Electricity

Good intentions, bad economics

By Advocata Institute

Originally appeared on Daily FT

In the past weeks, newspaper headlines have brought to the forefront a growing narrative that banks are prospering while SMEs are struggling. This outcome has largely been attributed to banks overlooking the impact of external shocks on SMEs and to the current lending frameworks that govern credit markets. Such headlines call for independent statutory mechanisms to probe the fairness of cases leading to credit enforcement. Whilst such concerns are understandable on moral and ethical grounds, urging for artificial interventions in credit markets risks promoting policies that undermine the very mechanisms that enable growth, particularly at a time when economic recovery is urgently needed.

Credit is an avenue available for SMEs to fund their current economic activity based on expected future outcomes. It can be used for investment, as working capital, and to smooth out cash flow volatility. Increased access to credit plays a critical role in stimulating aggregate demand and supporting businesses, especially during periods of recovery.

Many of these sources argue that SMEs were viable before being subject to repeated external shocks in the Sri Lankan economy, such as the Easter Sunday attacks, shutdowns as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, the economic crisis, which led to the collapse of the currency, and extreme interest rate volatility, as well as repeated climate related disruptions (for instance Cyclone Ditwah). Thus, their inability to service loans has not been attributed to poor entrepreneurship but the repeated exposure to such events beyond their control. While this claim carries weight, calling for the intervention in market mechanisms that govern financial and credit markets could potentially have an effect of worsening the very problems such interventions aim to resolve.

This is because credit inherently involves an element of risk. Repayment is uncertain, and therefore default is always a possibility. Risk varies by borrower, sector, and timing. Credit exists precisely because uncertainty exists. As a result, lending decisions are based on expected cash flows, collateral, sector risk, and macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, exogenous shocks to the economy are systematically taken into consideration. Interest rates and parate execution laws, and asset recovery mechanisms exist to balance risk and return. The higher the risk, the higher the price of the loan. This is necessary because if loans fail, it is ultimately the depositors and by extension the financial system that is compromised. Painting banks as villainous actors can have the opposite of the intended effect. Laws are in place to regulate the conduct of financial institutions for the benefit of all.

Sri Lanka is currently emerging from one of its major economic crises, and therefore, in such a precarious environment, banks cannot simply ignore risk without threatening their own survival and, by extension, the stability of the nation’s financial system. As the Governor of the Central Bank, Dr Nandalal Weerasinghe stated, “The banking system is the custodian of this money. If something happens to the system, the savings of the entire country could be lost». He made these comments at a seminar held on 20 December at Kandy City Centre, which was aimed at educating the SMEs in the Central Province on the assistance available from state and private banks to rebuild businesses damaged by national disasters.

Financial Repression Theory, developed by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), argues that government intervention in financial markets hampers economic growth in developing countries. Government policies such as interest rate ceilings, interference with market pricing of risk and directed credit, distort credit allocation. In this instance, interventions that are supported by such newspaper narratives risk reducing the pool of loanable funds in the market, thus reducing the amount of credit that is available for productive investment. This could also expand the informal sector in a country’s economy and increase illegal lending practices. Other potential drawbacks include an increase in financial exclusion, resulting in credible borrowers and first-time borrowers being unable to secure loan approvals, thus reducing both the quantity and quality of investment, ultimately stifling economic growth.

As the fourth pillar in a democratic society, a country’s media should definitely hold institutions accountable for malpractice. However, it should be noted that credit markets do not function on morality alone and that they function based on economic incentives. Framing one side as a villain in one’s narrative maybe rhetorically effective but when interventions in capital markets are encouraged, this opens the door to further distortions and in the long run, it is often the most vulnerable who bears the costs of these changes. Moreover, banks and financial institutions that are absorbing the risks of such ventures should not be discouraged, especially in the current context of an economy such as Sri Lanka that urgently needs investment-led economic growth. Therefore, we must ensure that public discourse supports and not undermines the delicate balance that credit markets depend upon.

යහපත් අභිප්‍රායයන් හා අයහපත් ආර්ථිකය: කුඩා හා මාධ්‍ය පරිමාණ ව්‍යාපාරවලට ණය දීමේ තීරණවලට මැදිහත් වීමේ අවදානම්

ඇඩ්වොකාටා ආයතනය විසිනි

පහුගිය සති කිහිපය පුරාවටම පුවත්පත් සිරස්තලවල වැඩි අවධානයට ලක්ව තිබුණේ කුඩා හා මධ්‍ය පරිමාණ ව්‍යාපාර අසීරු තත්වයන්ට මුහුණ දෙන නමුත් බැංකු සමෘද්ධිමත් වන බවයි. මෙම ප්‍රතිඵලයට බොහෝ දුරට හේතු වී ඇත්තේ කුඩා හා මධ්‍ය පරිමාණ ව්‍යාපාර කෙරෙහි බාහිර කම්පනවල බලපෑම නොසලකා හැරීම සහ ණය වෙළෙඳපොළවල් පාලනය කරන වත්මන් ණය දීමේ රාමුය. එවැනි සිරස්තල ණය බලාත්මක කිරීමට තුඩු දෙන නඩුවල සාධාරණත්වය විමර්ශනය කිරීම සඳහා ස්වාධීන ව්‍යවස්ථාපිත යාන්ත්‍රණ ඉල්ලා සිටී. සදාචාරාත්මක හා ආචාරශීලිත්වය සම්බන්ධ අහේතු මත එවැනි අවස්ථා තේරුම් ගත හැකි වුවද, ණය වෙළෙඳපොළවල කෘත්‍රිම මැදිහත්වීම් සඳහා ඉල්ලා සිටීම, විශේෂයෙන් ආර්ථික ප්‍රකෘතියක් හදිසියේ අවශ්‍ය වන අවස්ථාවක, වර්ධනයට ඉඩ සලසන යාන්ත්‍රණවලටම හානි කරන ප්‍රතිපත්ති ප්‍රවර්ධනය කිරීමේ අවදානමක් ඇත.

ණය යනු අපේක්ෂිත අනාගත ප්‍රතිඵල මත පදනම්ව ඔවුන්ගේ වත්මන් ආර්ථික ක්‍රියාකාරකම් සඳහා අරමුදල් සැපයීම සඳහා කුඩා හා මධ්‍ය පරිමාණ ව්‍යවසායකයන්ට ඇති මාර්ගයකි. එය ආයෝජනය සඳහා, කාරක ප්‍රාග්ධනය ලෙස සහ මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ අස්ථාවරත්වය සුමට කිරීමට භාවිත කළ හැකිය. විශේෂයෙන්ම ආර්ථිකය යථා තත්වයට පත්වෙමින් ඇති කාලවලදී, සමස්ත ඉල්ලු‍ම උත්තේජනය කිරීම සහ ව්‍යාපාර සඳහා සහාය වීම යන කාරණයේදී ණය සඳහා වැඩි ප්‍රවේශයක් පැවතීම තීරණාත්මක කාර්යභාරයක් ඉටු කරයි.

මෙම මූලාශ්‍ර බොහොමයක් තර්ක කරන අන්දමට පාස්කු ඉරිදා ප්‍රහාර සහ කොවිඩ්-19 වසංගතයේ ප්‍රතිඵලයක් ලෙස පැනවූ සීමා කිරීම්, මුදල් අවප්‍රමාණය වීමට හේතු වූ ආර්ථික අර්බුදය සහ අධික පොලී අනුපාත අස්ථාවරත්වය මෙන්ම දේශගුණික විපර්යාස (උදාහරණයක් ලෙස දිට්වා සුළි කුණාටුව) ශ්‍රී ලංකා ආර්ථිකයේ නිසා ඇතිවූ නිරන්තර බාහිර කම්පනවලට ලක්වීමට පෙර කුඩා හා මධ්‍ය පරිමාණ ව්‍යාපාර ශක්‍යව පැවති බවයි. මේ අනුව ණය ලබාදීමට ඔවුන්ට ඇති නොහැකියාව දුර්වල ව්‍යවසායකත්වයට හේතු වී ඇති නමුත් ඔවුන්ගේ පාලනයෙන් ඔබ්බට එවැනි සිදුවීම්වලට නැවත නැවත නිරාවරණය වීම නිසා ඇතිවූවක් සේ සැලකේ. මෙම ප්‍රකාශයේ යම් ගැඹුරක් ඇති අතර, මූල්‍ය හා ණය වෙළෙඳපොළ පාලනය කරන වෙළෙඳපොළ යාන්ත්‍රණ සඳහා මැදිහත්වීම සඳහා වන ඉල්ලීම, එවැනි මැදිහත්වීම් විසඳීමට අරමුණු කරන ගැටලු‍ තවත් උග්‍ර කිරීමට හේතු විය හැකිය.

මෙයට හේතුව වන්නේ ස්වභාවයෙන්ම ණය තුළ අවදානමක් ගැබ්ව ඇති බැවිනි. ණය ආපසු ගෙවීම අවිනිශ්චිත වන අතරම ඒ නිසා සැමවිටම පාහේ ණය පැහැර හැරීමේ සම්භාවිතාවක් පවතී. ණය ගැනුම්කරු, අංශය සහ වේලාව අනුව මෙකී අවදානම වෙනස් වේ. ණයවල පැවැත්ම රඳා පවතින්නේ අවිනිශ්චිතතාව පවතින නිසාමය. එහි ප්‍රතිඵලයක් ලෙස, ණය තීරණ අපේක්ෂිත මුදල් ප්‍රවාහ, ඇපකර, ආංශික අවදානම සහ සාර්ව ආර්ථික තත්ව මත පදනම් වේ. එපමණක් නොව, ආර්ථිකයට බාහිර කම්පන ක්‍රමානුකූලව සැලකිල්ලට ගනු ලැබේ. අවදානම සහ ප්‍රතිලාභ සමතුලිත කිරීම සඳහා පොලී අනුපාත සහ පරාටේ නීතිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සහ වත්කම් අයකර ගැනීමේ යාන්ත්‍රණ පවතී. අවදානම වැඩිවන තරමට ණයෙහි මිල වැඩි වේ. මෙය අත්‍යවශ්‍ය වන්නේ ණය අසාර්ථක වූ විට, අවසානයේ අවදානමට ලක්වන්නේ තැන්පත්කරුවන් සහ ඔවුන්ගෙන් සමන්විත සමස්ත මූල්‍ය පද්ධතියම වන බැවිනි. බැංකු සතුරු ක්‍රියාකාරීන් ලෙස හුවා දැක්වීමෙන් අනපේක්ෂිත බලපෑම් ඇතිවිය හැකිය. එම නිසා නීති ක්‍රියාත්මක වන්නේ සැම දෙනාගේ ප්‍රයෝජනය සඳහා මූල්‍ය ආයතනවල හැසිරීම නියාමනය කිරීම උදෙසාය.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාව වර්තමානයේ එහි ප්‍රධාන ආර්ථික අර්බුදයකින් ගොඩ එමින් සිටින අතර එවැනි අස්ථිර පරිසරයක, බැංකුවලට තමන්ගේම පැවැත්මට සහ දීර්ඝ වශයෙන් ජාතියේ මූල්‍ය පද්ධතියේ ස්ථාවරත්වයට තර්ජනයක් නොවී අවදානම නොසලකා හැරිය නොහැක. මහ බැංකුවේ අධිපති ආචාර්ය නන්දලාල් වීරසිංහ ප්‍රකාශ කළ පරිදි, “බැංකු පද්ධතිය මෙම මුදලේ භාරකරු වේ. පද්ධතියට යමක් සිදුවුවහොත් මුළු රටේම ඉතිරිකිරීම් අහිමි විය හැකිය”. ජාතික ව්‍යසනවලින් හානි වූ ව්‍යාපාර නැවත ගොඩනැගීම සඳහා රාජ්‍ය හා පෞද්ගලික බැංකුවලින් ලබාගත හැකි සහාය පිළිබඳව දෙසැම්බර් 20 වැනි දින කැන්ඩි සිටි සෙන්ටර්හිදී පැවති මධ්‍යම පළාතේ කුඩා හා මධ්‍ය පරිමාණ ව්‍යවසායකයන් දැනුවත් කිරීම අරමුණු කරගත් සම්මන්ත්‍රණයකදී ඔහු මෙම අදහස් පළ කළේය.

මැකිනන් (1973) සහ ෂෝ (1973) විසින් සංවර්ධනය කරන ලද මූල්‍ය මර්දන න්‍යාය, මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳපොළවල රජයේ මැදිහත්වීම සංවර්ධනය වෙමින් පවතින රටවල ආර්ථික වර්ධනයට බාධා කරන බව තර්ක කරයි. පොලී අනුපාත සීමා, අවදානම් වෙළෙඳපොළ මිලකරණයට බාධා කිරීම සහ ඍජු ණය වැනි රජයේ ප්‍රතිපත්තිවලින් ණය වෙන් කිරීම විකෘති කරයි. මෙම අවස්ථාවේදී, එවැනි මාධ්‍ය ආඛ්‍යාන මගින් සහාය දක්වන මැදිහත්වීම් වෙළෙඳපොළේ ණයට ගත හැකි අරමුදල් සංචිතය අඩු කිරීමේ අවදානමක් ඇති කරයි. එමගින් ඵලදායී ආයෝජන සඳහා ලබාගත හැකි ණය ප්‍රමාණය අඩු කරයි. මෙය රටක ආර්ථිකයේ අවිධිමත් අංශය පුළුල් කිරීමට සහ නීති විරෝධී ණය දීමේ පිළිවෙත් වැඩි කිරීමටද හේතු විය හැක. අනෙකුත් විභව අවාසි අතරට මූල්‍ය බැහැර කිරීම් වැඩිවීම, එහි ප්‍රතිඵලයක් ලෙස විශ්වසනීය ණය ගැනුම්කරුවන්ට සහ පළමුවරට ණය ගන්නා අයට ණය අනුමත කිරීම් ලබා ගැනීමට නොහැකිවීම, එමගින් ආයෝජන ප්‍රමාණය සහ ගුණාත්මකභාවය යන දෙකම අඩු කිරීම, අවසානයේ ආර්ථික වර්ධනය අඩාල කිරීම ඇතුළත් වේ.

ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදී සමාජයක සිව්වැනි ස්ථම්භය ලෙස රටක මාධ්‍ය අනිවාර්යයෙන්ම ආයතන අක්‍රමිකතා සඳහා වගකිව යුතුය. කෙසේ වෙතත්, ණය වෙළෙඳපොළවල් සදාචාරය මත පමණක් ක්‍රියාත්මක නොවන බවත් ඒවා ආර්ථික දිරිගැන්වීම් මත පදනම්ව ක්‍රියාත්මක වන බවත් සැලකිල්ලට ගත යුතුය. කෙනකුගේ ආඛ්‍යානය තුළ එක් පැත්තක් දුෂ්ටයකු ලෙස හැඩගැස්වීම ඒත්තු ගැන්විය හැකි නමුත්, මූල්‍ය වෙළෙඳපොළට ඇඟිලි ගැසීම තවත් ගැටලු‍ ඇතිකළ හැකිය. අවසානයේ දී, සාමාන්‍යයෙන් දුක් විඳින්නේ වඩාත්ම අවදානමට ලක්විය හැකි අයයි. එපමණක් නොව, ආයෝජන ප්‍රමුඛ ආර්ථික වර්ධනයක් හදිසියේ අවශ්‍ය වන ශ්‍රී ලංකාව වැනි ආර්ථිකයක වත්මන් සන්දර්භය තුළ, එවැනි ව්‍යාපාරවල අවදානම් උකහා ගන්නා බැංකු සහ මූල්‍ය ආයතන අධෛර්යවත් නොකළ යුතුය. එබැවින්, මහජන කථිකාව ණය වෙළෙඳපොළවල් රඳා පවතින සියුම් සමතුලිතතාවට සහාය දෙන බවත් එය අඩපණ නොකරන බවත් අප සහතික කළ යුතුය.

සම්පූර්ණ වර්තාව මෙතනින්

විමර්ශන මූලාශ්‍ර

Shaw, E. S. (1973). Financial deepening in economic development. Oxford University Press.

McKinnon, R.I. (1973). Money and capital in economic development. The Brookings Institution.

Advocata Institute urges Govt. to uphold electricity sector reforms

Originally appeared in the Daily FT

The Advocata Institute yesterday called on the Government to reaffirm its commitment to the critical reforms initiated by the 2024 Electricity Act.

The think tank emphasised the necessity of legally separating the Ceylon Electricity Board’s (CEB) functions and fostering a competitive and transparent electricity industry.

“The 2024 Electricity Act was a landmark step towards a more efficient and accountable energy sector,” said Advocata Institute CEO Dhananath Fernando. “Sri Lanka cannot afford to fall back into a monopoly-driven model at a time when attracting private capital and enhancing efficiency are critical to economic recovery and energy security.”

In its newly released paper, “Powering Forward: Why Unbundling the CEB is Critical for Sri Lanka’s Energy Future,” Advocata warns that proposed amendments to the 2024 Electricity Act threaten to reverse decades of progress in the sector. The Institute states that such reversals could severely undermine Sri Lanka’s economic and fiscal stability.

The paper critiques some of the 2025 amendments to the Sri Lanka Electricity Act, which seek to reconsolidate the CEB by placing generation, transmission, and distribution under 100% State control. Advocata argues that this reversal would entrench inefficiencies, deter private investment, and further strain already constrained public finances.

The position paper outlines three key reasons for why Sri Lanka should reconsider reconsolidating generation, transmission, and distribution under 100% State control.

Bullets

  • Sri Lanka’s challenges demand private capital: Continued reliance on public financing to cover the CEB’s losses and infrastructure needs is fiscally unsustainable. Circular debt, State guarantees, and legacy liabilities already burden the Treasury, threatening Sri Lanka’s ability to maintain its primary surplus and meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) commitments. They also undermine the country’s creditworthiness, limiting access to capital markets and affordable borrowing. Unbundling the electricity sector can help address this by creating a range of investment opportunities, allowing private investors to engage in specific segments that align with their risk-return preferences.

  • Unbundling the electricity industry has economic merit: Drawing on some global examples, the paper demonstrates how unbundling has improved operational efficiency, transparency, and service delivery, particularly when supported by competitive tendering and strong regulatory oversight.

  • Strategic interests can be protected without full State ownership: Global and local experience show that strategic assets in generation, transmission, and distribution can be safeguarded through strong regulation, public-private partnerships, and majority State ownership, without full State monopolisation. The paper highlights the case of Lanka Electricity Company (LECO), a publicly owned but commercially governed distributor that has consistently delivered operational efficiency and innovation due to competitive pressures. Rather than dismantling LECO and absorbing it into a centralised, 100% State-owned entity (as proposed), the paper argues that this successful model should be replicated and scaled.

The full position paper is available for download at: https://shorturl.at/Bijus

(https://www.advocata.org/media-archives/2025/07/09powering-forward-why-unbundling-the-ceb-is-critical-for-sri-lankas-energy-future).

Powering Forward: Why Unbundling the CEB is Critical for Sri Lanka’s Energy Future

Sri Lanka’s electricity sector has long suffered from inefficiencies and financial losses due to the centralized, state-dominated structure of the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB). After several attempts to reform the sector over the years, the Sri Lanka Electricity Act, No. 36 of 2024 sought to address these inefficiencies by unbundling the CEB into 12 entities, opening more space for private investment and effective regulation.

To access the Powering Forward: Why Unbundling the CEB is Critical for Sri Lanka’s Energy Future Position Paper, click below

Powering Reform: Why Electricity Tariffs Must Be Rewired for Sri Lanka’s Future

Sri Lanka’s electricity tariffs have never made much economic sense. They’re full of distortions, cross-subsidies and based on outdated assumptions. This is why the Advocata Institute recently made a formal submission to the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL), proposing a complete overhaul of the way electricity is priced.

To access the Powering Reform: Why Electricity Tariffs Must Be Rewired for Sri Lanka’s Future Oped, click below

To access the Powering Reform: Why Electricity Tariffs Must Be Rewired for Sri Lanka’s Future Oped in Sinhala, click below

Reforming Sri Lanka’s Electricity Tariffs: Principles for a Sustainable Future

The proposed reforms present an opportunity to rationalise the tariff structure. Consumers using the same commodity under similar conditions should pay comparable rates, with only one justified differentiation: a lifeline tariff for low-income domestic users. This principle supports equity while ensuring cost recovery.

To access the Reforming Sri Lanka’s Electricity Tariffs document, click below

PUCSL Electricity Tariff Revision is Discriminatory

Originally appeared in the Daily FT

Electricity tariff design must meet two main objectives: firstly, raising the money needed to pay for the costs of provision, and secondly, sending the right economic signals to each customer to favour the optimal socio-economic use of electricity. 

To achieve the above objectives the principles that must be followed when designing tariffs are; 

  1. Economic sustainability or revenue sufficiency, 

  2. Equity or non-discrimination among users, 

  3. Economic efficiency in resource allocation, and

  4. Transparency, simplicity, and stability of the methodology.

A well-defined and appropriate tariff structure must balance the financial sustainability of the sector on the one hand and the well-being of various segments of society on the other. The CEB’s tariff revisions seem to be mainly focused on the aspect of revenue sufficiency, ignoring the other aspects.  As electricity is a commodity, there should be no difference in the prices charged to different users, except when reflecting any differences in the cost of providing services to different classes of users.

A differential tariff implies that some categories are subsidised leading to the question of who pays these subsidies. The current structure is such that households consuming an excess of 60 Kwh, and general purpose bulk supply users subsidise the industrial, hotel and charitable sectors.

Households that consume over 90 Kwh and general purpose bulk customers are charged a tariff that is double that of industries and hotels. With regards to hotels, in effect, domestic consumers subsidise foreign tourists. However, the differential tariff between general bulk supply and industrial/hotel users is meaningless. For example, a hall that hosts weddings and celebrations would be treated as a general bulk customer and be charged double the tariff that a hotel would be charged, even though both host similar events. A restaurant in a shopping mall would be charged as a general customer, but the same restaurant located within a hotel would enjoy a tariff half of that which a hotel incurs. While this differential existed under the previous tariff, it is made worse under the new structure; hotels faced a 10% increase in tariff while general users faced a 20% increase.

If the idea behind a lower tariff for hotels is to make the sector more competitive, then the solution is to address the causes of uncompetitiveness directly. One area is construction costs which raises the level of investment and the cost of maintenance.  Protectionism for the domestic construction materials industry raises the costs of steel bars and rods, sanitary ware, aluminium extrusions, granite, electrical fittings, and carpets resulting in high overall construction cost. The effective protection granted on these items can exceed 200%; the savings in finance cost from a lower capital outlay would probably exceed the savings from a lower electricity tariff.

Economic value creation can take place in many different ways in an economy and the service sector is no less important than other sectors. The cross subsidisation between customers violates the equity or non-discrimination principle of a good tariff and discourages use by the overcharged and promotes overconsumption by the subsidised. 

For example, the higher domestic tariff may serve as a disincentive for remote work. Remote or flexible work arrangements can reduce transport costs, congestion, energy use and for some, enable a better work/life balance. The government should be facilitating flexible work but the higher rates applicable to some domestic consumers may be a disincentive.

Economic activity is increasingly complex and a value chain can involve many different sectors. For example, the tea industry involves agriculture, processing in factories, transport, warehousing, blending, financing, marketing and exports. Moreover, products are now more knowledge intensive, so a greater part of the value addition arises in non-production-oriented components of the value chain. With differential tariffs, parts of the same value chain may pay different prices for use of the same commodity.

Further, a lower tariff to “industry” penalises new economy enterprises while promoting highly energy intensive users. This distorts resource allocation by encouraging excessive energy consumption, artificially promoting capital-intensive industries where the country may not have a clear comparative advantage. A subsidised tariff also blunts the incentive to economise.

The cost of supplying electricity fluctuates throughout the day, depending on the power generation mix, cost of fuels used, transmission costs and energy losses but as electricity storage is not economically viable, it has to be consumed whenever it is produced. Households with rooftop solar thus enjoy a subsidy. Domestic solar generation takes place in day time where the cost of generation is low but the import of electricity to the house takes place at night when the cost of generation is high. Offsetting units generated against units imported results in a subsidy because of the difference in costs between the two. Time of use metres should be mandated for all domestic users on net metering with the import/export being accounted for on the respective time of use tariff. Indeed all users who consume above 60 Kwh should move to the time of use tariff. 

Should the government decide to subsidise the capital or operating costs to serve certain customer classes, it should do so directly from the budget and while a lifeline tariff for the poor is justified the high domestic users pay a tariff 7.4x that of the lowest. Not all households are the same size and an extended family living in a single house may face a much higher tariff although their income level may not differ greatly from the average.

The PUCSL should review tariffs to prevent the distortions highlighted above. Instead of cross-subsidies, the regulator should be working to reduce overall cost of the provision of electricity through better procurement and greater efficiency. 

Treating all costs as a pass-through in computing the tariff is a mistake. The PUCSL needs to set efficiency targets in order to set fair and reasonable tariffs. The CEB should be incentivised to control its costs by specifying and enforcing performance requirements. Benchmarking CEB performance against regional and international peers to assess relative efficiency is necessary, as is consulting stakeholders on achievable efficiency targets.