By Dhananath Fernando
Originally appeared on The Morning
There is a persistent belief among Sri Lankans that because we import more than we export, we borrow dollars at high interest rates to bridge the gap.
Many still assume that our external debt is simply the result of financing this trade deficit. The same fear resurfaces every time global oil prices rise. If fuel becomes expensive, people assume we must borrow more dollars to pay for imports.
This is a compelling story. But it is largely wrong. Let’s take this myth apart step by step.
It is true that Sri Lanka runs a deficit in merchandise trade. When we look at physical goods such as tea, apparel, rubber, coconut, and fuel, we import more than we export. In January for instance, the country exported goods worth $ 1,148 million and imported goods worth $ 1,803 million. That leaves a merchandise trade deficit of $ 654 million.
But this is only one part of the picture.
The flow of dollars into and out of a country is not limited to goods. There is also trade in services, including, but not limited to IT, logistics, insurance, and tourism. Even in a simple tea export, the value recorded at the port is only the ‘free on board’ price. Insurance and freight are counted separately as services.
In January, Sri Lanka exported $ 734 million in services and imported $ 328 million, generating a surplus of $ 406 million in the services account. When you combine goods and services, the overall trade deficit shrinks significantly, to around $ 248 million.
But the story does not end there.
The current account also includes income flows. This is where remittances play a major role. In January this year, Sri Lanka received $ 740 million in inflows such as worker remittances, while outward payments including interest and other transfers amounted to $ 122 million. This leaves a net income surplus of $ 617 million.
When you combine goods, services, and income, Sri Lanka actually recorded a current account surplus of about $ 369 million for the month.
This is the critical point – the economy, in that month, generated more dollars than it spent. Therefore, the idea that we automatically borrow to bridge the import-export gap is misleading.
Now consider a scenario where global fuel prices spike to around $ 120 per barrel due to the Middle Eastern tensions. Yes, the cost of fuel imports will rise. But that does not mean the country will automatically face a dollar shortage.
Why? Because the economy adjusts.
If more dollars are spent on fuel, there is less capacity to spend on other imports. Consumption shifts. If tourism declines, dollar earnings fall, but so do the associated dollar expenses. If remittances decline, household consumption reduces accordingly, lowering import demand.
In short, both inflows and outflows adjust. The total volume of dollar transactions may shrink, and people will feel the pressure, but this does not automatically translate into a balance of payments crisis.
Crises emerge not from price movements, but from policy failures.
The real risk arises when domestic policy distorts this natural adjustment. When the Central Bank expands the money supply excessively – beyond what the economy can absorb – it artificially boosts demand. That demand spills into imports, increasing the need for dollars without a corresponding increase in inflows.
This is why Central Bank independence matters. Its primary objective must be price stability. The moment it tries to chase short-term growth through money printing, the result is temporary expansion followed by currency pressure and instability.
Similarly, fiscal discipline is critical. A large budget deficit injects excess liquidity into the economy, driving consumption and imports. Reduce the deficit, and the pressure on the external account eases naturally. The trade deficit is not an isolated problem. It is deeply linked to fiscal and monetary choices.
This is also why price adjustments, including fuel pricing, are essential. Prices carry information. They signal scarcity. When prices are artificially suppressed, consumption does not adjust, and imbalances widen. Allowing prices to reflect global realities ensures that the economy self-corrects.
The lesson is simple.
Sri Lanka’s vulnerability does not come from importing more than it exports. It comes from how we manage our policies in response to that reality. External shocks such as oil price increases are inevitable. But whether they turn into crises depends entirely on our internal discipline.
If we get the fundamentals right, the economy will adjust. If we don’t, even a small shock can push us back into instability.
The real battle is not in global markets. It is at home, in our policy choices.