Why is the Sri Lankan Rupee depreciating?

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on The Morning

Why has the Sri Lankan Rupee depreciated over the last few days? Many people want to know the reason. Many also want to predict where the exchange rate will stabilise.

In simple terms, the exchange rate is the price we pay in rupees to buy one US Dollar. It is similar to buying a cake of soap from a shop. If the price of soap increases, we say soap has become more expensive. Likewise, when the price of a US Dollar increases in rupee terms, we say the rupee has depreciated.

Like any other good, the price of the US Dollar is determined by demand and supply.

On the supply side, dollars come into the banking system through merchandise exports, service exports, tourism earnings, worker remittances, foreign direct investments, and other capital inflows.

The real trick is in understanding the demand side. Dollars are demanded for merchandise imports such as raw materials, fuel, vehicles, and medicine. Dollars are also needed for outbound tourism expenditure, foreign salaries, profit repatriation, and outward remittances. In addition to importers and individuals, the Central Bank too buys dollars from the market to build reserves.

So, when the demand for dollars exceeds the supply of dollars, the rupee depreciates. In other words, the price of the dollar goes up.

But there is one important point many people miss. Demand for dollars is created through rupees. If there is more rupee liquidity in the banking system, and if that liquidity is converted into credit, it can create more demand for imports and therefore more demand for dollars.

How USD demand is created: Story of excess credit

Everyone who goes to a bank to buy dollars either pays in cash or obtains a loan from the bank.

If banks lend from depositors’ money, it does not necessarily create excess demand. This is because someone has already saved money by reducing consumption. That saved money is then lent to someone else with interest. In that case, overall demand in the economy does not increase in the same way.

But the situation is different when the Central Bank buys dollars from the market to build reserves.

The Central Bank does not collect deposits from the public like a commercial bank. When the Central Bank buys dollars, it pays rupees into the banking system. In simple terms, it creates new rupees.

One may then ask: is it wrong for the Central Bank to buy dollars and build reserves? The simple answer is no. The Central Bank must build reserves, especially after a crisis. It has to buy dollars from the market to do so.

However, when the Central Bank buys dollars, new rupees enter the banking system. Over the last three years, the Central Bank has bought a cumulative $ 6,528 million from the market, injecting rupees into the banking system in the process.

Once this additional rupee liquidity is in the banking system, banks cannot earn much by simply keeping it idle. They have two options:

They can deposit the money back at the Central Bank and earn interest – This is linked to what we call the overnight policy rate. At present, if banks deposit excess money at the Central Bank, they earn about 7.25% interest.

They can lend this money to customers – These loans can take many forms: letters of credit for imports, credit cards, housing loans, overdraft facilities, business loans, and other forms of credit.

When banks extend loans using this additional rupee liquidity, credit in the economy expands. Part of this credit eventually moves into imports because people and businesses buy more goods, many of which are imported. This creates additional demand for dollars.

According to the Central Bank’s Annual Economic Review 2025, private credit expanded sharply. Credit growth increased from around 25%, and in value terms, credit expanded from about Rs. 790 billion in 2024 to about Rs. 2,000 billion in 2025. This means the economy created more demand for dollars through credit expansion.

When the economy is growing strongly, new rupee liquidity may not immediately create trouble because the new money is also used to produce and consume more goods and services. But when credit expands faster than dollar inflows, the economy becomes vulnerable. Usually, the pressure becomes visible after an internal or external shock.

In simple terms, while Sri Lanka had excess dollars in the market for some time, excess rupee liquidity and credit expansion continued to create demand for imports. That import demand eventually created pressure on the exchange rate.

Speculation effect

The second reason for the recent depreciation is speculation.

When the currency starts to depreciate, those who bring dollars into the market may hold back, expecting the rupee to depreciate further. Exporters, remitters, and others who have dollars may delay conversion.

At the same time, those who need dollars try to buy them as early as possible to avoid a further loss. Importers and businesses rush to cover their dollar needs.

As a result, demand increases while supply is delayed. This can push the exchange rate up quickly.

If this continues, informal markets can also get activated. When people feel they cannot access dollars easily through the formal banking system, or when they expect the rupee to depreciate further, they may start looking for dollars outside the formal market.

That creates another problem. The informal rate can move above the official rate, more dollar holders may delay bringing money into the formal system, and confidence in the exchange rate can weaken further.

Fuel price adjustments and vehicle import ban

Adjusting diesel prices to market prices is essential to contain dollar demand. Fuel is one of our largest import items. In March, fuel accounted for about 23% of our imports. Therefore, fuel prices have to reflect market costs.

If fuel prices are kept artificially low, consumption does not adjust. People continue to consume fuel as if global prices have not changed. But the country still has to find dollars to pay for those imports. That is how a fuel subsidy becomes an exchange rate problem.

There is another argument that vehicle imports should be banned again to save dollars. This sounds attractive, but it does not solve the real problem.

If vehicle imports are banned while excess rupee liquidity remains in the banking system, banks will lend that money to other sectors. Credit may then move into construction, electronics, consumer goods, or other import-heavy categories. So while vehicle imports come down on one side, imports in another category can increase.

Therefore, banning one import item does not necessarily reduce overall import demand. It only shifts demand from one category to another.

If the objective is to reduce overall import demand, the real tool is interest rates. When market interest rates increase, banks have a better incentive to deposit money at the Central Bank instead of lending aggressively to customers. Higher interest rates also discourage people and businesses from taking new loans. Consumption slows down, credit slows down, and import demand comes down.

Of course, this is not painless. When interest rates go up, the economy slows. Businesses face pressure. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) face a difficult time. Borrowers feel the pain.

But this is the difficult choice in economic management. Either we adjust early through prices and interest rates, or we are forced to adjust later through a currency crisis.

The real reasons for exchange rate depreciation are a mix of global shocks, credit expansion, and speculation. The tools available are also clear: fuel prices must be cost-reflective, and interest rates must be used when credit expansion creates pressure on the currency.

Both actions are politically unpopular. But if we fail to adjust to reality, the reality we will face later will be far more unpopular.

The dollar myth we keep getting wrong

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on The Morning

There is a persistent belief among Sri Lankans that because we import more than we export, we borrow dollars at high interest rates to bridge the gap. 

Many still assume that our external debt is simply the result of financing this trade deficit. The same fear resurfaces every time global oil prices rise. If fuel becomes expensive, people assume we must borrow more dollars to pay for imports. 

This is a compelling story. But it is largely wrong. Let’s take this myth apart step by step. 

It is true that Sri Lanka runs a deficit in merchandise trade. When we look at physical goods such as tea, apparel, rubber, coconut, and fuel, we import more than we export. In January for instance, the country exported goods worth $ 1,148 million and imported goods worth $ 1,803 million. That leaves a merchandise trade deficit of $ 654 million. 

But this is only one part of the picture. 

The flow of dollars into and out of a country is not limited to goods. There is also trade in services, including, but not limited to IT, logistics, insurance, and tourism. Even in a simple tea export, the value recorded at the port is only the ‘free on board’ price. Insurance and freight are counted separately as services. 

In January, Sri Lanka exported $ 734 million in services and imported $ 328 million, generating a surplus of $ 406 million in the services account. When you combine goods and services, the overall trade deficit shrinks significantly, to around $ 248 million. 

But the story does not end there. 

The current account also includes income flows. This is where remittances play a major role. In January this year, Sri Lanka received $ 740 million in inflows such as worker remittances, while outward payments including interest and other transfers amounted to $ 122 million. This leaves a net income surplus of $ 617 million. 

When you combine goods, services, and income, Sri Lanka actually recorded a current account surplus of about $ 369 million for the month.  

This is the critical point – the economy, in that month, generated more dollars than it spent. Therefore, the idea that we automatically borrow to bridge the import-export gap is misleading. 

Now consider a scenario where global fuel prices spike to around $ 120 per barrel due to the Middle Eastern tensions. Yes, the cost of fuel imports will rise. But that does not mean the country will automatically face a dollar shortage. 

Why? Because the economy adjusts. 

If more dollars are spent on fuel, there is less capacity to spend on other imports. Consumption shifts. If tourism declines, dollar earnings fall, but so do the associated dollar expenses. If remittances decline, household consumption reduces accordingly, lowering import demand. 

In short, both inflows and outflows adjust. The total volume of dollar transactions may shrink, and people will feel the pressure, but this does not automatically translate into a balance of payments crisis. 

Crises emerge not from price movements, but from policy failures. 

The real risk arises when domestic policy distorts this natural adjustment. When the Central Bank expands the money supply excessively – beyond what the economy can absorb – it artificially boosts demand. That demand spills into imports, increasing the need for dollars without a corresponding increase in inflows. 

This is why Central Bank independence matters. Its primary objective must be price stability. The moment it tries to chase short-term growth through money printing, the result is temporary expansion followed by currency pressure and instability. 

Similarly, fiscal discipline is critical. A large budget deficit injects excess liquidity into the economy, driving consumption and imports. Reduce the deficit, and the pressure on the external account eases naturally. The trade deficit is not an isolated problem. It is deeply linked to fiscal and monetary choices. 

This is also why price adjustments, including fuel pricing, are essential. Prices carry information. They signal scarcity. When prices are artificially suppressed, consumption does not adjust, and imbalances widen. Allowing prices to reflect global realities ensures that the economy self-corrects. 

The lesson is simple. 

Sri Lanka’s vulnerability does not come from importing more than it exports. It comes from how we manage our policies in response to that reality. External shocks such as oil price increases are inevitable. But whether they turn into crises depends entirely on our internal discipline. 

If we get the fundamentals right, the economy will adjust. If we don’t, even a small shock can push us back into instability. 

The real battle is not in global markets. It is at home, in our policy choices. 

Tourism, like cricket, needs better fundamentals

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on The Morning

Sri Lanka tourism is a lot like Sri Lanka cricket. For cricket, everyone has an opinion. Who should be captain, what the team should look like, what the game plan should be. Tourism is the same. Almost everyone has a different idea of how to ‘fix’ it.

And, like cricket, tourism is emotionally connected to the hearts and minds of people. That is why we get disappointed so easily after even a small setback, and why we bounce back so quickly too. The love for the game and the industry is real.

Tourist arrivals are now picking up and we are hitting record highs. But estimated earnings are declining. We need to remember that ‘earnings’ are an estimate. We calculate earnings by multiplying the number of arrivals by average length of stay, and then by average spending per night. The most sensitive part of that equation is average spending, which is based on surveys of tourists, on what they spend on categories such as accommodation, travel, shopping, and so on.

A few months ago, the Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (SLTDA) with Australia’s Market Development Facility (MDF) launched results of a survey with a sample of about 11,000 inbound travellers and 5,000 outbound travellers, covering about 50 countries.

According to those results, average spending per tourist is now $ 148, down from the earlier $ 171. That shift alone helps explain why earnings can fall even while arrivals rise. The same survey shows that about 18% of visitors are repeat visitors and 58% are women. Of total spending, 55% goes to accommodation. Interestingly, 46% of travellers booked through Online Travel Agents (OTAs) and 62% are non-package travellers.

In this context, another SLTDA study has made headlines: out of about $ 3 billion in earnings in 2024, around $ 900 million is said to have “leaked,” and the Government is now trying to prevent this leakage. According to the study, around $ 500 million is leaking through inbound travel operators and another $ 250 million through accommodation. Based on these findings, there is a renewed push for measures to minimise leakage.

The obsession with leakage

The intentions are good. But the problem is the way we are diagnosing the disease. In my view, there is a poor understanding of monetary economics behind this obsession with ‘leakage.’

Yes, OTAs charge commissions. Yes, some payments are settled overseas, so not every tourism dollar will enter Sri Lanka through our banking system. But the idea that regulating OTAs or tightening rules on parts of the tourism value chain will meaningfully ‘save’ dollars is not first principles thinking. Oversight matters. Compliance matters. But oversight is not a monetary strategy.

Here is why.

Leakage of dollars is largely a function of excess rupees in the system, not simply the behaviour of tourism stakeholders. When we create excess rupees, people will try to convert those rupees into dollars. The most common way this happens is through imports.

Let’s simplify it. When we buy a mobile phone, we are effectively buying dollars with rupees. We pay the shop in rupees. The shopkeeper goes to the bank, buys dollars using those rupees, and pays the overseas supplier. The transaction is initiated by rupees. If we have excess rupees the demand for USD is higher.

Now imagine we ban mobile phones, thinking those dollars will stay in the country. They will not. The bank will sell those dollars to someone else who wants to import something else, because banks are in the business of converting currencies, and because demand for dollars does not disappear simply because one item is restricted. If there is excess rupee liquidity, the dollars will find a way out through whatever channel is available.

The same logic applies to tourism. Even if you restrict OTAs or tighten certain import segments, there will be no ‘dollar saving’ if the rupee side remains loose. Any dollars entering the market will still leave as long as there is excess rupee liquidity chasing foreign exchange. Restrictions shift routes. They do not remove the pressure.

At the same time, we should be honest about why some businesses prefer to keep foreign currency outside Sri Lanka. It is not only about commissions or convenience. It is also about the difficulty of moving money across borders when regulations are heavy, approvals are unclear, and conversion rules are tight. If you are running a cross-border business, you will naturally park funds where transactions are smoother and risk is lower. That is exactly what is happening.

There is another reality we cannot ignore: there is a limit to how much import content we can cut in tourism without damaging the product.

A visitor expects a basic standard. Rooms need air-conditioning. Air-conditioners are imported. Tourism transport needs reliable vehicles and fuel. Vehicles and fuel are imported. There is a minimum quality bar in a competitive global market, and trying to cut our way below that bar will not save us; it will simply push tourists elsewhere.

Even in services, ‘local only’ is not always practical. World-class restaurants and wellness experiences often depend on specialised inputs and, sometimes, specialised talent. In some cases, salaries have to be paid in foreign currency.

You cannot run a top-tier Japanese restaurant or a great Thai experience with good intentions alone. We need talent from those countries to be located here for an authentic experience. If we attempt to ‘save dollars’ by lowering quality, we will end up losing the very customers who bring the dollars in the first place.

So what should we focus on?

Instead of hunting ‘leakage’ like it is the main villain, we should focus on value creation. If tourists see value, they spend more. Higher spend improves earnings, supports better jobs, and creates stronger businesses that can invest in quality.

The path to stronger tourism earnings is not to squeeze the system tighter; it is to make Sri Lanka a place where people are happy to spend, and businesses are confident to bring money in and reinvest.

And this is where monetary stability becomes central. If we stabilise the monetary system, avoid excess rupee creation, and reduce unnecessary friction in capital flows, tourism earnings will naturally improve. Yes, there will always be some money that is paid abroad, just as Sri Lankans will always spend money abroad too. That is normal in an open economy.

The solution is not to treat tourism stakeholders as the problem. The real fix is to get the monetary foundations right and make Sri Lanka easy to do business with. Otherwise, we will keep arguing about captains and game plans while losing the match in the middle overs.