Interest Rates

Patriotism isn’t protectionism

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

Ask any Sri Lankan what we should do to develop the country, and most will say we need to improve our exports. The same majority will also suggest that we must cut down imports to achieve this. While the need to grow exports is true, the belief that reducing imports is the way to do it is where things start to fall apart.

Many Sri Lankans even see boycotting imported goods and shifting to locally produced alternatives as an act of patriotism. The logic is simple: buying local helps local producers generate a surplus, which can then be reinvested to expand internationally. 

It is an emotional argument, but one that is deeply flawed when translated into policy. This sentiment often influences governments to raise import tariffs or impose outright bans on products that can be locally produced, believing that this will encourage domestic industry and, over time, boost exports.

But this approach misunderstands how exports work. Take the Donald Trump administration, for example. It also embraced this worldview, failing to recognise a basic economic truth: the ability to export doesn’t come from blocking imports, it comes from being competitive in price and quality. 

When we restrict better quality and lower-priced imports, we don’t support patriotism; we harm it. We shield local industries from global standards, stifle innovation, and force both consumers and other businesses to bear higher costs, weakening their global competitiveness in the process.

From an economic theory standpoint, protecting one sector of the economy often comes at the cost of others that are already competitive globally. 

Here is a simple example to illustrate this fact. Suppose Sri Lanka produces 100 coconuts a month. We consume 80 and have 20 left to export. But if we allow coconut substitutes or cheaper imported coconut oil for industrial use, we might reduce domestic consumption to 70, freeing up 30 coconuts for export. Better still, we could use imports for industrial purposes and reserve our highest-quality coconuts for premium export products like virgin or desiccated coconut.

All that we import is not final consumer goods. In fact, most of our imports are intermediary or investment goods. For instance, if the price of steel is high due to protectionist policies, it increases costs across all industries that rely on steel, from construction to manufacturing. The resulting job losses across those industries far outweigh the jobs ‘saved’ in the protected steel industry. 

In Sri Lanka’s case, nearly 80% of our imports are intermediary or investment goods. When we restrict these, it doesn’t help the economy – it hurts it. This is yet another reason why protectionism is not patriotism, but quite the opposite.

If we block these types of imports, domestic consumption remains high, and we are left with fewer coconuts – or fewer resources in general – to export or reinvest. This is the irony of protectionism; it reduces our export potential. 

We do a triple disservice: first, we make our exports uncompetitive, second, we increase the burden on local industries and consumers, and third, we create long-term dependency where protected industries lobby to maintain their privileges, making it politically costly to remove trade barriers even when they no longer make sense.

This is why governments find it so difficult to roll back import restrictions. Once protection is in place, it breeds cronyism. Protected industries band together, fund political campaigns, and perpetuate a cycle where economic power is concentrated in the hands of a few politically connected elites. In the name of ‘patriotism,’ we end up creating an unproductive, anti-competitive economy.

Another key misconception is the belief that a negative trade balance is caused by high imports. At face value, it seems logical since the trade balance is calculated as the difference between exports and imports. But in reality, imports and exports are not opposing forces; they are interconnected. Blocking imports hampers exports.

Let’s return to the example of coconuts. If we produce 100 coconuts, consume 80, and export 20, we might choose to invest 10 of those coconuts in planting new trees, increasing future production and export capacity. But we can only save and invest if we consume less. And we can only consume less if we have access to cheaper or more efficient alternatives, often through imports.

In economic theory, the trade balance is ultimately the difference between national savings and investment. Consumption is determined by the price of money – interest rates. This is why artificially lowering interest rates to stimulate growth can be disastrous. It increases consumption, and with it, imports, but without the productive capacity to match. 

When the situation inevitably unravels, we blame imports and turn to protectionist measures, instead of recognising that the true culprit is excessive consumption and insufficient savings.

The result? We reimpose import restrictions, raise tariffs, worsen the situation, and end up back at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout. Then we repeat the same cycle, creating a class of politically connected cronies who thrive not by being competitive but by being protected.

And again, we tell ourselves we need to boost exports by cutting imports. It’s a tragic loop, reinforcing the very problems we claim we want to solve.

This is why protectionism is not patriotic. In fact, it is the exact opposite.

Nearing debt negotiation deal amid economic uncertainty

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

Sri Lanka is hopeful that we can reach a debt negotiation before the first half of the year. Many are focused on the potential for reductions in principal and interest rates or extensions of debt maturities.

According to a recent update from the Ministry of Finance, we are yet to finalise a settlement with our bondholders, although we are close to an agreement. The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the Sri Lankan Government’s proposal is about 9.7%, while the bondholders’ proposal is 11.51%. The total cash outflow according to the bondholder proposal for 2024-2028 is approximately $ 16.6 billion, compared to $ 14.7 billion for the Government’s proposal. Ideally, we should reach a settlement close to the Government’s proposal if all goes well.

Both the initial and revised proposals indicate that bondholders are reluctant to reduce the interest accrued during the suspension of debt repayments. In both proposals, there have been no haircuts on $ 1,678 million of accumulated interest. Only a 4% interest rate has been proposed for 2024-2028.

Bondholders have suggested a 28% reduction on existing bonds, reducing the total bond value from $ 12,550 million to $ 9,036 million. Both parties appreciate the depth of the haircut, particularly with respect to economic growth. These adjustments depend heavily on adhering to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) baseline projections. If we fail to achieve the necessary growth rates, we will receive a deeper concession, and vice versa.

Achieving the best debt restructuring plan for Sri Lanka is crucial and our future hinges on economic growth. The debt level must be compared with the size and growth of the economy because only growth can ensure our ability to repay our debt. Our debt sustainability can only be secured through high growth rates, not solely through the debt relief offered by bondholders.

Economic and governance reforms are essential for growth. Notably, bondholders have proposed an innovative idea called Governance-Linked Bonds (GLB), where Sri Lanka would receive an additional benefit of 50 basis points on two selected bonds, each worth $ 800 million, if we implement two key governance reforms – one qualitative and one quantitative. The quantitative target is to reach a 14% tax-to-GDP ratio in 2026 and 14.1% in 2027.

A list of qualitative targets primarily focuses on publishing procurement contracts and tax exemptions, both of which are included in the IMF Staff-Level Agreement. However, the governance linked bonds, according to the proposal, would only apply to two bonds maturing in 2034 and 2035, each worth about $ 800 million.

While GLBs are an excellent idea, it is questionable whether the incentive is sufficient to encourage a strong governance programme. The savings from a 50 basis point cut in interest for $ 1,600 million would be about $ 80 million. Given that our accumulated interest is also about $ 1,600 million, there is a risk that governments could easily deviate.

Nevertheless, GLBs would send a strong signal to the market that the Sri Lankan administration is committed to governance reforms, which would enhance confidence in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka’s real challenge is avoiding a second debt restructuring. We can only achieve this by taking necessary steps and reforms to grow the economy, not solely relying on debt restructuring agreements.

Even if we secure a 30% haircut, our debt-to-GDP ratio in 2032 would still be approximately 95%. Over 50% of countries that have undergone a first debt restructuring have experienced a second. In Sri Lanka’s case, a second debt restructuring would be extremely painful for the population.

Moreover, our interest rates must remain high to meet the Government’s debt servicing requirements, attracting more funds. However, high interest rates discourage investment as people prefer to deposit their money in banks, leading to a low investment environment that could slow down growth. This slowdown would bring us back to the challenge of managing debt sustainability. This vicious cycle must be avoided.

Growth can only be achieved through improved productivity in a competitive environment, which arises when people are incentivised to perform. When the State dominates business and we try to manage everything independently, people do not become competitive.

Ultimately, growth is the only viable solution. Sadly, it is the only solution. Growth occurs when markets function effectively.