report on Trade and Industrialisation.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

National Single Window: Paving the way for paperless trade

Originally appeared on Daily FT, The Morning, the Island, and Lanka Business Online

By Mithara Fonseka and Kavishka Indraratna

In 2016, Sri Lanka ratified its Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) with the WTO and in 2017 a Secretariat was established for the National Trade Facilitation Committee to drive much needed trade reforms in the country. Currently, the rate of Sri Lanka’s implementation commitments under TFA stands at 34.9% with a timeframe ranging from 2017-2030. Reforms include the Trade Information Portal, streamlining customs processes and revamping the systems for post-clearance audit. However, progress of one of the key reforms, the National Single Window (NSW), has been stalled. Deviating from the initial time frame of completing the Single Window in December 2022, the target date has been delayed to 2030. The NSW, a globally recognised trading portal, acts as a one-stop shop for exporters and importers where customs documents, permits, registrations and other information can be submitted online at once. The definition of a Single Window, as provided by the UN/CEFACT Recommendation No. 33, is as follows: “A Single Window is defined as a facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized information and documents with a single entry point to fulfil all import, export, and transit-related regulatory requirements. If information is electronic, then individual data elements should only be submitted once”. Putting such a reform on the back-burner will only delay Sri Lanka’s transition to a system of streamlined, paperless trade processes and therefore acts as an impediment to local and foreign investment.

Why should Sri Lanka implement a NSW?
Sri Lanka has been underperforming in global trade rankings, where we sometimes rank in the bottom 50 countries. According to the Ease of Doing Business in 2020, in the trading across borders pillar, Sri Lanka ranks 96 out of 190 economies. While several of Sri Lanka’s indicators perform better than the South Asian average, there is significant room for improvement. When comparing with OECD standards, Sri Lanka takes 72 hours for border compliance regarding imports and 48 hours for export documentary compliance whereas the OECD average stands at 8.5 and 2.3 hours respectively. Lengthy customs procedures and multiple inspections impede efficiency. Meanwhile, we ranked 94 out of 160 countries under World’s Bank 2018 Logistics Performance index and 103 out of 136 for the World Economic Forum’s 2016 Enabling Trade index. Notably, one of the indicators from the Enabling Trade Index, the customs services index, which considers factors such as clearance of shipments via electronic data interchange and the separation of physical release of goods from fiscal control, we rank 116 out of 117 countries. A lack of transparency, inter-agency coordination and lengthy cumbersome processes contribute to Sri Lanka’s poor trade environment. An average trade transaction can involve over 30 different agencies and upto 200 data elements, a lot of which have to be repeated. There is thus an evident need to streamline trade processes through digitisation, creating a business friendly environment that supports small businesses as well as foreign investors.

A Background into the National Single Window

In 1989, the Government of Singapore introduced the world’s first NSW, known as Tradenet. It took two years for the model to become operational and has now become one of the most advanced models in the world. Since then, many countries have adopted similar models and a NSW has become a critical tool in facilitating efficient and paperless trade. The annual survey conducted by The United Nations on trade facilitation identified that almost 74% of countries surveyed in the Asia Pacific region have to some extent engaged in creating a NSW (this includes countries which are only in the pilot stage). While a NSW is universally known for promoting the transition from paper-based to electronic customs processing, each window developed by a country is unique and varies according to the context of the country. For example, in Chile and Malaysia, the NSW enables traders to submit their export and import declarations, manifests and their trade-related documents to customs authorities electronically. In Korea and Hong Kong, private sector participants including banks, customs brokers, insurance companies and freight forwarders are also connected through the portal.

Single entry, single submission, standardized documents and data, sharing of information (information dissemination), centralised risk management, coordination of agencies and stakeholders, analytical capability and electronic payment facilities are some of the key functions included in a Single Window. In Sri Lanka, the World Bank did several studies on the NSW, identifying different operational models, best practices and a final blueprint document was given to the government and Sri Lanka Customs (SLC) in July 2019. However, since then, there has been no news of progress. While many countries including Sri Lanka are keen to emulate Singapore’s pioneering model, a lack of clear targets and timelines deteriorate the chances of implementing such a system.


The Mutual Benefits of a NSW

Businesses in countries without an integrated trade system find it difficult to compete in the international arena given the time and money spent to simply get clearance. Streamlining the entire process from start to finish in a manner that’s comprehensive and transparent, sans bureaucracy has a number of positive effects for traders. It was estimated that Singapore’s TradeNet saved its traders around US$1 billion per year. Korea’s uTradeHub allowed its business community to save approximately US$ 818.9 million. These were savings from the use of e-documents, automated administrative work and information storage and retrieval with the use of ICT. A Single Window automatically simplifies the compliance requirements traders face. In Mozambique traders benefited from faster clearance times, where through the NSW, the time was reduced from 3 days to a few hours. Meanwhile, Thailand’s NSW transformed the customs clearance turnaround time (measured as per declaration) to 95% in 5 minutes. Using a single portal has enabled traders to avoid visiting multiple agencies and simply submit an application at their convenience from any location. NSW has supported businesses through the removal of unnecessary costs, time and red tape, factors which tend to act as key deterrents to small businesses as well as foreign enterprises. 

The NSW system has similarly provided noteworthy cost-savings for government entities involved in trade. Singapore Customs, has claimed that for every US$1 earned in customs revenue, it only spends 1 cent, implying a profit margin of 9,900%.  In Hong Kong, trade facilitation measures have provided them with HK$1.3 billion in annual savings. The NSW has also reduced revenue leakages which may arise through transit. For example, Mozambique is a transit country to Swaziland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. By expanding their NSW to include value added services such as GPS tracking of consignments in transit, automatic detection of breaches in consignment and deviation from assigned transit corridors the NSW prevents revenue leakages and the opportunity for corruption, maximising revenue collection. The NSW has further led to productivity and efficiency improvements. A Single Window has enabled authorities to handle a larger volume of applications with much more ease. Mozambique, which used to face infrastructural weaknesses, through the implementation of its single window, is able to handle roughly 1,500 custom declarations per day.  Shifting to paperless customs processes would reduce costs for inventory and assist in improved resource allocation as personnel would not be required for trivial and mundane tasks such as preparation and cross checking of numerous documents. In totality, a fully digitised system provides government agencies with the means to do away with inefficiencies that hold back the speed of document processing, approval, communication and inspection stages. Further contributing to efficency, a NSW has also facilitated the dissemination of data through multiple agencies ranging from border control authorities, freight forwarders, customs brokers, shipping agents, banks and so on. As a result, there is improved inter-agency coordination and increased transparency.

Apart from a substantial increase in government revenue, the NSW will contribute to an improved business environment in Sri Lanka. The domino effects include an upward movement in the country’s global rankings, incentives for FDI and local business as well as a global recognition. 

Driving forces for implementation

While the NSW on the surface seems like an IT-based innovation, it is rather a platform for inter-agency and private sector collaboration. As the NSW is a system which requires involvement from government, the private sector and the transport community, it is crucial to ensure inter-agency collaboration. Ensuring public-private sector participation, introducing mandates and a steering committee to oversee implementation is crucial in developing such a system. The system as a whole is one that constantly evolves with no end stage. It requires continuous maintenance, support, and enhancement. This should be supplemented by the appropriate legislation, disclosure and publishing, backed by training and airtight data security policies. Thus governance of the NSW needs to be executed appropriately so that new technologies, techniques and new modes of trade can be leveraged. In best performing nations, a Single Window is not considered a single system but rather “a combination of trade-related platforms that serve various trade communities and modalities”. This has enabled leading countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong to facilitate seamless trade by building an environment of interoperable trade systems.

  1. WTO, Trade facilitation Agreement Database, https://tfadatabase.org/members/sri-lanka , Accessed January 6, 2022.

  2. WTO, Trade facilitation Agreement Database,10.4-Single Window, https://tfadatabase.org/members/sri-lanka/technical-assistance-projects/article-10-4

  3. United Nations, UN/CEFACT, ‘Recommendation and Guidelines on establishing a Single Window: to enhance the efficient exchange of information between trade and government, Recommendation No.33, (2005), https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/cefact/recommendations/rec33/rec33_trd352e.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  4. World Bank Group, ‘Doing Business 2020’, Economy Profile Sri Lanka, Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies,(2020), https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/sri-lanka/LKA.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  5. World Bank Group, ‘Doing Business 2020’, Economy Profile Sri Lanka, Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies,(2020), https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/sri-lanka/LKA.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  6. World Bank Group, ‘Logistics Performance Index 2018’, (2018), https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/radar/254/C/LKA/2018#chartarea Accessed January 6, 2022.

  7. World Economic Forum,’The Global Enabling Trade Report 2016, Enabling Trade Rankings’, (2016) https://reports.weforum.org/global-enabling-trade-report-2016/enabling-trade-rankings/#series=CUSTSERVIND

  8. World Economic Forum, ‘Enabling Trade Index 2016’, (2016) https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GETR_2016_report.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  9. World Economic Forum, ‘The Global Enabling Trade Report 2016, Enabling Trade Rankings’, https://reports.weforum.org/global-enabling-trade-report-2016/enabling-trade-rankings/#series=CUSTSERVIND Accessed January 6, 2022.

  10. Johns, M. “Trade facilitation reform in Sri Lanka can drive a change in culture”, World Bank Blogs, 2017

    https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/trade-facilitation-reform-sri-lanka-can-drive-change-culture Accessed January 6, 2022.

  11. UN ESCAP,’Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation in Asia and the Pacific 2021’, (2021)
      https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/UNTF%20Report.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  12. UN ESCAP,’Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide’,

    https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/5%20-%201.%20Introduction_0.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  13. UN ESCAP, ’Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide’

     https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/5%20-%201.%20Introduction_0.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  14. UN ESCAP, ‘Single Window for Trade Facilitation: Regional Best Practices and Future Development’ https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Regional%20Best%20Practices%20of%20Single%20Windows_updated.pdf, Accessed January 6, 2022.

  15.  UNECE, ‘Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide, Singapore case study’, https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/cefact/single_window/sw_cases/Download/Singapore.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  16. United Nations ESCAP, ‘Single Window Implementation: Benefits and Key Success Factors’, (2012), https://unnext.unescap.org/sites/default/files/switajik-sangwon.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  17. UNECE, ‘Trade Facilitation Guide, Single Window Implementation in Mozambique’,
    https://tfig.unece.org/cases/Mozambique.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  18. UNECE,Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide, Interagency Collaboration for Single Window    Implementation:Thailand’s Experience, https://tfig.unece.org/cases/Thailand.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  19. United Nations, Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide, (2012) https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/0%20-%20Full%20Report_5.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  20. United Nations, ESCAP, Single Window Implementation: Benefits and Key Success Factors

     https://unnext.unescap.org/sites/default/files/switajik-sangwon.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  21. UNECE, ‘Trade Facilitation Guide, Single Window Implementation in Mozambique’,   
        https://tfig.unece.org/cases/Mozambique.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

  22. United Nations, ESCAP, Single Window for Trade Facilitation:Regional Best Practices and Future  
    Development, (2018),  https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Regional%20Best%20Practices%20of%20Single%20Windows_updated.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

State-owned enterprises: A major crisis in the making

Originally appeared on Daily FT, The Island, Ada Derana Biz, Ground Views and The Morning

By Migara Rodrigo

Sri Lankan State-Owned Enterprises: A Major Crisis in the Making

Sri Lanka has a whopping 527 state-owned enterprises (1) (SOEs). The 55 SOEs classified as “strategically important” alone employ 10% of the public sector workforce (2) or about 1.9% of all workers. Such a large number of SOEs are not the norm globally(3); many other countries (such as India) have been reducing their stakes in SOEs and, in some cases (e.g. Air India), have been privatizing them entirely. SOEs - particularly many in Sri Lanka - tend to be grossly inefficient, loss-making, and a burden on the taxpayer. The time is ripe for major SOE reforms. 

What is an SOE?

An SOE is traditionally defined as a commercial entity that has majority ownership/control by a nation’s government – in Sri Lanka, this can include statutory bodies, regulatory agencies, promotional institutions, educational institutions, public and limited companies. While Sri Lankan SOEs have traditionally been incorporated by an Act of Parliament, in recent years these entities have also been incorporated under the Companies Act instead. 

Sri Lankan SOEs can be divided into three categories: 55 Strategic SOEs, 287 SOEs with commercial interests, and 185 SOEs with non-commercial interests. Unlike nations such as India which mandate internal audits of their SOE’s business activities and publish an annual overview with a balance sheet of each individual business, the majority of Sri Lankan SOEs do not reveal this pertinent information to the public; financial information is available for just 10.4% of SOEs. 

Fundamental problems with Sri Lankan SOEs

Contrary to what some believe, low quality of talent is not the most significant issue with SOEs; many employees are eminently qualified and capable. Unfortunately, these organisations fall victim to government mismanagement and corruption. In addition to excessive employment to fulfil their political ambitions, there have been allegations that some SOEs have been formed purely to facilitate corruption – for example, the Lanka Coal Company engaged in fraudulent deals to purchase coal causing a loss of over Rs. 4 billion (allegedly with the knowledge of the minister in charge)(4). 

SOE financials are late and few obtain ‘clean’ audit reports. Investigations have revealed repeated instances of fraud, mismanagement, corruption and negligence. Furthermore, the internal control, monitoring and governance frameworks seem inadequate to deal with these problems – of over 500 SOEs, regular information is only available for 55. Even obtaining a complete list of entities proved to be a challenge. Public access to information is limited – the Department of Public Enterprises has not released an annual report since 2018, and right-to-information requests often go unanswered.

Figure 1 Source: Ginting, Edimon et al, 2020, Reforms, Opportunities, and Challenges for State-Owned Enterprises, Asian Development Bank

Moreover, SOEs have few budget constraints and shareholder (public) accountability and therefore have limited incentive to control costs. Unlike with private sector enterprises, which have a need to make a profit, many SOEs (particularly in Sri Lanka) can simply borrow from other state organisations/banks or the government when they require additional funds, which undermines the threat of bankruptcy as a source of discipline(5). Some recently established SOEs have found a new way of bypassing budgets and oversight: by incorporating as companies rather than through an act of Parliament, they are excluded from Parliamentary accountability and allowed to rack up unsustainable debts and surpass budgets more easily. This has led to SOEs burning through taxpayer rupees: the cumulative losses of the 55 strategic SOEs from 2006-20 amounts to Rs. 1.2 trillion.

Finally, while some SOEs do manage to make a profit this is, more often than not, due to the advantage that these companies have in an uneven playing field. In addition to lax budgetary requirements and the ability to rack up unsustainable debts, these companies are supported by the government through direct subsidies and state-backed guarantees; by regulators through exemptions from antitrust policies and preferential treatment; and by the justice system through an ability to sidestep parliament. This has led to private sector organisations being crowded out of the industries that SOEs operate in. Instead of having private firms in the marketplace with efficient and high-quality services, the Sri Lankan taxpayer is beset with SOEs with total liabilities of 4-5% of GDP(6).

Potential reforms 

Given that the nation has reached an economic tipping point, with serious questions about debt sustainability and government solvency, it is clear that immediate action must be taken. Advocata proposes a short-term policy solution consisting of privatisation, restructuring and disinvestment, and listing on the Colombo Stock Exchange. None of these solutions are particularly radical in the global or local context. According to Lankan Angel Network Director Anarkali Moonesinghe, the two main policies of both Western and Eastern governments when reforming SOEs are to reduce subsidies and increase efficiency, forcing SOEs to compete more equitably with private enterprises.

Alternatively, full or partial privatisation is a possible solution: SLT-Mobitel’s service has markedly improved following its 1997 privatisation and the entrance of competitors such as Dialog Axiata, all held accountable by the broadly competent Telecommunications Regulatory Commission. Listing on the CSE would allow these firms to have broad-based direct ownership, while also improving the growth of the CSE and capital markets. Importantly, these firms would have to be ‘corporatised’ before listing, an opportunity to improve productivity and eliminate bloat. 

There are, unfortunately, firms that will essentially have to be given away due to their huge debts and poor reputations. A prime example of this is SriLankan Airlines, which has racked up Rs. 316 billion in losses (7) since control was taken from Emirates in 2008. While some will regard this as a blow to our national pride, Sri Lanka would not be alone in taking such a pragmatic step to improve government finances and customer experience; Air India, the Indian national carrier, is currently in the process of being sold to the Tata Group for the relatively small sum of INR 18,000 crore. This would also inspire confidence in Sri Lanka amongst foreign investors as it would show the country’s commitment to meeting its upcoming debt servicing obligations.

Furthermore, long-term solutions include strengthening governance/limiting corruption and influence, improving efficiency, enacting cost-reflective pricing, and finally unbundling key sectors. This applies particularly to firms like the Ceylon Electricity Board which, as a natural monopoly, cannot be broken up and privatised without losing efficiency. A 2006 study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency recommended breaking up CEB into three parts: “making the generation, transmission, and distribution divisions…independent” (8). Despite the 15 years and multiple nationwide blackouts that have occurred since, GoSL continues to drag their feet on the issue, as it is politically unpopular. 

Cost-reflective pricing (also prevented due to political unpopularity) is another essential reform. The existing system of having electricity tariffs priced below cost is a public subsidy whose cost will be borne by future generations. It is also inequitable, as the Government could provide low-cost services to those who need it by giving them direct cash transfers, instead of subsidising the wealthy who can afford to pay. A similar situation is evident with the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, which currently makes a loss of Rs. 23-38 per litre of fuel (9); again, a public subsidy to those who can often afford to pay the market price. Finally, greater accountability, by means of annual internal audits and the availability of SOEs’ financial information to the public, is also important to ensure these firms stick to the targets they are given.

A successful and thriving market, in most industries, will only occur with the presence of three crucial factors: competition, a good framework, and competent regulation. By reforming Sri Lanka’s SOEs to meet these criteria, we will ensure a good customer experience, a reduction in the government deficit, and general prosperity for all key stakeholders. 

References:

1 Ratnsabapathy, Ravi et al, 2019, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka, Advocata Institute

2 Dissanayake, Imesha, 2021, SOE Reforms; the Impetus for Post Pandemic Economic Revival, Ceylon Chamber of Commerce

3 Büge, Max et al, State-owned enterprises in the global economy: Reason for concern? Last modified: May 2nd, 2013 

4 ColomboPage.com, President to take action against removal of head of Lanka Coal Company, Last modified: January 21st, 2017, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_17A/Jan21_1484983651CH.php

5 Ratnsabapathy, et al, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka

6 WorldBank.org, South Asia Must Reform Debt-Accumulating State-Owned Banks and Enterprises to Avert Next Financial Crisis, Last modified: June 29th, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/24/south-asia-must-reform-debt-accumulating-state-owned-banks-and-enterprises

7 PublicFinance.lk, Sri Lankan Airlines: Annual and Accumulated Loss to the Public, Last modified: 24th August 2021, https://publicfinance.lk/en/topics/Sri-Lankan-Airlines:-Annual-and-Accumulated-Loss-to-the-Public-1629789830

8 Saito, Yoshitaka et al, 2006, Master Plan Study on the Development of Power Generation and Transmission System in Sri Lanka, Japan International Cooperation Agency Economic Development Department

9 EconomyNext.com, Sri Lanka’s CPC says petrol, diesel losses rise as LIOC hikes prices, Last modified: 25th October 2021, https://economynext.com/sri-lankas-cpc-says-petrol-diesel-losses-rise-as-lioc-hikes-prices-87276/#modal-one

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Reform or Regress

Originally appeared on The Morning

By K D Vimanga

The Sri Lankan economy’s crossroads

The great South African Statesman Nelson Mandela once said: “It always seems impossible until it is done.” Well, in our case, the time to get things done is already here. If we keep calling the act of reforming our economy impossible, then this country for sure will continue on a very dangerous path. So the longer we postpone the possibility of reforms, the more painful the process is going to be. So, we all, both policy makers and citizens alike, need to realise that the only way we can get out of this crisis is by implementing immediate and hard reforms, which this column has over and over again expounded on. 

Implementing reforms remains impossible for the sole reason that there remains very little political will to do so. However, what history teaches us is that the only way for nations to emerge from a crisis is by implementing bold reforms, even if they are politically unpopular. Such bold policy decisions, taken for the greater good of the nation, have been instrumental in releasing millions out of poverty. The best example is the economic reforms in India, which commenced from the 1991 economic crisis. The bold decisions taken by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh were taken during compelling times. India was facing a similar situation, where the country was finding it hard to meet external debt obligations along with a serious balance of payment crisis. India was almost bankrupt as a result of the post-independence command and control-driven economy that brought the nation to the brink. However, amidst all odds, at the height of the crisis, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh opened its economy to be driven by market forces, while dismantling the license quota raj. This also involved the devaluation of the rupee at the height of the crisis. It were these hard reforms that laid the foundation of India emerging out from the depths of bankruptcy. As a result of these reforms from 1992 to 2005, foreign investment increased by 316.9%, and India’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew from $266 billion in 1991 to $2.3 trillion in 2018 (1). 

Sri Lanka is facing a similar or far worse crisis. It is public knowledge that the economy has reached a boiling point, with the country’s reserves falling to $ 1.57 billion, while Sri Lanka has debt payment commitments of $ 4.5 billion (2) for 2022. Inflation has been rising to 9.9% (3). Advocata’s Bath Curry Indicator, which tracks the price of essential food items, records that since 2019, prices have increased by 44%. This means that an average family who spent Rs. 960 weekly on the BCI basket of food items in November 2019 now has to pay Rs. 1,390 for the same basket of goods just two years later. Continued printing of money, along with the implementation of policies without foresight – such as the overnight move to organic fertiliser – have all significantly added to this present rise in food prices. Therefore one cannot deny the existence of the crisis anymore. 

So what needs to be done? 

The answer is simply, implement a comprehensive programme of reforms now. For this week’s column, I would like to discuss the role of privatisation in the most immediate and short term. Implementing such a programme of privatisation which releases commercial activities carried out by the state can bring in significant cost savings for the Government while also bringing in short term liquidity. More importantly, such a programme can become a much needed productivity boost to the economy while opening up for private sector participation. Closing down non-viable state-owned entities is another key requirement of such a programme. 

The country is also currently in desperate need for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The Finance Minister admitted in Parliament that Sri Lanka is not getting FDIs as fast as expected. Therefore privatisation can be the fastest route to capture foreign direct investment. FDIs jumped in the 1990s mainly due to their ambitious privatisation programme. Out of the total privatisation proceeds realised during 1989-2005, 59% was financed by foreign investors as illustrated by the Central Bank (4). Privatisation served as a significant channel for FDI entry. Privatisation-related FDI accounted for at least one-third of FDI in the 1990s. The largest 20 foreign investors in Sri Lanka all arrived in the 1990s and made significant contributions in telecommunications, power, ports, and other areas of services and manufacturing. However, to be effective, it is critical that privatisations are carried out through open and transparent processes.

One way to maintain this transparency is maintaining oversight. The Public Enterprises Reform Commission (PERC) was established under an Act of Parliament in 1996 to be solely responsible for ensuring that the privatisation process occurred in a transparent and structured manner. Although not entirely free of controversy, PERC increased transparency and public information about the privatisation process. The PERC was shut down, and it is now necessary to revive PERC and put in place measures to ensure transparent and competitive processes.

Successful privatisation, if done right, can reduce the drain of government resources, especially at a time when government expenditure and mismanagement of state-owned enterprises are a serious burden on the fast draining government coffers. A second benefit is the generation of new sources of government revenue through receipt of proceeds, at a time where the Government is in desperate need for government revenue. The improvement of infrastructure and delivery of public services by the involvement of private capital and expertise is another important benefit. Other merits of privatisation include the improvement of the efficiency of the economy by making it more responsive to market forces, the broadening of the base of ownership in the economy; and the enhancement of the capital markets. 

A programme of privatisation can be the center point of the reform programme. However, macro-economic stabilisation, which we have discussed over and over again, must be carried in tandem. What is crystal clear is that time to implement these is running out if we continue to be blindly critical of these painful reforms and be complacent of its merits. Unlike at any other point in time, policy makers also need to be ready to make bold reforms and this will be the ultimate test of the resilience of our economy. The tipping point has been reached, we have no choice but to get these reforms done. Bold policy making is the need of the hour!

References

  • Dutta, M. K. and Sarma, Gopal Kumar, Foreign Direct Investment in India Since 1991: Trends, Challenges and Prospects (1 January 2008).

    Ministry of Finance Annual Report 2020

    https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/press/pr/press_20211130_inflation_in_november_2021_ccpi_e.pdf

    https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_docu-ments/publications/annual_report/archives/en/2007_17_Appendix.pdf

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Urgent need for justice reforms: Digitalisation can lead the way

Originally appeared on The Morning and Daily FT

By Tiffahny Hoole and Sumhiya Sallay

The Supreme Court, in the 1994 case of Jayasinghe v. AG, correctly asserted that “justice delayed is justice denied” (1). While the very apex of the justice system recognised that delays in court proceedings hinder litigants’ access to justice, there is a major backlog of cases in Sri Lanka. The entire court process, from the point where a case is taken up to court until its final verdict, is an extremely time-consuming process.

The operation of a country’s legal system significantly influences several components of its economic development such as the optimal allocation of resources and the increase in total factor productivity (2).

In 2021, a three-year plan targeting digitisation of courts was implemented to make the judicial system more efficient. Digitisation of the courts would mean a more streamlined process of court hearings.

Shortcomings of the Sri Lankan legal system

By the end of 2019, there were 4,767 pending cases to be heard in the Supreme Court, while 6,813 were to be heard in the Commercial High Court (3). In the speech delivered by the incumbent Minister of Justice at the Bar Association’s 47th Annual Convocation, it was stated that a total of 766,784 cases were pending by the end of 2019, with approximately 350 judges to hear those cases (4). The situation was only exacerbated in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. With periodic lockdowns consequent to seasonal outbreaks of Covid-19 cases, both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal suspended proceedings (5).

The increased backlog of cases prior to and during the pandemic is attributable to the very nature in which the justice system operates. Sri Lanka’s court procedure and practice has been heavily reliant on in-person proceedings, physical filings, and production of documents and evidence respectively (6); a system too archaic to withstand any external shocks such as natural disasters, fires, or more specifically, a pandemic.

Ease of doing business: A point of discussion

The continuous delay in court proceedings over the years is one of the key factors which contributed to Sri Lanka’s low rank in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” index (7). Contract enforcement is one of Sri Lanka’s worst performing pillars in the index, as it ranked 164 out of 190 countries in 2020 (8). The average time period required to enforce a contract stands at 1,318 days (3.61 years) (9). In comparison, New Zealand, which topped the index, takes 216 days (0.6 years) (10). In his speech, the Minister of Justice further stated that market research prior to any investment would result in flocking towards countries with higher indexes, concluding that we would be losing “big” (11).

With the data highlighted by the index, in conjunction with prolonged lockdowns, the Minister of Justice soon realised that the backlog in cases had reached saturation. Speedy resolution in litigation is a prerequisite on foreign investments (12). Thus, with the aim of administering the public’s access to justice, major reforms are finally underway.

Reforms: Future of court procedures in Sri Lanka

Upon comprehensive studies conducted in 2017 with the assistance of the Information and Communication Technology Agency (ICTA) in Sri Lanka, the Ministry of Justice embarked on a court automation and digitisation project (13). In the recent Budget 2022 speech, the urgent need for reform was highlighted by Minister of Finance Basil Rajapaksa. Following this, a proposal to allocate a further Rs. 5,000 million towards this cause was presented (14).

The Covid-19 pandemic brought to light how far behind Sri Lanka is in terms of judicial digitised systems. Many countries were able to quickly recover post-Covid, as they already had systems in place to shift to virtual court hearings. However, courts, and other dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration in Sri Lanka, were far behind.

Prior to the commencement of this project, digitisation in court proceedings was being experimented in selected courts on an incremental basis. In November 2020, the “Virtual Courthouse Programme” was pioneered by the Commercial High Court in partnership with Sri Lanka Telecom and the Colombo Law Library (15). Similarly, a key person interview conducted by the Advocata Institute brought to light the efforts made by the lawyers in the courts of Mount Lavinia to transform court proceedings to an entirely virtual platform. In response to the pandemic, reformation was witnessed on an incremental basis. Finally, operations of virtual court hearings were formerly recognised by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Temporary Provisions), Act No. 17 of 2021, subject to the condition that physical hearings cannot be held (16).

Nevertheless, by taking into account the complexity and gravity of court procedure, it was understood that reform needed to be holistic. Accordingly, digitisation is not limited to virtual court hearings but also envisions the registration component of the judicial system. This includes scheduling, managing documents, recording proceedings, etc. Furthermore, payment of court filing fees will be shifted to an online platform. In respect of court hearings, reformation is twofold; the first phase is a pilot project which covers 18 courthouses within the Colombo District (17). The second phase is expected to implement court automation procedures across 100 courthouses in Sri Lanka (18). In the interim, existing online platforms such as Zoom and Google Meet will be utilised for this purpose.

A major challenge going forward will be data security and privacy. However, the issue of security already exists even with physical documents and in-person court hearings. Documents are tampered with, stolen, or even damaged. Witnesses may be coerced to perjure in or outside court. Thus, moving towards an online platform will circumvent the damages caused to case documents such as a fire, similar to the recent incident in the Supreme Court Complex (19). In order to minimise the concerns raised, the Ministry of Justice has partnered with professional experts in the ICT sector to build a data protection and data security plan and develop remote data storage facilities (20).

The long-term benefits of digitisation

In the long term, digitisation and automation will make the litigation process far cheaper. Litigation in Sri Lanka is known to be a very expensive procedure. Instead of requiring a 100-page document to be submitted to each judge on a panel prior to the case hearing, litigants would now be able to send a pdf through an online portal. Electronic delivery of paper documents would also speed up the filing procedures (21). Rather than having to commute all the way to a district court that is outside one’s residence, litigants are able to participate in court hearings through Zoom.

Reforms in the justice system play an essential role in restoring the confidence of investors. A representative of the World Bank in the Legal Department highlighted that encouragement of foreign direct investment is at the forefront of government thinking behind legal reform (22). In the wake of the pandemic, it is pivotal that the State prioritises and ensures such essential reforms do take place so as to attract foreign investors. Justice is only delivered in the absence of delay.

References

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Cattle Slaughter Ban: It’s Not Intentions But Consequences That Matter

Originally appeared on Daily FT, Daily Mirror and The Island

By Sathya Karunarathne and Pravena Yogendra

The Cabinet of Ministers approved the Bill to amend laws to ban cattle slaughter in the third week of October. While this is a contentious policy measure, it did not come as a surprise as the Prime Minister proposed the same policy just over a year ago in September of 2020. 

From the outset, it may seem that the policy is well-intended. Alleviating animal suffering is a noble cause that many Sri Lankans would identify with. Unfortunately, even well-intended policies have unintended consequences. In the case of a cattle slaughter ban, the consequences can be dire for the livelihoods of thousands of people. As stated by the Department of Census and Statistics, 117,033 farmers raised cattle and/or buffalo locally and 56,984 farmers raised improved cattle and/or buffalo in 2020.1 Further, as reported by the Livestock Statistical Bulletin there were 296,111 cattle farms and 26,284 Buffalo farms registered in 2020.

The cattle rearing industry does not exist in isolation, nor is it sustained to nurture the beef industry alone. Cattle are an integral part of the dairy industry, leather tanning industry and footwear and leather goods industry. The dairy industry sells unproductive cattle, where 50% of the animal is salvaged as beef (3) and other parts are sold as raw material to other industries such as the leather tanning industry, etc. Therefore, a cattle slaughter ban would have consequences on all these sectors.

The Government’s intention in banning cattle slaughter is to increase dairy production and local agriculture as reported by the media. According to Central Bank data in 2020, the annual milk production from cattle was 414 m litres and 78 m litres were produced by buffalos. In the same year, Sri Lanka imported 102,355,524 Kgs of milk and milk products, and exported 1,057,079 Kgs of the same.

To keep this dairy industry running, milk producers need to get rid of unproductive cattle. Eranga Nihal Perera, the Chief of the Ceylon Cattle Farmers Association, put this into perspective speaking to the Sunday Times a few weeks ago. He stated that a bull or milch cow requires 10% of its body weight in food daily. For example, an adult stud bull weighs about 400 kgs. That is approximately 40 Kgs of feed per bull, every day. Therefore, a bull would require a monthly cost of around Rs. 26,000 to be maintained. It makes limited economic sense to sustain unproductive cattle incurring such costs as it will increase costs of maintenance with no return on investment. 

A total of 162,000 cattle were legally slaughtered in 2020. Key person interviews with leading industry stakeholders revealed that the cattle population which amounted to 1,628,771 in 2020 can grow up to three times within 10 years with the implementation of a slaughter ban with 75% of them counting to be unproductive.(10) The costs of maintenance will therefore evidently be unbearable. These cost increases, if they can be sustained at all, will be passed on to consumers as price increases in milk. A further stress to an industry already reeling with shortages and high prices. 

Beef is sourced from cattle deemed as unproductive by the dairy industry. Male cattle or bull calves are used to identify female animals in heat and to serve stud purposes, aiding the artificial insemination process. They are slaughtered for beef when they reach about three months of age. Milch cows are slaughtered after completing four calving cycles as they are considered aged, unproductive and unprofitable to maintain at this juncture. Unproductive animals must be culled to maintain the overall productivity of the herd as unproductive stud animals could mate with productive cows, producing low yielding calves. 

The latest available data shows that beef production in 2019 amounted to 29.87 metric tons.

Smallholder dairy farmers contribute to this as smallholders dominate the livestock industry. For example, a 2019 study by the University of Peradeniya revealed that among private dairy farms in the country about 95% are small scale producers. While cattle farming in Sri Lanka is running on narrow margins, a significant contribution of the marginal profits comes from the sale of these animals to the beef industry. 

Dairy farmers make an annual lifetime profit of ~30% from the sale of an animal. Therefore, small farmers who raise cattle individually for an additional income will be severely impacted by the ban. They will not be able to afford the additional maintenance costs of unproductive cattle and will have to halt their small scale business operations.

Banning cattle slaughter with the intention of increasing dairy production therefore is contradictory as it proves to be counterproductive. As illustrated above the milk industry can barely sustain itself without the beef industry. 

A slaughterer purchases an animal for ~LKR 300 per Kg live weight. Live weight ranges from 300-500kg. Thereafter, 50% of the animal is salvaged as beef and the remaining is sold to other industries.(14) The leather tanning industry is one such industry that sources raw material from cattle slaughter. A slaughtered cow yields 15-16 sq ft of rawhide. Rawhide is sourced from the slaughterer by the leather tanning industry at Rs. 45 per Kg. Domestically tanned leather is sold to the footwear and leather goods industry as raw material at Rs. 175 per Kg as opposed to imported tanned leather priced at Rs. 250 per kg ($1- 1.20).(15) 

Moreover, discussions with the industry revealed that about 60% of leather needed to produce affordable footwear is produced domestically and banning cattle slaughter will directly impact the accessibility of affordable footwear by the middle and lower-income earners of the country. Further, more than 60% of the footwear and leather goods industry consists of micro and small businesses.(16) Therefore, this policy measure will indeed hamper their access to affordable raw material and their very sustenance.

Implications of cattle slaughter 

As stated by the Buddhasasana, Religious, and Cultural Affairs Ministry Secretary, Prof. Kapila Gunawardana the Government is discussing the possibility of exporting ageing cows that will not be slaughtered in Sri Lanka with the implementation of the ban. However, exporting aged live cattle is challenging as there is a high probability of international markets being reluctant to purchase cattle exposed to infections in the process of transportation. 

With the increase of idling cattle, the Government will have to invest to build new cattle salvage farms, ensuring adequate veterinary facilities and daily feed. The NLDB has only two salvage farms in Kurunegala and Anuradhapura with a combined capacity of 1,000 animals at a time. About 400 cows are legally slaughtered per day.(19) As aged cattle require high maintenance costs with no return on investment, this will be an added strain on Government expenditure given Sri Lanka’s current limited fiscal space and precarious economic conditions. This will also clash with limited agricultural land available in the country leading to a serious threat to crops. 

Moreover, with the local beef industry coming to a complete halt, the domestic production and importation of alternative sources of protein such as chicken and fish will have to increase, meeting domestic demand and ensuring affordability for the average consumer. It is important to note that the prices of these alternatives have experienced a steep increase. According to the Department of Census and Statistics weekly retail prices, one kg of fresh chicken that cost Rs. 558.93 in November of 2020 costs Rs. 727.27 now. Further, one kg of salaya that cost Rs. 252.67 in November of 2020 is now priced at Rs. 291.67.

Moreover, a flat-out ban on cattle slaughter will breed an underground economy of illegal slaughter and trade. This will foster animal cruelty as the industry will not come under the purview of welfare authorities, creating the environment for low-cost slaughtering techniques defeating the very moral grounds of a cattle slaughter ban.

Further, banning cattle slaughter with no ban on beef consumption allowing for beef imports will only shift the burden of slaughter elsewhere. This is hypocritical as cattle will still have to be slaughtered abroad, for the consumption of Sri Lankan people. It is worthy to note that India is the fifth largest carabeef exporter in the world earning 2.8 billion dollars in exports in 2020 despite the country’s religious veneration of cattle. 

It is evident that even though a slaughter ban may sound ideal in theory, it springs a chain of unintended economic consequences hampering the dairy, beef and other related industries, paving the way for further price increases and posing a threat to business operations. 

Therefore, it is clear that when making economic decisions it is paramount to look at policies in terms of incentives they create rather than blindly pursuing a goal. This simply means that immediate and long term consequences matter more than intentions. Economic policies therefore must strive to go beyond intentions crafted by hopes and inspiration. Failure to do this will certainly lead to disastrous outcomes for the whole nation. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Did we miss the opportunity to formulate ‘a non-traditional budget’?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By K.D.D.B Vimanga

A non-traditional budget was what the country needed. In general, budgets in Sri Lanka have mostly been giveaways to maintain political status quo or simply an outline of the Government’s plan for the economy, without taking into consideration current economic realities. As a result of numerous governments prioritising political gains over economic realities, the nation is currently experiencing severe economic consequences. These are manifested to the public in the form of steep price increases, shortages of essential goods, import restrictions, and much more. The macroeconomic consequences of this are fiscal and monetary instability, coupled with serious questions on Sri Lanka’s debt sustainability. A non-traditional budget would have indicated the broad policy direction and priorities of the Government with an understanding of where the economy is right now. The Budget would have prioritised macroeconomic stabilisation, taking into consideration the seriousness of the present economic crisis. Whether the budget proposals for 2022 achieve this remains a question.

Analysing the Budget Speech makes it clear that the intention of the Budget was to be conscious of government expenditure. Is this consciousness sufficient? Especially at a time where the foreign debt service forecast for 2022 is an estimated $ 4,483.80 million? (1), when the state of the country’s foreign reserves stood at about $ 2.6 billion in September 2021 (1.7 months of imports [2]), and following which the net foreign assets have been negative in the months after. This very question of debt sustainability remains the elephant in the room. Yet, the Budget Speech failed to elaborate on specific measures that the Government hopes to utilise to meet this target. A budget that understands the present challenges would have presented a roadmap of actions to meet these outflows. The failure to do so highlights the failure to streamline the Budget to meet the seriousness of the present economic crisis.

A certain amount of credit must be given to the Government for refraining from making excessive government expenditure proposals. There is a slight increase in government total expenditure from the revised estimate of Rs. 3,387 billion for 2021 to Rs. 3,912 billion for 2022. This remains prudent in comparison to the Government’s total revenue from the revised estimate of Rs. 1,556 billion in 2021 to Rs. 2,284 billion (3). According to the figures provided by the Ministry of Finance, the budget deficit would see a reduction from Rs. 1,826 billion in 2021 to Rs. 1,628 billion in 2022. However, it should be noted that while the Budget Speech of 2021 promised a deficit of 9%, the revised estimate of the deficit has increased to 11.1% as per the Fiscal Management Report of 2022.

The budget deficit still remains unsustainably large for a country with a gross domestic product (GDP) of $ 80.7 billion in 2020 (4). The Budget tries to reduce government expenditure by proposing policies to reduce recurrent expenditure. These include reducing the fuel allowance provided to ministers and government officials by five litres per month, a 25% reduction in telephone expenses, and increasing the eligibility of MPs to receive a pension from five to 10 years. The magnitude of these cuts in government expenditure remains insignificant in contrast to the real need of the hour; especially when the Budget has made provisions to further expand the public sector, by offering permanent appointments to over 53,000 graduates which would drain a further Rs. 27,600 million from the exchequer. Such is counterintuitive to policies aimed at countering recurrent expenditure, and maintaining a bloated public sector is simply unaffordable with the current state of our public finances. Bold cuts to government expenditure would have reassured Sri Lanka’s creditors, donors, and lenders that we are serious about reforms while also making more resources and talent available to the private sector. Maintaining inflated departments with little or no productive output is a luxury we cannot afford anymore.

The continuation of financing this budget deficit through the domestic market borrowings will have a crowding out effect, especially as it will stunt credit available for the private sector and in return slow the country’s medium to long-term growth potential. Therefore, an ideal budget or a non-traditional budget would have prioritised fiscal consolidation. This includes setting a clear path to reduce the fiscal deficit to 5% by 2024. More efficient tax policy alternatives would have been reintroducing PAYE and withholding taxes and widening the tax base and spreading the tax burden to include a significant number of organisations that were given long tax breaks.

The Budget Speech highlighted three policies that, if implemented right, could direct the economy towards growth. The first being the acknowledgement that price controls have failed, and that market intervention creates uncertainties that affect consumers. This must be looked at with pragmatism, as the complete elimination of price controls including in the energy sector, can achieve better outcomes for the economy. The second being a policy focus to ensure a fair and competitive market. Recognising the role of the market economy and competition is a move in the right direction. This remains the only tried and tested solution to lower prices in the economy. The third policy that should be highlighted is the Finance Minister’s acknowledgement of a re-examination of the Samurdhi scheme. The scheme currently excludes some of the most vulnerable households and therefore, there is a need for tighter administration to ensure benefits accrue to those who need it most. The focus to streamline this initiative towards building entrepreneurship, fostering SMEs, and skill development is the right decision. However, for this to materialise, the Government needs to implement comprehensive reforms to improve ease of doing business and a comprehensive programme of digitalisation.

Addressing macroeconomic imbalances should have been a policy priority of the Budget. This includes addressing the fiscal deficit and the external current account deficit which have effects on the rest of the economy through interest rates and exchange rates. The Budget tries to address this issue by focusing on empowering local production. Prioritising self-sufficiency without opening the domestic market for competition is untenable. The Finance Minister’s speech outlined proposals to boost productivity, which are indeed pragmatic. Yet, one cannot increase productivity without improving competition. Focusing on improving national output has no economic impact without boosting domestic competition.

In the background, there was hope that the Government would start stabilising public finances, which would restore confidence. However, analysing the policy priorities of the Budget makes it clear that there has been little attempt to address the deficit and debt sustainability. Therefore, markets are unlikely to respond positively. At this juncture, Sri Lanka cannot afford to be complacent about our credit ratings. The Budget provided an ideal opportunity to provide a credible plan of action to get our credit ratings up. However, we seem to have missed this opportunity.

Measures to control public finances: spending, budget deficits, and debt 

Year after year, the budget proposals have highlighted large-scale policies that remain limited to budget speeches. However, the present economic storm makes no space for such complacency. Hard structural reforms will need to be implemented inevitably. The Budget could have been the starting point. However, it seems that this window has passed. Therefore, there is a conscious need to build consensus for the implementation of key structural reforms that achieve macroeconomic stabilisation and long-term economic growth. Without macroeconomic stability, there will be no growth. Furthermore, these reforms need to be institutionalised. One way of doing this is the adoption of a medium-term fiscal and monetary framework that gives confidence to donors, lenders, investors, and citizens. Having such a framework will act as a clear sign that the State is committed to fiscal prudence and monetary stability. A medium-term expenditure framework is a tool for establishing public expenditure programmes within a coherent multi-year economic and fiscal framework. 

Other key structural reforms for macroeconomic stabilisation, as outlined in Advocata’s Framework for Economic Recovery, include public finance management and public sector reforms, state-owned enterprise reforms, enhancing monetary policy effectiveness and maintaining exchange rate flexibility, supporting trade and investment to strengthen external trade, land reform, improving ease of doing business, and bridging infrastructure gaps. The only salvation to Sri Lanka’s present economic crisis is such a comprehensive reform package that goes beyond a traditional budget.

References:

  1. MOF annual report 2020

  2. CBSL Recent Economic Developments: Highlights of 2021 and prospects for 2022

  3. https://www.treasury.gov.lk/api/file/0c3639d9-cb0a-4f9d-b4f9-5571c2d16a8b

  4. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=LK

K.D.D.B. Vimanga is a Policy Analyst at the Advocata Institute. He can be contacted at kdvimanga@advocata.org.

The Advocata Institute is an Independent Public Policy Think Tank. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute


Is Wealth Tax the Solution to Sri Lanka’s Low Tax Revenue Collection

Originally appeared on Daily FT, Biz Adaderana , The Morning, Daily Mirror, The Island and Lanka Business Online

By Sathya Karunarathne

Successive governments have run fiscal deficits. Inadequate revenue collection and unrestrained government expenditure have worsened the country’s fiscal position.  

Tax revenue which averaged over 20% of GDP in 1990 has declined to under 10% of GDP in 2020. Ad hoc tax policy changes have significantly eroded the tax base. Weak tax administration has also contributed to the sharp decline in tax collection.

While tax revenue has contracted, government expenditure has ballooned over time. Today, government revenue is not sufficient even to meet its expenditure on salaries and wages and transfers and subsidies to households which include pension payments and social welfare payments such as Samurdhi.  

In this context, there are various proposals put forward to raise government revenue. One proposal is the reintroduction of the wealth tax.  

A wealth tax is expected to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, achieving equality. This tax shifts the tax burden to affluent households, taxing an individual’s net wealth, which is the market value of total owned assets. Proponents of wealth taxation argue that this is a progressive system of taxation and is a more powerful tool in comparison to income, estate or corporate taxes as it addresses the issue of wealth concentration.  

Moreover, a tax should ideally satisfy basic characteristics of taxation: it should not be distortionary; it should be fair, and it should not be difficult to collect. 

The rationale for a wealth tax

One of the earliest proponents of the wealth tax for developing countries was Nicholas Kaldor.  Based on his recommendation, a wealth tax together with an income tax, expenditure tax and a gift tax were introduced in Sri Lanka in 1958. However, these new taxes yielded little revenue due to difficulties in determining the tax base and problems in administration.  Following the recommendation of the Tax Commission in 1990, the government abolished the wealth tax from the year of assessment 1992/1993.

Wealth taxes have mainly been implemented in European countries. In 1990, twelve countries in Europe had a wealth tax. Today, there are only three: Norway, Spain, and Switzerland.  Several non-European countries have also imposed wealth taxes from time to time including such as Argentina, Bangladesh, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan 

In recent times there has been renewed interest in wealth taxes. Presidential candidates in the US proposed various forms of a wealth tax. In the UK and France, there were proposals to impose “super taxes” on the rich. The primary justification was to address the increasing inequality in society.  

Issues with a wealth tax

Despite renewed interest in the wealth tax as a progressive tax based on equity, it scores poorly on the criteria of efficiency, and administrative feasibility.  

Many factors have justified the repeal of wealth taxes in OECD countries. The reasons cited are related to efficiency costs, risk of capital flight particularly in light of increased capital mobility and wealthy taxpayers' access to tax havens, failure to meet redistributive goals as a result of narrow tax bases, tax avoidance and evasion, high administrative and compliance costs compared to limited revenues (high cost yield ratio).  

To understand the efficiency costs of wealth taxes one can look at taxing a person’s wealth accumulated through savings. Despite the common consensus that taxing savings is an effective way to redistribute, a person’s saving decisions reveal little about their underlying lifetime resources and wellbeing. It only reveals their preference to consume tomorrow rather than today. Thereby a wealth tax imposes a tax on those who prefer to spend their money later as opposed to taxing the wealthy. Efficiency costs refer to the reduction of the welfare of the taxed individuals by more than $1 to generate $1 of revenue. Therefore, the efficiency cost of a wealth tax in terms of taxing savings is a reduction of  future consumption that can be bought with earnings, reducing incentive to work for those who prefer to consume the proceeds later and reducing incentive for young people to save for their retirement.

Capital flight is the possibility of holding assets outside of one's resident country without declaring them.As wealth taxes are imposed on residents it increases the risk of the wealthy

reallocating their assets to avoid taxation. Therefore a high tax burden encourages taxpayers to change their tax residence to a lower tax jurisdiction or tax havens.

Both income-generating and non-income generating assets are taxed under wealth taxation. They can include land, real estate, bank accounts, investment funds, intellectual or industrial property rights, bonds, shares, and even jewellery, vehicles, art and antiques. However, this tax base for wealth taxes has often been narrowed through exemptions. These exemptions have been justified most commonly on the grounds of social concerns such as the negative social implications of taxing  pension assets. Further liquidity issues (eg - farm assets), supporting entrepreneurship and investment (eg- business assets), avoiding valuation difficulties ( eg- artwork and jewellery) and preserving countries cultural heritage (eg - artwork and antiques) have also been cited as reasons for wealth tax reliefs. While some of these exemptions can be justified, they have led to the reduction of revenue raised from wealth taxes. They have also contributed to wealth taxes being less equitable as the wealthiest such as businesses benefit from these exemptions defeating the very purpose of imposing a wealth tax which is to meet its redistributive goals.

Narrow tax bases in wealth taxation often leads to tax avoidance and evasion opportunities. For example, Spain's 1994 wealth tax exemption for the shares of owner managers resulted in wealthy businesses reorganizing their activities to reap benefits of the exemption resulting in a significant erosion of the wealth tax base. 

Further, several other factors have also discouraged countries to sustain a wealth tax. They are namely, the difficulty in determining the tax base or what assets to be taxed, underreporting and undervaluation of assets, difficulty in measuring wealth taxes, distinguishing between individuals who are asset rich but cash poor, the constant need to value assets and audit returns increasing administrative and enforcement costs

Low revenue collection as well as the other reasons discussed have led to the abolishing of wealth taxes in most countries  (See Table 1 for details) . Tax revenue from individual net wealth taxes in 2016 ranged from only 0.2% of GDP in Spain to 1.0% of GDP in Switzerland. Sri Lanka’s experience with wealth taxation was no different with the tax yielding low revenue as reported by the 1990 Tax Commission.

Table 1: Implementation of Wealth Taxes in Selected Countries

Conclusion 

Taxing the wealth of the rich to generate income and to eliminate economic inequality sounds promising in terms of political debate. However, wealth taxes have failed to generate adequate revenue, failed to meet redistributive goals as a result of narrow tax bases, proven to have high administrative and enforcement costs, resulted in tax evasion and avoidance due to underreporting and undervaluation of assets, increased the risk of capital flight and access to tax havens and may have contributed to the reduction of investment and employment. 

Therefore, imposing a wealth tax may not be the ideal policy response to Sri Lanka’s low tax revenue, especially given the country’s previous experience with the tax yielding low revenue.

Sathya Karunarathne is the Research Analyst at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at sathya@advocata.org. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

When ‘national assets’ become ‘national liabilities’

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

  • Understanding the Trinco Oil Tank Farm controversy

Robert Kysokai, the author of the book “Rich Dad Poor Dad”, defines the difference between an asset and a liability quite simply. According to Mr. Kysokai, who is a management guru, anything which creates a cash flow is an asset and anything that dries the cash flow is a liability. If someone buys a car to be rented out to a taxi service, then it is an asset, because it can create cash flow and generate income. It can cover the expenses of the car from the income it creates by being used as a taxi. But if someone buys the same car to commute to work, it’s a liability, because it dries the existing cash flow from a different cash inflow, as the buyer has to incur regular cost for fuel, insurance, running costs, etc.

The lack of understanding of this simple concept has cost Sri Lanka a few generations of delayed development, with the recent fiasco surrounding the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm story being a prime example of this.

The discussion surrounding the Trinco Oil Tank Farm is a good case study to explore the question as to whether the resources we have as a country are actually “national assets” or “national liabilities”. In most cases, holding onto national resources has gone on to create “breeding grounds for corruption and crime”, thereby becoming national liabilities.

The Trincomalee Oil Tanks were developed by the British, using labour from British territories in Africa between 1924 and 1930 – almost a century ago. The project plan was to develop 102 oil tanks. Tank number 100 was not developed and tank number 91 was destroyed due to an aeroplane accident. The tanks were constructed with inch-thick steel and protected with foot-thick concrete rings. The objective of setting up the tanks in Trincomalee was to make the  Trincomalee Port a naval hub in the region. This could be utilised for trade and military usage. The Trincomalee Port was one of the main natural deep-water ports where big vessels can be docked easily. So the vision behind setting up an oil tank farm in Trincomalee was mainly to set up an ecosystem for naval operations and bunkering operations.

In the meantime, in the 1970s, Sri Lanka introduced a policy of nationalisation and self-sufficiency. As a result, the properties of foreign energy companies that were in operation were asked to leave our shores, with the government monopolising the energy market.

Singapore took this as an opportunity and embraced all oil companies that left our shores. They were, in fact, welcomed with open arms. Provisions were made for them to invest and provide the freedom to take their profits off if they wanted. But instead of taking the profits off, investors invested them back into Singapore and made Singapore a dominant trading hub in the region, while also making it a maritime centre. Sri Lanka lost a great opportunity. This loss is signified  by the difference in the GDP per capita of the two countries. In approximate figures, Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP is $ 4,000 while Singapore’s per capita GDP is $ 60,000.

Rather than utilising the resources of oil tanks as an asset by working with foreign investors, the government taking over the energy market converted the asset into a liability. As a result, taxpayers have to keep supporting the colossal loss-making Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC), which was a creation of this monopolising energy markets.

Since the nationalisation and self-sufficiency attempts in the 1970s, only about 15 oil tanks were used by CPC and their subsidiary, Ceylon Petroleum Storage Terminals (CPST) Ltd., till 2002, when Indian Oil Company bought one third of CPST’s shares. Then, the 15 tanks were leased out on a 35-year lease agreement to India for development. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) war too obstructed the optimum usage of the tanks. Each tank in the  Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm has a storage capacity of about 12,000 MT per tank, which accounts for about 1.2 million MT of storage in the entire facility. The recently built Muthurajawela Oil Tank Facility, built with a $ 72 million loan from China’s Exim Bank (total investment was $ 157 million), can only store upto about 250,000 MT. So the capacity of the Trincomalee Oil Tanks is far more substantial.

However, according to the shipping  industry expert Mr.Rohan Masakorala, the  LTTE problem would never  have taken off if the foriegn oil companies were allowed to operate in Trincomalee. According to him their entire eastern coastal belt would have been developed as much as Colombo, if we had allowed the foreign capital and technology to flow in,  especially in the Energy Market.

In 2018, the then Minister of Petroleum had discussions on a joint development project with India for 15 oil tanks out of the remaining 85 tanks. Again, another political monsoon started and nothing took off. So for nearly a century, we really didn’t use the Trincomalee Oil Tanks, although we still claim it as a “national asset”. Refurbishment of Phase I of the Trincomalee Oil Tanks requires a few billion dollars of capital. It also requires technology beyond our shores, and having an international partner is the only way to operationalise it.

Again in February, the current Minister of Petroleum announced that Sri Lanka is going to take over all oil tanks. Now there is a national interest on these oil tanks as a result of the Indian Foreign Secretary’s visit. The simple reality is that the 100 oil tanks which we failed to do anything with for 100 years, which occupies valuable land stretching 850 acres, are not really assets at present, from an economic perspective. They are simply liabilities, and in our case, they are even more than liabilities.

The only solution we have is to open our resources for foreign investments, if Sri Lanka is really serious about coming out from this economic downturn. Trincomalee has the potential to become a revenue-earning asset. The emerging Bay of Bengal economy is just opposite the Trincomalee Port. Chennai, Bangladesh, Visakhapatnam, and Thailand are countries and cities with large populations, with bigger markets where Trincomalee has the capacity to trade with and become a naval point for much larger economies. Currently, the trade volume we do at the Trincomalee Port is very limited, and the Prima factory and the cement plant are the only players presently using these facilities.

We have to think about Trincomalee as a whole and see the bigger picture than just seeing a fraction of it. The development of Trincomalee can be further extended with tourism up to our southern beach belt.

National assets are the ones that generate cash flows, regardless of ownership, and national liabilities dry up our cash flow. From an economic perspective, what we really celebrate as “national assets” and what we really try to hold for ourselves are “national liabilities”.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Regulating prices: From price mandates to more competition

Originally appeared on Daily FT, Lanka Business Online, Colombo Telegraph, Ceylon Today and the Morning

By Thiloka Yapa

As price controls ultimately lead to instability in the system, a surer way to achieve stability and growth is to allow markets to flow freely and responsibly

The Government recently removed the maximum retail price (MRP) on rice with a decision to import a buffer stock of rice to prevent any shortages.1 This is an important step in the right direction. Opening up the market for more competition will reduce the market power of the alleged oligopoly of large-scale rice mill owners. While the removal of the MRP is commendable, the Government’s action on this front has been anything but consistent. Despite the frequent use of price controls and their appeal to politicians, economists are generally opposed to them, except perhaps for very brief periods during emergencies. While the pandemic is undoubtedly an emergency, Sri Lanka’s current economic problems are largely due to poor policies. 

Although the politicians who impose them may be motivated by good intentions, they are counterproductive, often leading to higher prices and damaging the market. 

The Parliament recently passed an amendment to the Consumer Affairs Authority Act which increases fines on traders who do not follow the MRP issued by the Consumer Affairs Authority (CAA).2 Raising the penalties seems to indicate that the Government intends to impose controls more strictly. The reason that some of the ill-effects of price controls were not experienced is because they were not strictly enforced. Previous research by Advocata Institute revealed that only larger producers and the larger retailers in the formal sector adhered to them; in the informal markets and among smaller retailers these were routinely ignored so the shortages and black markets associated with price controls were not widespread.3 Strict enforcement and larger fines could see products disappearing from shelves as traders find it no longer profitable to engage in the trade of the controlled commodities.  

Price regulation and its impact 

Price controls are administered through the Consumer Affairs Authority Act which has the power to regulate prices.4

Under Section 10(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, the authority, in protection of the consumer, can call retailers and wholesale traders to register their stocks and warehouses with the CAA. Moreover, under Section 18, the Minister in consultation with the CAA is empowered to specify any good or service, as essential to the life of the community, by way of gazette notification. Manufacturers and traders are restricted from increasing prices without the prior written approval of the CAA. A period of 30 days is provided for the authority to examine the application for any price revision and convey the decision to the applicant company. 

This Section permits the CAA to make decisions on behalf of traders in the market, whenever it regards a product to be ‘essential’. Further, under Section 20(5), the Authority can fix the maximum price above which goods and services cannot be sold. It was under this section that the recent MRP for sugar, rice and LP Gas was imposed. 

This regulation could be a barrier against market competition, as it may deter the entry of new firms and discourage innovation which curtails competition. Competition plays a vital role in a market economy. It incentivises firms to challenge each other, create new markets and expand existing markets. While this leads efficient firms to enter and grow, inefficient firms shrink and exit. Firms innovate, leading to lower prices and enhance consumer choices. While the objective of the Consumer Affairs Authority Act No. 9 of 2003 in itself is to promote competition and protect consumers, the impact of the provisions which allow the authority to regulate prices lead to the exact opposite, resulting in high prices and less choice for consumers.

Prices play a key role in a market economy. It is a signal, wrapped in an incentive. Change in prices incentivise individuals to respond; either by consuming less of a product, or shifting to alternatives. Price controls distort these signals. Since the Government defines market prices when controls are imposed, it forces the market to function based on the imposed price. As producers and consumers respond to controls, they produce an excess supply when the prices are set high or increase the demand when prices are set low. This leads to wastage and shortages, exacerbating the fundamental economic problem that the controls expect to solve. 

A 2018 report on price controls by the Advocata Institute revealed that price controls have limited value in controlling the cost of goods, particularly in the consumer market due to weak enforcement.5 The report highlighted other ill-effects: traders surveyed have admitted to the problem of low-quality goods being brought into the market, meaning that quality suffers as a result. As traders are under pressure to comply, they resort to importing substandard products to supply at prices close to the controlled price.

The enforcement of ad-hoc controls also adds up to the costs of suppliers, as these regulations distort their cost structures. This was the case when the Government slashed the Special Commodity Levy on sugar, big onions, dhal and canned fish in November last year, imposing an MRP on these commodities.6 The sellers who were impacted, opposed the MRP and continued their sale at high prices, claiming they would incur massive losses since the stocks were purchased before tax revisions, at a much higher price. 

Price controls also result in policy uncertainty. This is a situation where there is ambiguity in the stability of future rules and regulations. While entrepreneurs in the market will then keep attempting to predict what regulators would do in the future, this comes at the expense of consumers, who would have otherwise been the main-focus of these businesses.7

What can be done?

Sri Lanka urgently needs to rethink government interventions that increase the costs of competing. At a recent discussion hosted by the Advocata Institute, the newly-appointed Governor emphasised the importance of growth and stability. He stated that the lack of stability would lead to uncertainty. As price controls ultimately lead to instability in the system, a surer way to achieve stability and growth is to allow markets to flow freely and responsibly. For this to happen, as one major reform, Sri Lanka needs to amend the sections in the Consumer Affairs Authority Act that permits the authority to regulate market prices. In doing so, it is also worthy to review Sections 34 to Section 38 in the Act, which aims to promote competition and revisit the mandate of the CAA. 

  1.  Ruwani Fonseka, ‘Alagiyawanna explains removal of MRP on rice’, The Morning, September 28, 2021 https://www.themorning.lk/alagiyawanna-explains-removal-of-mrp-on-rice/ (accessed September 29, 2021)

  2. Parliament of Sri Lanka, ‘Hon. Speaker endorses the certificate on the Consumer Affairs Authority (Amendment) Bill’, Parliament of Sri Lanka. September 23, 2021, https://parliament.lk/en/news-en/view/2263 (accessed September 25, 2021)

  3. Advocata Institute, ‘Price Controls in Sri Lanka-Political Theatre’( Sri Lanka: Advocata Institute, 2018), 24 https://www.research.advocata.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Price-Controls-in-Srilanka-Book.pdf (accessed September 25, 2021)

  4.  Consumer Affairs Authority Act No. 09 of 2003 

  5. Advocata Institute, ‘Price Controls in Sri Lanka-Political Theatre’( Sri Lanka: Advocata Institute, 2018), 9 https://www.research.advocata.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Price-Controls-in-Srilanka-Book.pdf (accessed September 25, 2021) 

  6. ‘Revised taxes, MRP complicate commodities market’, The Sunday Times, November 22, 2020 https://www.sundaytimes.lk/201122/business-times/revised-taxes-mrp-complicate-commodities-market-423077.html (accessed September 30, 2021)

  7. Institute of Economic Affairs, ‘Flaws and Ceilings: Price Controls and the damage they cause’ (London: London Publishing Partnership, 2015) quoted in Advocata Institute, ‘Price Controls in Sri Lanka-Political Theatre’( Sri Lanka: Advocata Institute, 2018), 43 https://www.research.advocata.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Price-Controls-in-Srilanka-Book.pdf (accessed September 25, 2021)

    ‘රටේ ආර්ථිකය හා අපේ හෙට දවස’ YouTube video, posted by “Advocata Plus,” September 25, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JvWQWn7cHw (accessed September 25, 2021)

Thiloka Yapa is the Research Analyst at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at thiloka@advocata.org. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

When price controls get out of control

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

  • Price controls lead to shortages and distort markets

Why has Sri Lanka’s economy remained stagnant? This is not a difficult puzzle to solve. It is simply because Sri Lanka has repeated the same failed policies ignoring “economic fundamentals”. This is evident now more so than ever by the number of “price controls” imposed by the Government. Even an amateur student of economics would know that price controls distort markets creating black markets. Black markets mean reduced quality of goods and services and shortages. The recent conundrum of a few rice millers declaring rice prices and the Government having to withdraw price controls is the best example of the failure of this policy measure. The lack of economic analysis behind such policies have not only diluted the Government’s political capital but also have created shortages of rice in the market. 

It is no secret that the entire economic system has been damaged by the implementation of price controls. The real impact, like in the case of rice, is much more severe than what we see on the surface. 

A retired army officer was appointed to ensure the supply of essential food items. He raided a few rice mills, warehouses, sugar storages, and other essential commodities as per media reports to ensure the supply of essential food items. However, the recent withdrawal of price controls on rice is an indication of the failure of such short-sighted policies. Shortages sprouted, markets reacted and prices have increased further. These miscalculated policies have also led to the dilution of investor confidence by providing all the wrong signals to investors. Heavy Government intervention in businesses and private property, confiscating stocks and storages discourage investors. 

Markets work on the principles of demand and supply. It is a series of coordinated actions and reactions. These happen as a result of people working for the benefit of each other when allocating scarce resources which have alternative uses. Allowing this system to function can achieve the best outcomes for everyone, especially the consumers. Controlling the price by means of force is counterproductive. This will leave a bitter taste for both the consumer and producer as well as the Government. 

The political theatre of price controls is not new to Sri Lanka. It goes back to the 1970’s. Since then Sri Lanka has had a habit of imposing, relaxing and reimposing price controls. We have been in the same vicious cycle for decades. The previous Yahapalana Government imposed price controls on hoppers, tea, and milk tea. The current Government imposed price controls on another long list of goods including lentils and tinned fish. Even today, our USD has a price control of Rs. 203 per dollar. As a result there is a serious shortage of USD in the market. What is evident is that all items which have price controls imposed, experience some level of shortage or market distortions. 

How can the distorted rice market be rectified? 

The distortion of our rice and paddy market ultimately boils down to poor productivity along with excessive political and Governmental interference in the industry. The contribution of the agricultural sector to the country’s GDP is 8% with about 24% of the country’s labour force in agriculture. This is a good indicator to highlight how unproductive the sector is. Additionally, analysis shows that our pricing of one kilogramme of rice is completely irrational. According to research, paddy is a water guzzler that consumes about 2400 litres of water for transpiration. Further, 1200 litres is required to produce one kilogramme of rice. At the moment we do not charge for water needed for paddy cultivation. Most of the water provided is subsidized by taxpayer money. Additionally we provide fertiliser at a subsidised rate (organic or chemical). The subsidy is included in the price of paddy and rice. One of the main factors of production which is land is also not calculated in the cost of production as most of the cultivated land is owned by the Government. 

If we were to calculate the price of water, land and fertiliser, the cost of production of rice in Sri Lanka is extremely high. So if Sri Lanka is serious about rectifying the problem of rice, all these issues must be addressed. Attempting to control the price which is the final indication of resource allocation is not the solution. Failure to address the real bottlenecks at the root of the issue will exacerbate problems faced by the paddy farmer as well as the consumer. 

Importation of rice is not a popular topic in Sri Lanka for many reasons including the current forex crisis. One way to address the market manipulation by rice millers and provide consumers affordable prices is to let the market system work. That includes allowing the importation of rice by private businesses. Unlocking land for our farmers too is important to increase their productivity by using low cost methods of farming. At the moment since the land is owned by the Government, capital infusion and technological development that could be done is limited. Farmers cannot take a loan from the bank or do any technological advancement using the land as collateral. Farmers have very limited options and they are trapped in a vicious debt cycle while continuing to resort to unproductive methods of farming on land they do not own. 

Until Sri Lanka comprehends the problem, our solutions will be mere performative political theatre. Without evidenced-based public policies and a good understanding of economics, price controls will be imposed and reversed overnight, leaving the consumer, producer and the Government with a foul taste.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Losing by focusing on the winners

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

  • Winners focus on winning and losers focus on winners.

“Winners focus on winning and losers focus on winners”, I recalled this statement when I saw different headlines on Sri Lanka’s budget for the fiscal year 2022. As per media reports, the Government expects three main policy proposals in the upcoming budget. These include the development of local industries, expansion of infrastructure development, and having an expansionary monetary policy. 

Speculations too have highlighted continued import restrictions as a strategy to develop local industries. This is what reminded me of the saying that losers focus on winners while winners focus on winning. 

In a hundred metre race the most rational thing to do is to focus on one’s timing and speed as opposed to focusing on obstructing fellow athletes. Similarly in economics and business if one wants to develop local industries one must increase productivity and efficiency rather than resorting to import restrictions. 

One reason many justify import controls as a strategy for the development of local industries is the lack of knowledge rather than a strong ideological stance. Sri Lanka has had a trade deficit for a long time, which is “value of imports – value of exports”. Therefore, many Sri Lankans generally believe that by reducing imports the trade deficit can be reduced. 

The same argument applies when people assume that we have to spend foreign exchange earned from exports when importing. People believe that producing locally will save foreign exchange due to the reduced need for imports. As a result, there is growing animosity against imports across all products and services. People believe that this will leave local industries better off. This thought process has led Sri Lanka to become a nation full of people who detest imports. But they forget that local industries depend significantly on raw materials and parts. 

This idea is not endemic to Sri Lanka but can also be found in some other parts of the world. So there is a global belief that having complete import controls can help homegrown local innovation regardless of its severe economic consequences. However the reality is far different. Banning imports would do more harm for local businesses than good. It can significantly impact the production and manufacturing potential of the economy. However, we will only be able to arrive at a reasonable conclusion once the budget is presented. 

One of the main arguments provided by proponents of import controls, is the belief that Micro and Small Enterprises (MSMEs) cannot compete with large-scale global brands. However, the truth is different. In Sri Lanka, the apparel sector especially consists of quite a number of MSMEs. They produce goods at the standards acceptable to international markets. These target markets are far different from the domestic market. Therefore they actually compete internationally and are capable of doing so because they are able to maintain productivity. Therefore the best way to empower small enterprises is by helping them improve productivity and allowing them to compete. 

Another common belief is that some developed countries too have import controls or higher tariffs. Ardent believers of import substitution present these examples to defend their case. A common example provided was the import duty and tariff rates in India and South Korea in comparison to Sri Lanka’s, claiming that our tariff rates are much lower. However the truth is that Sri Lanka has a complicated system of para tariffs. These are additional tariffs on custom duties (CESS and PAL). Para tariffs increase the effective rate of protectionism, which is the overall protection levied at the border on imports. Sri Lanka’s effective rate of protection is much higher than other countries in the region. Once again, this exhibits Sri Lanka’s obsession with winners and the lack of attention given to winning. In addition, many new winners in trade have appreciated the importance of neutral policies that give similar incentives for export production as well as import substitution production.  

Another common argument is that the similar practices by the west at the initial trajectory on their development and the extent to which they protected their industries is often provided by proponents who believe banning imports is a strategy for local industry development. South Korea and Japan have been provided as an example often on how they banned car imports which made the boom of brands like Toyota and Hyundai is a common story. If that argument is true then countries like North Korea have to be most prosperous as they have very serious import restrictions. 

Second, for the country and the market size of Sri Lanka to get economies of scale, we need to produce bigger volumes beyond our shores. So competition is inevitable. Just because one country has succeeded at doing it doesn’t make sense for us to repeat without understanding geography, demography, and geopolitics. Thirdly if we look at the brands that have really done well those are the ones who have been opened for competition. In the case of Japan, the Ministry of Trade and Industry recommended to Toyota Founder Kiichiro Toyoda, not to produce cars in the first place and the rest of the Toyota brand is just history. 

We are all in agreement that the local industries should prosper and have to be productive. But thinking that the import bans as a strategy for local industry development is not in the right direction. It would set a bad example for people to just target winners instead of winning and ultimately the entire country will be a net loser. We have to become a country of thinking about winning rather than a country of focusing on winners and the budget 2022 should lay a broader strategy to achieve this objective. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Underneath the underwear patriotism

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

  • Can Sri Lanka become self-sufficient in undergarments?

My father had a very hard time with me when he accompanied me for haircuts when I was a kid. I’d ask him “Who cuts the hair of the barber?”. He’d say “It has to be another barber!”. Then I’d argue back saying “If the barber can give haircuts to everybody, why can’t he cut his own hair?”. Then my argument continued. Do the doctors go to doctors when they are sick or do they check themselves by their own stethoscope and decide their own medication? The same goes for surgeons. When a surgeon has to go through surgery can they do it on their own or do they have to go for another surgeon? When I look back, though I am not very proud of my arguments as a kid, the recent comments on the economics of undergarments on “Why Sri Lanka cannot produce all undergarments we require locally?” took me back to my childhood. 

A big social media discussion driven by political rhetoric, with little to no understanding of basic economics, was popular last week. Some argued that Sri Lankans will not have enough undergarments with the new direction by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) for licensed commercial banks (LCBs). The direction was to deposit 100% of the invoice value to open a letter of credit and halting credit facilities for LC’s for 623 HS codes including men and women undergarments. 

The opposite argument was there are enough local undergarment brands in Sri Lanka and anyone can buy it from Pamunuwa. There were some arguments going to the extent that “Sathosa” can provide undergarments in case of any shortages. Many argued that if Sri Lanka can export and stitch for world-class brands such as Victoria’s Secret, VS PINK, GAP Body, and Calvin Klein, how come we can’t produce to meet local demand? 

The argument went to the extent of some proponents mentioning that we have to ban everything we can produce in Sri Lanka to solve our foreign exchange crisis. 

First, let’s understand the reason behind the circular direction by the CBSL. A cluster of 623 HS codes are now required to deposit 100% of the value upfront. Additionally LCBs are not permitted to provide credit facilities, to open LC’s for the purposes of importing the mentioned 623 HS code line items. So simply it is not a tariff barrier, but the real objective is to discourage imports, in order to minimise the demand for foreign exchange used for imports, given the forex shortage we have presently. When the supply is suppressed, in this case on undergarments which is an essential product category the prices will automatically go up. That higher prices may impact consumer behaviour. 

Secondly, the question is why can’t we produce undergarments for Sri Lankans if we produce for Victoria’s Secret? Obviously, we can produce but economically or business-wise it doesn’t make any sense for the producer to produce a low-value, low-priced product for a 22 million market. Especially when the existing competency is at producing a world-class high-value, high-priced product for a market of a few billion people. In terms of margin as well as volume, the obvious pick is to produce for a bigger market. If we ask our manufacturers to produce for the local market as well, most likely they will have to shut down most of their factories, and obviously, Sri Lanka’s export numbers will drop drastically. When the capacity is there to produce high-value goods with significant value additions, why should a business consider producing a low-value product for a smaller volume. So pondering whether we can produce undergarments to our own markets by restricting imports, is the same as my childhood argument of asking the surgeon to get his own surgery done. So producing undergarments for the local market just because we produce for Victoria’s Secrets doesn’t have any rationale. On the other hand, if the current garment manufacturing plants are pushed to produce for the local market, the resources such as labour, land and capital have to be taken from the same resource pool. This can make exports expensive and make Sri Lankan exports uncompetitive. 

At the same time, export garments are stitched under branding regulations and contractual standards with strict customer audits where even a rejected garment is not allowed to be released to the local market. The companies have signed intellectual property agreements on individual designs and premium quality raw material is imported from Hong Kong, China and different parts of the world to make the product of superior quality. 

The same argument is there for tea. Often people complain that though Sri Lanka produces Ceylon tea, the tea available at the retail market is not as good as export quality. Obviously, just like the high value branded undergarments, there are high quality teas in Sri Lanka which many can’t afford given our purchasing power. As a result we have to settle for something affordable and the market is offering a product which is affordable for an average Sri Lankan consumer. Obviously a country of nearly a per capita $ 4000 income cannot afford to drink expensive silver tea three times a day. It is same for undergarments that markets offer a range of products where anyone can pick based on their affordability and personal preference. Those who could afford Victoria’s Secret and Tommy Hilfiger can go for it and those who can’t have the freedom to select from a range of undergarment brands and even unbranded categories based on their affordability. What is important is to make sure the choice is available so people can pick what fits them the best. 

Especially in a category like undergarments, it is the last thing that people will check – whether it is imported or locally manufactured. Perfect fit for the body, hygiene factors, sanitation factors, comfortability, affordability and even emotional attachment for the brand are very prominent in the product category at point of purchase. So it is essential that Sri Lankans have the freedom of choice to select what undergarments they feel comfortable with. Some people obviously may have a preference for local brands based on their criterion of selection. 

At the same time it doesn’t mean that local players shouldn’t produce garments for the local market. In a level playing field some businesses can produce for the local market and importing also needs to be allowed for their production as well. 

With the deepening of the US dollar shortage there are economic misperceptions built around imports. Banning imports is deemed to be the only way to develop local industries. Obviously we all know by hating something; we cannot achieve anything and the only way to achieve it is by competing. It is understandable that we face a foreign exchange shortage but obviously trying to produce undergarments for the local market by cutting imports will worsen the situation rather than solving it. 

Thinking that we should produce all undergarments we require locally as we produce for Victoria’s Secret is the same as my childhood thought that the barber should get his own haircut done and the surgeon should do his own surgery.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Reform or Perish. It’s not too late

Originally appeared on The Island, ColomboTelegraph and Groundviews

By K.D.D.B Vimanga and Naqiya Shiraz

The Sri Lankan economy faces a historical crisis.  The root causes are the twin deficits. First, the persistent fiscal deficit - the gap between government expenditure and income. Second, the external current account deficit - the gap between total exports and imports.  The problems have been festering for too long. Without urgent reforms, the crisis could easily morph into a full-blown debt crisis. 

Sovereign debt workouts are extremely painful for citizens. A mangled debt restructuring can perpetuate the sense of crisis for years or even decades. A return to normal economic activity may be delayed, credit market access frozen, trade finance unavailable.

With the global pandemic, these are unusual and difficult times. The next five years are going to be crucial for the country.  The problems can no longer be avoided and should be faced squarely. The journey ahead is going to be painful but the longer these are delayed the worse the problem becomes and the magnitude of the damage compounds. 

The State of the Economy 

The new government inherited a fragile economy, battered by the Easter attacks of 2019, the constitutional crisis of October 2018 and the worst drought in 40 years in 2017. With the pandemic in 2020 Sri Lanka’s economy shrank by 3.6% with all sectors of the economy contracting. 

Yet, the pandemic is not the sole cause - it only accelerated the decline of Sri Lanka’s economy that was weak to begin with.  The country has long been plagued by structural weaknesses, with growth rates in the last few years even below the average growth rate during the war. Mismanaged government expenditure coupled with a long term decline in revenue have characterised Sri Lanka’s fiscal policy. As of 2020 total tax as a percentage of GDP fell to just 8%, while recurrent expenditure increased. 

Borrowing to finance the persistent budget deficits is proving to be unsustainable. Total government debt rose to 101% of GDP in 2020 and has grown since. Sovereign downgrades have shut the country from international debt markets. The foreign reserves declined from US$ 7.6 bn in 2019 to US$ 5.7bn at the end of 2020 and to US$ 2.8 bn by July 2021. This level of reserves is equivalent to less than two months of imports. With future debt obligations also in need of financing, the situation is dire. 

Reserves and months.png

The import restrictions placed to combat this foreign exchange crisis have failed to achieve their purpose and are doing more harm than good. imports rose 30% in the first half of  2021 compared to 2020 despite stringent restrictions.

The problem lies not in the trade policy but in loose fiscal and monetary policy that has increased demand pressures within the economy, drawing in imports and leading to the balance of payments crisis and consequently the depreciation of the currency.  

Measures by the Central Bank to address this by exchange rate controls and moral suasion have caused a shortage of foreign currency leading to a logjam in imports.

Money growth.png

Fundamental and long-running macroeconomic problems were  intensified by the pandemic.Import restrictions, price and exchange controls do not address the real causes.

Treating symptoms instead of the underlying causes is a recipe for disaster.

The continuation of such policies will lead to the deterioration of the economy,  elevate scarcities, disadvantage the poor who are more vulnerable and in the long run lead to even higher prices and lower output due to lack of investment. 

Sri Lanka’s GDP growth over the last decade has been alternating between short periods of high growth and prolonged periods of low growth. This is a result of the state-led, inward-looking policies of the last decade.

A comprehensive reform agenda must be built around  five fundamental pillars:

i) fiscal consolidation - The need to manage government spending within available resources and to reduce debt are paramount. Revenue mobilization must improve but the control of expenditure cannot be ignored. Budgetary institutions must be strengthened and there must be reviews not only of the scale of spending but also the scope of Government.

 ii) Much of government expenditure is rigid - the bulk comprises salaries, pensions and interest so reducing these is a long term process. Reforming State Enterprises, especially in the energy sector and Sri Lankan Airlines is less difficult and could yield substantial savings. Continued operation of  inefficient and loss-making SOE’s is untenable under such tight fiscal conditions. Financing SOE’s from state bank borrowings and transfers from government reduces the funds available for vital and underfunded sectors such as healthcare and education. Excessive SOE debt also  weakens the financial sector and increases the contingent liabilities of the state. Therefore SOE reforms commencing with improving governance, transparency, establishing cost reflective pricing and privatisation are necessary. This can take a significant weight off the public finances and by fostering competition contribute to improvements in overall economic  productivity. 

iii) Tighten monetary policy and maintain exchange rate flexibility.  Immediate structural reforms include, Inflation targeting, ensuring the independence of the central bank by way of legislation and enabling the functioning of a flexible exchange rate regime. Further significant  attention has to be placed on the  financial sector stability with a cohesive financial sector consolidation plan, with special emphasis on restructuring of SOE debt. 

 iv) Supporting trade and investment. Sri Lanka cannot achieve economic growth without international trade which means linking to  global production sharing networks. Special focus has to be given to reducing Sri Lanka’s high rates of protection which creates a domestic market bias in the economy along with measures to improve trade facilitation and attract new export oriented FDI. 

Attempts to build local champions supported by high levels of protection have 

(a) diverted resources away from competitive businesses, 

(b) created a hostile environment for foreign investment, 

(c) been detrimental to consumer welfare,

(d) dragged down growth

v) Structural reforms to increase productivity and attract FDI - Productivity levels in Sri Lanka have not matched pace with the rest of the growing economies. The reforms mentioned above are extensively discussed in Advocata’s  latest publication “Framework for Economic Recovery”.

Sri Lanka  stumbled into the coronavirus crisis in bad shape,with weak finances; high debt and widening fiscal deficits. It no longer has the luxury to delay painful reforms. Failure to do so will not only jeopardize the economy; it could even spawn social and humanitarian crises.

Naqiya Shiraz is the Research Analyst at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at naqiya@advocata.org.K.D.D.B. Vimanga is a Policy Analyst at the Advocata Institute. He can be contacted at kdvimanga@advocata.org.

The Advocata Institute is an Independent Public Policy Think Tank. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute


The Government’s dangerous honey

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Minister of Finance Basil Rajapaksa, moving two important bills in Parliament, recited a poem in Sinhala literature, which is also a proverb, to explain the sorry state of our economy. He compared Sri Lanka’s economy to a man in the jungle trying to rescue himself from three life-threatening challenges.

Firstly, a furious wild elephant, similar to our mounting debt obligations. Secondly, to avoid the elephant, the man attempts to hide in a pit, but before he jumps into the pit, he realises that there is a cobra in it. So instead of jumping, the man then decides to hang onto the roots of a tree that lies above the pit as an alternative. The cobra in the bottom of the pit is similar to our Balance of Payment (BOP) crisis. Our importers and exporters are in big trouble, having difficulties opening Letters of Credit (LCs) due to forex shortages, and currency is depreciating rapidly with attempts to keep interest rates artificially low by policymakers.

Then the man realises that one root he is holding onto is the tail of a venomous reptile. He now cannot release his grip on the tail as the reptile will bite back. So, the adventure of running away from the elephant waiting at the edge of the pit now has two more severe life-threatening risks. The Finance Minister’s analogy reflects that trying to avoid one problem without a proper estimation and analysis has now opened us to more vulnerabilities while the previous challenges remain as they are.

As the story goes, one tree root the man is holding in his other hand is attached to a bee honey nest. So when he tightens his grip, bee honey keeps dripping, and so he decides to indulge in some bee honey. While the man has three life threats from the elephant, the cobra, and the other reptile, he decides to enjoy the dripping bee honey for a moment.

The Sri Lankan economic crisis is exactly the same. At a moment in history where urgent, hard, and serious economic reforms are required to overcome the crisis in the midst of the global pandemic, some alternative policies such as self-sufficiency, Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), and import substitution have become sweet bee honey for some policymakers who really do not understand the gravity of the crisis.

Unfortunately, just as the man who attempted to jump to a pitfall without properly analysing the situation, some economic measures with little analysis are cornering us for a brewing crisis.

Fixing USD at Rs. 203

Attempting to fix our exchange rate at Rs. 203 against the USD to avoid currency depreciation is one such activity. Simply, it is a price control on US dollars. Every good or service with an economic value is naturally obliged to a demand and supply matrix. In other terms, there is no alternative to fix the price of a currency without someone intervening in the excess or shortage.

In the forex market, the Central Bank does not have adequate forex to intervene in markets any longer, with the mounting debt obligations. So it is natural that $ 1 for Rs. 203 is a complete misguidance where there is no USD in the market at that price. The downside of trying to fix the USD at an artificially lower price is the encouragement it would provide on more importers to open LCs, adding more pressure on banks as well as the USD.

“Imports” are incentivised at a lower rate than the market rate for the USD. Exporters, on the other hand, are discouraged to bring forex as they get a far less market rate if they bring USD to the market. As a result, exporters hold the USD as long as possible and many exporters maximise their offshore accounts, as it is very cost-effective and hassle-free. As such, banks’ forex market has now further dried up, with both importers and exporters falling into trouble. It is the same predicament faced by the man who tried to avoid an elephant and came across two more additional troubles.

Additionally, another restriction has been imposed on more than 600 HS codes where the full amount has to be paid upfront to open the LC. This move will directly impact micro, small, and medium-sized businesses that depend on imports in those categories. Consumers will have to experience higher prices and black markets in most of these product categories, and the quality of life will be affected drastically.

Concerns expressed by investors on property rights over seizing rice stocks

Recent raids carried out on rice mills in Polonnaruwa will worsen Sri Lanka’s image as a destination for investors. As previously written in this column, it is the lack of competition, along with political support, that leads to the creation of cartels in the rice milling industry. However, seizing private property of an individual undermines investor confidence – no investor will consider Sri Lanka if there is a fear that the government will take over their property rights.

This was the same point made by the President when he was questioned by Indian media in his very first international media interview about the Hambantota Port. Though his supporters claimed that the Hambantota Port will be taken back by China, the President mentioned that if we were to do it, it would completely provide a wrong message for the investor community. According to media reports, the Government is initiating a very important Selendiva project for investors (Hilton Colombo, Grand Hyatt, etc). However, property rights concerns will seriously erode attracting quality investors for the Selendiva project.

At the same time, exactly like the proverb in the speech by the Finance Minister, while we are in serious trouble on multiple fronts, ideological groups seem to be defending their ideology rather than finding solutions with pragmatism. Ideological groups are the same as the man who is focusing on bee honey dripping, by forgetting that we are already in a very serious situation. The narration created on self-sufficiency and import substitution are just an example.

The Finance Minister has to be objective and pragmatic instead of falling into ideological traps. Otherwise, he will be a victim of his own analogy and the proverb of the man who multiplied the problem by irrational decision-making.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Closing the gate once the horse has bolted

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Can price controls rein in uncontrolled depreciation?

People are infuriated over the recent drastic price hikes on essential food items, and analysts and policymakers are attempting to make sense of what triggered this.

Some argue that the increasing global commodity prices are indeed the root cause of these local price hikes. In my opinion, however, global price hikes cannot be the sole reason. This conclusion is misleading as the domestic prices of these food items are higher than the percentage increase of global commodity prices adjusted for the depreciation of the Sri Lankan rupee (SLR).

Steep depreciation of the currency

It is no secret that the Government sought refuge in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) in recent times. This has had a considerable impact on commodity prices due to the depreciation of the rupee. A depreciating rupee coupled with increasing commodity prices is certainly an ill-fated combination. Even though many economists alerted the Government of the risks MMT could pose, they fell on deaf ears.

When global market prices rise, it is inevitable that domestic markets adjust accordingly due to price signals. This means that people shift their consumption behaviours and patterns with price volatility. However, Sri Lanka’s essential commodity price hikes came suddenly and have given people no time to adjust their purchasing patterns.

As per Central Bank data, Sri Lanka’s food inflation is increasing. Advocata Institute’s Bath Curry Indicator, which tracks the weekly expenditure of a four-member household on rice and curry, found that prices increased by 45% on a YoY (Year-on-Year) basis in July and by 30% in August.

I’d like to conclude my argument by quoting Nobel Laureate Prof. Milton Friedman: “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”

Acute foreign exchange crisis exacerbated by MMT

The acute foreign exchange crisis we are in, too, is a major contributor to recent price hikes. Oversupply of money has drained our reserves and added additional pressure on the currency. For example, when the government provides Rs. 20,000 (which is beyond the government’s capacity) for low-income families, money will flow out of the system due to the purchase of imported goods. People will be inclined towards buying imported LP gas, lentils, sprats, and tin fish.

Further, maintaining a negative real interest rate, which is to keep interest rates artificially low by increasing money supply below the inflation rate, will motivate people to spend more money than to save. More spending equals more expenditure on imports, which will then exacerbate the country’s Balance of Payment (BOP) crisis.

Currently, banks have different exchange rates for different customers. The kerb market’s exchange rate for the US dollar is between Rs. 250 and Rs. 260.

If this trend continues, the country’s fuel prices, LP gas, milk powder, and many other commodity prices will continue to rise.

Price controls

The Government has announced strict price controls and has appointed a designated officer to curb hoarding by traders with the objective of decreasing essential commodity prices. Recent news reports claim that hoarded essential food items such as sugar have been confiscated from stores by the authorities.

However, price controls are proven to be ineffective and will lead to goods disappearing from markets, as a result creating black markets. Further, it is likely that price controls will result in importers stopping the importation of goods. The first lockdown saw an initial price control of Rs. 65 on lentils and a controlled price of Rs. 100 on tin fish. Later, the Government had to withdraw the price controls as it resulted in severe shortages, with traders halting imports and the sellers hesitating to trade at a loss. Price controls simply don’t work because the price structure is unique for each trader.

Competition is the only factor that drives prices down. For example, the cost structure of a trader who sells lentils in an air-conditioned shop and a trader who sells at the Sunday market is different. The price they mark is based on the cost, and consumers buy it based on the value they get. Price controls hamper the signalling mechanism, resulting in severe repercussions.

Why do traders hoard?

Even with increased raids by the Consumer Affairs Authority (CAA), traders continue to hoard. This behaviour is intricately linked with the foreign exchange crisis the country is in. The Central Bank introduced regulations stating that traders cannot buy US dollars for a future day (forward market) at the current exchange rate. Further, importers were requested to open Letters of Credit (LCs) for a 180-day credit period. As a result, importers brought essential commodities in agreement to pay the exchange rate to be in effect after 180 days. They brought the goods they already sold at a calculated exchange rate.

However, now the exchange rates are depreciating further. For example, when traders imported the consignments, our exchange rate was about Rs. 190. But with the currency depreciation, now they have to pay the current exchange rate as there is no forward market or interbank market in operation. This is pushing importers to hoard to secure stocks for the future. Importers will also be inclined to increase prices to cover their losses incurred due to exchange rate volatility.

All of these trickle down to the average consumer as higher prices on essential commodities. Higher prices, long queues for essential goods, and empty shelves are symptoms of wrong macroeconomic policies.

This column and many economists alerted the Government that it would come to this, and I am disappointed that the Government did not heed our advice.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Reforms required, IMF or no IMF

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

At Advocata’s first deep-dive session on Sri Lanka’s debt sustainability, Harvard Prof. Ricardo Hausmann emphasised on the importance of avoiding an economic crisis at all costs. As he is of Venezuelan origin, it is safe to assume Prof. Hausmann has first-hand experience of having to live through the realities of such a crisis. He warned that “an economic crisis comes slowly and then suddenly”.

Every week, the Central Bank attempts with various tools to subjugate the situation, but unfortunately the intensity of the wind seems difficult to change. The Energy Minister initiating discussions with the UAE to purchase fuel on a long-term credit period while restricting the country’s USD payments with a 5% ceiling on USD deposits indicates how hazardous things can be in future.

The Central Bank’s recent inflation numbers have indicated high food inflation. Now the last resort in sight is to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Opinions on this are many.

In my view, emphasis should not be on the IMF. A credible plan to drive economic growth must take precedence. However, I don’t see such a plan in place as of now.

So let’s discuss solutions we can incorporate into a credible plan as the problem is clear.

Immediate policies

Cash transfer system for safety nets

Given the nature of the pandemic, it looks like we have to expect more lockdowns or limited travel in the immediate future. This will affect Sri Lanka’s MSME (micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise) sector and informal employment. At the moment, 99% of our establishments are MSMEs and more than 60% of our labour force is in the informal sector. MSMEs contribute more than 50% of our GDP. So any policy to stop spreading the virus through travel restrictions will undoubtedly affect our informal sector. We do not have a mechanism to protect them.

Samurdhi targeting and distribution through grama niladharis is extremely poor. Therefore, what governments often do is bring down prices of all food items, fuel, and other essentials across the board. This is direct intervention in the market in the form of subsidies. These subsidies end up in rich households due to their high consumption of commodities.

The solution is to introduce a cash transfer system to the vulnerable households. This will give them the freedom to choose what they want to spend on. The cash transfers can have multiple tiers based on the poverty levels. For example, when the global fuel prices are increasing, the cash transfer on fuel can be increased, but when prices decrease, the cash transfer can decrease proportionately. Simply, we have to introduce an agile digital safety net system in the future because market reforms are painful, especially for the poor.

Cutting down govt. expenditure and voluntary retirement scheme for govt. servants

A reason the Central Bank has to continue to follow Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is the ballooning government expenditure. It is true our expenditure is somewhat on par with our regional peers, but our labour market is completely distorted by about 1.5 million people, and most of them are unproductive and dissatisfied with their work conditions. Undoubtedly, this is beyond our government’s afforbality, especially with pension payments and other expenses incurred utilising prime property across the island wasting most of our resources. Our state-owned enterprises (SOE) absorb a greater portion of our government revenue, their debt in state banks adding a serious risk to the stability of the banking system. So a freeze in the government sector is a must and we do not have any alternatives left.

Debt restructuring and debt conversion

We have to leave our current strategy of trying to manage debt with short-term swap agreements. The more we wait, the more the pain we have to go through. Debt conversion is a strategy that can be explored. We can consider a few debts to equity swaps similar to what we did with the Hambantota Port on identified unproductive assets. Debt restructuring or reprofiling is another option, which, however, requires serious effort. It will be an extremely costly process, where we will have to work with foreign legal firms and our creditors. This will have both positive and negative consequences.

Unlocking our land supply

Land is one of the main factors of production. It is unimaginable that 80% of land is owned by the government and only 3% of the land have clear titles, as per a World Bank study. Without having land ownership for its people, there is no opportunity for capital flow that can expand the entire business ecosystem. The Government has to prioritise creating a digital land registry instead of other unproductive alternatives.

Above are just a few recommendations for a credible recovery plan, whether we go to the IMF or not. The real problem is not whether we are going to the IMF or not. It is looking at what reforms we have to make on our own and how we are going to make these changes, which are required to drive economic growth.

Prof. Hausmann said that the big bad wolf comes slowly and suddenly. I hope we move much faster and get the reforms done before “the big bad wolf that comes slowly and suddenly” comes for us.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.